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Non-government organisations (NGOs) are becoming more and more significant 
in India, due to the country’s overburdened state, poverty, democracy and plural 
society. The state cannot reach the poor, whilst the market with its profit motive does 
not have the incentive to empower them. Therefore, autonomous, civil society 
institutions like NGOs are seen as fostering people’s participation through a bottom-up 
approach. 
This makes the study of NGOs significant. The purpose here is to explore how 
NGOs in India decide to fulfil goals. For this, the study examines how external factors 
(influences of the state, donors and beneficiaries) and internal factors (NGOs’ 
leadership style, personnel, and organisational structure) influence their decisions. It 
also examines how NGOs pursue their objectives when faced with these influences. 
Government agencies, donors and beneficiaries can be hostile. In fact, the government 
exerts pressure through its acts and statutes. Donors also constrain by placing a 
premium on their monetary assistance to NGOs. They expect quick results and their aid 
structures are insensitive to beneficiaries’ socio-economic problems. Beneficiaries too 
constrain NGOs through hostility, and lack of motivation in project participation.  
Consequently while making decisions on rural development, NGOs have to adopt 
the best strategy to confront these pressures. Effective decisions are needed for these 
organisations to prove their worth as complements to the government or state, whilst 
maintaining accountability among stakeholders. Inability to do so would mean failure 
of rural development programmes and the country’s development as well. Hence, NGO 
decisions are crucial.  
viii 
The focus here is on decisions made by one rural development NGO in India, i.e. 
AWARE (Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment). it examines how 
AWARE, despite influences or constraints from various stakeholders tries to achieve 
objectives through its decision-making process. The study also considers the mode and 
criteria of decision-making within this NGO.  
Through this study, it has been observed that whenever stakeholders are involved 
in decisions, it provides NGOs with more feedback and more exposure to various 
opinions. However, the success of an NGO depends on how it is able to reconcile 
diverse opinions and preferences. Also favourable influence of internal and external 
factors is conducive, whilst their negative influence can constrain decisions and lead to 
compromise of goals. 
ix 
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CHAPTER ONE   
A Case Study from India 
INTRODUCTION 
The state is supposed to deliver welfare services to its citizens. However its top-
down, bureaucratic approach can leave a large stratum of the population unattended. 
The market with its profit motive, on the other hand, does not have the incentive to 
empower the poor. The process of market competition could undermine people’s voice 
and grievances of the poor. In such circumstances, initiative is left to the autonomous, 
civil society institutions like non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which foster 
people’s participation through a bottom-up approach.  
While it is imperative to strengthen people’s initiative to manage local resources, 
provide effective redistribution and make government services accessible, the state has 
increasingly become a regulatory institution. There are concepts like retreat of the state, 
greater economic liberalisation, globalisation, and structural adjustment, which 
demonstrate the market’s increasing role in a country’s development.1 Where the state 
and the market are considered unable to cater to society’s peripheral sections, NGOs 
provide a useful alternative with their spirit of democracy and bottom-up participation. 
                                                           
1Peter Evans, “Predatory development and other apparatuses: a comparative analysis of third world state,” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, 1989 
2 
Recently, this NGO option has received greater boost from liberal ideologies like the 
“Third Way”.2 
In India’s case, an overburdened state, poverty, democracy, and plural society 
make NGO intervention significant. As the state cannot reach the weaker sections of 
the population, NGO services become essential. Moreover, the country’s democratic 
tradition enables dialogue between the government and people through NGOs.3 
Another reason for the Indian State’s inability to address all needs is the existence of 
several economic, social, regional and religious communities in the society, each with 
their own needs.4 In this regard, NGOs are perceived as an alternative since their 
proximity to people, enables them to address these needs. 
There are other contributory factors to the rise of NGOs in India. One was the 
country’s economic situation - the 1991 external debt crisis and recommendations of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - which culminated in the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP). This was to reform India’s 
economy and open the market to foreign direct investment. It also institutionalised the 
state’s retreat and allowed private actors, including NGOs, to be involved in areas 
previously considered the state’s domain. Apart from such developments, India’s Five 
year Plans had already recognised NGOs’ potential in the social sector in the 1980s. 
                                                           
2Dahrendorf believes the Third Way involves changing of the democratic system and the welfare state by bringing 
the state, market and civil society closer. See Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Third Way and Liberty,” in Foreign Affairs, 
78, September/October 1999, p. 13.  
3Indologists like Frankel, Kohli, and Narasimhan consider organising the poor through NGOs as crucial for India, 
whose HDI ranking is 135 out of 174 countries with a third of its population below poverty line and two thirds 
lacking capability. See Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947 – 1977, the gradual revolution. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978; Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987; Shakuntala Narasimhan, Empowering Women: an alternative strategy from rural India. New 
Delhi: Sage, 1999.  
4Manoj Mohanty, et.al. (eds.), People’s Rights, Social Movements and The State In The Third World. New Delhi: 
Sage, 1998. p.63 
3 
In the first five-year plan (1951-1956), Rs. 40 million was earmarked for voluntary 
organisations. The government also admitted that it had not allocated enough for 
dealing with social problems. The 3rd plan (1961-1966) accepted the role of voluntary 
agencies as part of public co-operation. Grants and funds in the 5th plan (1974-1979) 
was set as high as Rs. 830 million (approximately US$18,104,458),5 while the 7th plan 
(1985-1990) earmarked nearly 1.5 billion rupees (approximately US$327,189,000) for 
voluntary organisations.6 The 7th plan focused on professionalising voluntary agencies 
so that they could meet the government’s requirements of accountability.  
At present, the country’s economic development is seen to be inextricably linked 
with human resource development. This is seen in the 8th and 9th plan documents, 
which take cognisance of ‘sustainable development’. In this effort, both government 
and non-government agencies have been identified as significant players.7 
Increasingly, NGOs are considered critical in developing India’s social sector due 
to the country’s political and economic trends. In attempting to fulfil this, NGOs are 
involved in delivery of social services, community empowerment, and rural 
development. The latter is important in an agrarian country, where 74.2% of the 
population is village-based. However, while implementing programmes, these NGOs 
face pressures from the government, donors, political parties, and even villagers.  
Consequently while making decisions on rural development; NGOs should adopt 
the best strategy to confront pressures from the government, donors, political parties 
and beneficiaries, apart from addressing beneficiaries and community development 
                                                           
5 Based on current conversion rates of Indian Rs.1 equal to US $ 0.0218126 
6 R. Sooryamoorthy and K.D. Gangrade, NGOs in India-A Cross-Sectional Study. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
2001. p. 33. 
7 Ninth Five Year Plan 1997 – 2002. New Delhi: Government of India: Planning Commission, 1997. 
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issues. Inability to address them would mean failure of rural development programmes 
and the country’s development as well. Hence, decisions within NGOs are crucial, 
because it impacts on NGOs, beneficiaries, rural development and the country’s 
development. The criticality of NGO decision-making for India’s rural development is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS  
 The previous section explained the importance of decisions made by rural NGOs. 
In this section, the significance of such decisions made by one rural development NGO 
in India, i.e. AWARE (Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment), is 
briefly examined. AWARE was formed in 1975, by Mr. P.K.S. Madhavan (also its 
Chairman) who was disappointed with the bureaucracy’s inefficiency and quit the 
Indian Administrative Services. This NGO seeks to provide an alternative to the 
government’s top-down approach, which does not cater to Andhra’s rural, tribal 
communities, who lack access to infrastructure and the capability to develop.  
    In fact, the tribals (Girijans) and depressed classes (Harijans) have been prime 
beneficiaries of AWARE’s human resource development efforts in health, education 
and poverty eradication. It is based in South India with outreach projects in the North. 
Its head office is in Hyderabad (capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh), but operates in 
other states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh.8 
                                                           
8 AWARE’s functions, objectives, structure, staffing and role are discussed at length in chapter 3. 
5 
AWARE is among several rural NGOs that attempt to supplement government 
services that are inaccessible to villagers.9 This inaccessibility is compounded by 
dissonance between people and local administration and the presence of red tape.  
 When faced by such constraints, NGOs like AWARE, try to involve people in 
development. AWARE addresses welfare, health, education, microfinance, vocational 
training, women and childcare and even political participation. Apart from AWARE, 
there are other popular rural NGOs like MYRADA, AKRSP, PRADAN and Tilonia (a 
rural support programme named after the village where it works). However most NGO 
activities are controversial, since they operate in areas considered state’s prerogatives. 
In fact, NGOs have to contend with interference from government agencies, 
donors and beneficiaries according to studies.
10
 These also claim that patron-client 
relations of powerful stakeholders (i.e. state and donors) with NGOs, result in similar 
relations between NGOs and beneficiaries.11 Rural development NGOs also face these 
influences. Despite diminishing state intervention, governmental preponderance 
continues. This is seen from Government of India’s (GoI) actions like the ‘Code of 
conduct’, blacklisting of certain NGOs by government sponsored autonomous rural 
development boards including Council for Advancement of People’s Action and Rural 
                                                           
9 H.Kaur. “Role of perspectives of NGOs in Development,” in Noorjahan Bava (ed.), Non-governmental 
organizations in development: theory and practice. New Delhi: Kanishka, 1997. pp.87. 
10Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Non-Governmental Organizations: Performance and Accountability Beyond 
The Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan and Save The Children, 1995. p. 240. See John Farrington et.al. (eds.), Non-
Governmental Organizations and The State In Asia. London: Routledge, 1993. p. 366. See also Julie Fisher, The 
Road from Rio. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993. p. 263. 
11Alan Fowler, Striking A Balance. London: Earthscan Publication, 1997. p. 263; Mark Robinson, Evaluating The 
Impact of NGOs In Rural Poverty Alleviation. London: Overseas Development Institute, Working paper, 1991; 
Roger C.Riddel and Mark Robinson, Non-Governmental Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1995. p.303. See also Paul Streeten, “Banker to the poor,” Finance and Development, Vol. 37, 
March 2000. 
6 
Technology (CAPART) and Central Social Welfare Board, and finally NGOs being 
denied foreign aid through the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act.12 
Like the state, donors also constrain NGOs by placing a premium on their 
monetary assistance to NGOs. They expect quick results and their aid structures are 
insensitive to beneficiaries’ socio-economic problems. Consequently, NGOs 
compromise by cursorily addressing people’s problems and focusing on short-term 
objectives. Beneficiaries too constrain NGOs through hostility, and lack of motivation 
in project participation. Finally, NGOs face leadership problems, lack of co-ordination 
among personnel, and concentration of authority. These can adversely affect project 
goals. In fact, studies of many rural projects in India posited NGOs’ failure to benefit 
the core poor.
13
 Also observed was a distinct lack of networking among NGOs and 
stakeholders, and a compromise in services to maintain cost efficacy. 
Certain rural NGOs like MYRADA, AWARE, AKRSP and PRADAN have been 
quite successful,14 despite these constraints. In fact, the state government, landed elite, 
donors, and beneficiaries constrained AWARE during project decisions. For example, 
in its campaign against bonded labour, AWARE encountered hostility from landed 
elite and local politicians. It therefore decided to employ session’s court lawyers to 
fight them. It also employed legal workers to educate villagers on legal rights, since 
many, who were freed from bondage were liable to face future harassment. 
                                                           
12Rasheeda Bhagat, “We have plenty of fly-by-night NGOs,” Business Line, Wednesday 29th October 1997.  
13Vanita Vishwanath, NGOs and Women’s Development in Rural South India. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 
1991. p.179. See also.Riddel and Robinson, Non-Governmental Organizations. p.303. See John Farrington, et.al 
(eds.), Non-Governmental Organizations. pp. 91. See also Griffith, “Project appraisals: the need for methodological 
guidelines” in Johan Pottier (ed.), Practising development: social science perspectives. New York: Routledge, 1993. 
p.138.  
14Edwards and Hulme, Non-Governmental. See also Farrington, et.al (eds.), Non-Governmental Organizations. pp. 
123 - 165: See also Narasimhan, Empowering. pp. 136. 
7 
During the same project, members of local political cadres infiltrated AWARE 
and created dissent. The management decided not to yield to pressure and exploited the 
sympathy generated for AWARE in the local media and by social activists. Through 
their help, it surmounted this constraint. Even the state government was non-co-
operative. This is true of AWARE’s boat hospital project, when the government 
refused a no-objection certificate and delayed central government’s grants. 
Consequently AWARE decided to raise money from beneficiaries.  
Donors also constrained AWARE. They were against its decision to introduce 
interest-free loans under the Chaitanya Nidhi (wealth of consciousness) microfinance 
scheme. Nevertheless AWARE introduced this scheme and approached other donors 
for finance. However in its latest micro credit programme, AWARE decided to charge 
interest after all. Yet donors have been thrifty with funds for latest projects like the 
deemed university, multi-speciality hospital and emergency trauma centre. 
Consequently AWARE has decided to raise a corpus of funds locally. 
Along with constraints from the government, donors and beneficiaries, AWARE 
faced lack of co-ordination and over-staffing, due to growth and proliferation of 
activities. Hence it decided to create sister organisations to monitor and consolidate 
earlier programmes in education, health and poverty eradication. This decision led to 
establishment of “Shantivanam” to monitor all health projects, Bliss Foundation to 
monitor education and training programmes; and AWARE India Foundation (AIF) to 
control all poverty eradication and social action programmes. 
Other rural development NGOs also make strategic decisions. For example, 
AKRSP decided to involve villagers through village institutions to overcome villagers’ 
8 
passivity and project failure. It made another strategic decision by partnering with 
PRADAN and meeting central government officials, because Gujarat government 
stymied its forest regeneration efforts. Subsequently the state government supported 
AKRSP. Similarly, PRADAN faced the state and the central government’s hostility. So 
it decided to make its operations transparent and networked with PRIs.  
The above discussion shows that development NGOs make significant decisions 
on dealing with the needs of the rural poor, local government’s demands and rural 
elite’s pressure.15 Their actions are generally guided by concerns like providing cost-
effective services, having greater accessibility, and satisfying donors, government, 
beneficiaries and internal organisational requirements.16 Effective strategies to fulfil 
these demands require effective decisions. Therefore, strategic decision-making is 
critical to NGOs, who have to serve as effective complements to the state, and 
maintain multiple accountability amongst stakeholders.17 
To understand how NGOs, despite influences from the government, donors, 
beneficiaries, and personnel within the organisation, can achieve their objectives, the 
study addresses the following question: How are NGOs able to achieve goals through 
decision-making, despite constraints? It was observed earlier that NGOs, through their 
decisions in projects, could make projects successful. Yet in all decisions, they are 
influenced by factors that contribute or constrain them in fulfilling their goals. Hence it 
is critical to learn what influences decision-makers face. It was also mentioned that 
                                                           
 
15Fowler, Striking. pp. 185; See also Paul Streeten, “Comments of a future development strategy: the importance of 
human development,” Finance and Development, Vol. 36, December 1999.  
16WW Powell and Elisabeth Clemens (eds.), Private Action and The Public Good. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1998. pp. 217. See also Edwards and Hulme. Non-Governmental Organizations. pp. 75. 
17Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (eds.), Non-Governmental Organisations and Governments: Stakeholders for 
Development. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation, 1993. p.363. 
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decisions are undertaken at the behest of the organisation’s leader, staff and sometimes 
beneficiaries. To understand how NGO decisions can fulfil their objectives, it is 
essential to examine who participate in decisions and what concerns guide them.  
From this brief discussion, it can be concluded that the basic questions, which this 
study answers, are not only ‘how NGO decisions help achieve their goals?’ But also 
‘what criteria do NGO decision-makers use in decision-making?’, ‘who participates in 
decision-making?’, and ‘what are the specific internal and external factors that 
influence NGOs in their decision-making?’ 
Decision-making is crucial to all organisations, including NGOs. The uncertainty 
in organisational life makes it imperative to make apposite decisions. It is critical for 
an NGO’s survival and success. Besides the course of organisational history can be 
changed through dynamic decisions. In fact, when NGOs react to constraints and make 
decisions, they create precedents for other NGOs to deal with similar constraints. The 
next section examines why study of NGOs’ decisions is significant.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
Many studies have evaluated NGO projects and critiqued their relations with 
stakeholders.18 Most of them have focused on different aspects of NGOs’ existence. 
However not many have focused on NGO decisions. Nor is there adequate research on 
how they make decisions under constraints from stakeholders. It is this gap in literature 
that the present study has attempted to fill. 
                                                           
18Fowler, Striking. p.298; Powell and Clemens, Private action. p.313; Julie Fisher, NGOs and the political 
development of the Third World. Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998. pp. 105; Farrington, et.al. (eds.), Non-
Governmental. pp. 123. 
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The study’s recommendations can be significant as well, given the proliferation of 
NGOs in India’s socio-economic sector. Most studies emphasise the lack of 
networking between NGOs, government, donors, and beneficiaries.
19
 They have also 
highlighted the shortcomings of improper networking, i.e. failed projects, dilution of 
NGO objectives, and lack of bottom-up participation. The present study goes beyond 
this to posit that stakeholders constrain and contribute to NGOs’ success in India. In 
fact, this study’s recommendations can guide NGOs and their stakeholders in 
networking. This is significant for India, which, despite its democracy, has not fostered 
harmonious relations between NGOs and the Government.  
Another contribution is the attempt to examine how NGOs draw lessons from 
earlier decisions. More specifically, this study on AWARE’s decision-making 
examines how organisational learning occurs in Indian NGOs. This is significant, 
because present studies on NGOs are limited with their focus on the northern NGOs 
and funders.20 Their western bias makes them unsuitable to the Asian context.21 Since 
few scholars have considered NGOs in developing countries like India, this study’s 
contribution is to increase the body of knowledge in this area. 
                                                           
19Joseph Grubbs, “Can agencies work together? Collaboration in public and non profit organizations,” Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 60, May/June, 2000; David Hulme and Michael Edwards (eds.), NGOs, states and 
donors: too close for comfort. New York: St Martin’s Press and Save the Children, 1997. p. 309; Thomas Princen 
and Mathias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking The Local and The Global. London: 
Routledge, 1994. pp.186; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and empirical studies of international 
institutions,” in Peter J.Katzenstein, et.al (eds.), Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999. pp.89; See also Andrew Natsios, “NGOs and the UN systems in complex 
humanitarian emergencies,” in Thomas G.Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, The UN and Global 
Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996. pp. 67. 
20Michael Edwards, “Organizational learning in non-governmental organizations: what have we learned?”, Public 
Administration and Development, Vol. 17, 1997; See also Powell and Clemens (eds.), Private action. p. 313. 
21Bava, Non-governmental. p.288; Narasimhan, Empowering. pp. 11; Prayag Mehta, A psychological strategy for 
alternative human development: Indian performance since independence. New Delhi: Sage, 1998. p. 256; 
Farrington, et.al. (eds.), Non-Governmental. pp.47. See also Riddel and Robinson, Non-Governmental. pp.138 
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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
This study’s purpose was to explore how most rural NGOs in India decide to fulfil 
goals. To this end, the study examines how external factors (influences of the state, 
donors and beneficiaries) and internal factors (leadership style, personnel, and 
organisational structure of an NGO) influence NGO decisions. It also examines how 
NGOs pursue their objectives when faced with these influences. 
     To address the above-mentioned purpose, this study explores decisions within 
AWARE through its landmark projects in health, education, women’s empowerment 
and poverty eradication from the year of AWARE’s conception (1970) to 2002. 
Decisions made within these projects are studied to posit how certain decisions were 
goal achieving, despite internal and external influences, while decisions for other 
projects remained unsuccessful. Such a study will help understand what causes India’s 
rural development NGOs to make decisions that can achieve objectives. 
Another objective of this study has been to reveal how rural NGOs learn from 
experience, i.e. how they repeat goal-fulfilling strategies from decisions of past 
projects. This is examined through a longitudinal study of decisions for all landmark 
projects undertaken by AWARE (in the domains mentioned above) from 1975 to 2002. 
It emphasises the constraining or contributory factors related to decisions for these 
projects; how such decisions were taken despite these factors; and who eventually 
made these project decisions. Since AWARE is broadly representative of other rural 
development NGOs, inference from this study can be conservatively extrapolated to 
other rural development NGOs in India.  
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HYPOTHESES OF STUDY 
Hypothesis 1: The first hypothesis is that greater involvement of NGO stakeholders in 
formulation and implementation of decisions, leads to decisions that are conducive to 
achievement of NGO goals.  
This implies that when an NGO makes decisions for its projects, it can fulfil goals 
only if most stakeholders participate in decision-making. Decisions should involve 
leader of the organisation, upper and middle level staff members and most importantly 
the beneficiaries. Ideally, government and donors should also participate in decisions, 
since organisations like NGOs are accountable to many stakeholders.  
This assumption is applicable to AWARE. In fact, it initially had a pyramidal 
structure, which made it difficult for villagers to access central office members, since 
they had to contact village association leaders and project coordinators. Therefore 
AWARE lost contact with beneficiaries, until beneficiaries initiated a cluster form of 
administration. Subsequently AWARE appointed cluster development officers (CDOs) 
to represent beneficiaries during project formulation.
22
 However lately AWARE has 
not networked with donors. It is said to have lost their trust, since it did not report its 
micro-credit earnings to donors. Nor did it involve donors when it introduced changes 
in its programme.23 
Hypothesis 2: The second hypothesis is that given the various internal and external 
influences on NGOs, only some factors exert positive influences, which are conducive 
                                                           
22Anubhav – Experiences in Community Health – AWARE. New Delhi: The Ford Foundation, 1988. pp. 25. 
23As Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) and Dr. Madduri (Professor at the Hyderabad Central University) 
explained.  
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to decision-making within NGOs. At the same time, negative influence from some other 
factors, constrain decision-making.24  
These organisations as examined above, are accountable to several external 
stakeholders, like government, donors, beneficiaries and partners, and internal 
stakeholders, like trustees and staff members. Consequently NGOs are sensitive to 
influences from all stakeholders. However, positive influences from only certain 
stakeholders are critical in enabling its decision-makers to make decisions that fulfil 
objectives. Negative influences from certain other stakeholders would engender 
compromises, because decisions would be made to appease them and deviate from the 
original objectives.  
For example, AWARE established “Shantivanam”, a multi-specialty hospital to 
assist rural and urban patients. However, it faced an external negative influence, i.e. 
lack of patronage from beneficiaries, i.e. urban patients. This caused a fall in clientele, 
which made Shantivanam unsuccessful. Consequently, its management decided to 
open an emergency clinic near Hyderabad to target urban patients. However this 
decision was contrary to the objective of catering only to rural inhabitants. Such 
actions have made critics complain that AWARE has compromised its original 
objectives.25 Still there have been some positive influences. For example, the support 
of beneficiaries has helped Chinnapuram Centre network with neighbouring villages.  
                                                           
24This is similar to the first hypothesis, which refers to participation of beneficiaries and lower staff, which can be 
viewed as external and internal factors. However there is a difference. The first hypothesis considers nature of 
decisions, whilst this hypothesis focuses on nature of influences.  
25Based on interviews with Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB), Dr. Madduri (Professor Hyderabad 
Central University), Dr. Suman Chandra (Centre for Social Research and Development). 
14 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Organisational decisions are dynamic. This is true of NGOs with multiple 
stakeholders, accountability and goals.
26
 AWARE is no exception to this. Therefore a 
single theoretical framework is inadequate to understand the complexity of decisions. 
Consequently, this study has avoided a single-theory approach.27 Theoretical models of 
Bounded Rationality, Garbage Can, and Incremental Programme are used. But before 
discussing their use here, it is necessary to examine the variables of this study. 
Research Components 
AWARE’s decisions in landmark projects of health, education, women’s 
emancipation and poverty eradication undertaken since the 1970s are considered. 
Decisions within each landmark project are studied for content, process, factors and 
outcome. So project decisions are examined at four levels. The first is decision content, 
i.e. decisions are described in terms of what the project entailed or what the objectives 
were. The second level of analysis is in terms of decision process. Decisions 
responsible for project formulation and implementation are examined. Also 
organisational members or stakeholders, who participated in decisions, are identified 
and their roles specified. This is to learn whether a decision was participatory or 
centralised and how decision-makers influenced project decisions.  
The third level of analysis is in terms of decision factors. Here the criteria of 
decisions are examined, i.e. concerns and preferences of decision-makers, for making 
                                                           
26Brian H.Smith, “Non-profit organisations in international development: agents of empowerment or preservers of 
stability?” in Powell and Clemens (eds.), Private Action. pp. 217.  
27 Ferejohn and Satz reject single theory studies, since a theory is stretched to explain a phenomenon beyond its 
jurisdiction. See John Ferejohn and Debra Satz, “Unification, universalism and rational choice theory,” Critical 
Review, Vol. 9, 1995. 
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decisions in a project are considered. It helps to determine constraints and contributing 
factors that influenced project decisions. Apart from this project outcomes have been 
studied too. This is to learn whether or not decisions helped projects achieve their 
objectives in the presence of various internal and external influences. Also examined 
is, whether AWARE’s experience in decisions improved its subsequent decisions in a 
domain. This is to learn whether there has been any change in project participation, and 
project objectives, over the years within every domain.  
Having discussed what will be studied in AWARE’s decision-making, it is 
essential to learn how the three theories (mentioned earlier) have been applied. It can 
be argued that using more than one theoretical model can lead to varied prediction of 
strategic outcomes. However in this study these theories are assumed to act in 
consonance to explain decision-making. In fact, many social scientists favour multiple, 
albeit relevant, theoretical models to examine phenomena.28 Besides, a single-theory 
approach could neglect significant details and draw flawed inferences.   
Decision Models 
One of the theories considered in this study was Simon’s Bounded Rationality. 
Simon’s model was a reaction to the classical economists’ Instrumental Rationality, 
where decision-makers were shown as optimising agents.29 They were aware of each 
alternative while making decisions and also of every possible consequence from each 
alternative. Through a process of elimination, decision-makers would choose the best 
possible course of action with maximum positive benefits for them. Hence, classical 
                                                           
28Ferejohn and Satz, Op. Cit; see also Robert K Yin, Applications of Case Study Research. New Delhi; London: 
Sage, 1993. p.131. 
29Herbert Simon, Administrative behaviour: a study of decision-making processes in organizations. New York: Free 
Press, 1976. p.364. 
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theorists forced a utopian concept of perfect knowledge and rationality on individual 
decision-makers. 
As opposed to this, Simon posited that decision-makers are influenced by their 
inherent limits and those imposed by the external environment, which leaves them 
unable to optimise. There are limits of information search, computational limits to 
process enormous information, lack of knowledge on all alternative decisions that 
could be taken, and ignorance about various consequences of each alternative. Due to 
these constraints, decision-makers ‘satisfice’ or compromise within the bounds of 
constraints.  
In this model, decision-makers were posited as making choices, through a 
repertoire of ‘programmed’ or learned responses.
30
 For this, they use certain guiding 
principles or ‘heuristics’ to identify problems and issues. Over a period of time, 
decision-makers identify the most suitable course of action when faced with similar 
situations. They are risk-averse, given their inherent and environmental constraints. 
However, successful outcomes could make decision-makers risk seeking, since their 
‘aspiration levels’ would rise.31  
Simon’s definition of constraints related to individual decision-makers was 
expanded to accommodate group-based decisions pursued by organisations like NGOs. 
His model was applied in this study to posit how internal and external influences affect 
project decisions in each domain32. It was used to posit how conducive influences from 
                                                           
 
30 Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality - Volume 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason. Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1997. p. 172. 
31 Simon, like Lindblom attributed risk-aversion to decision-makers, but he also built upon Lindblom’s approach by 
ascribing risk seeking to individuals in certain situations. 
32These influences are constraints.  
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stakeholders help AWARE reach its objectives, while their constraining influences 
make this NGO compromise on its goals. Bounded Rationality was used to analyse 
how AWARE’s criteria in making decisions are determined by internal and external 
influences and how they affected project decisions across domains.  
Simon’s model was used to also show how AWARE’s decisions were risk-averse, 
due to the bounds of its accountability towards stakeholders. Yet, successful project 
outcomes would cause this NGO’s aspiration levels to rise and it would become more 
risk seeking.      
 Apart from bounded rationality, the Incremental Model has been used. This was 
originally developed by Lindblom.33 He suggested that decisions are an ongoing 
process, weaved together by a series of small decisions. Decision-makers, when faced 
with solving complex problems tend to be risk averse. Consequently, they make 
decisions that alter status quo in small ways. Although this may not be an optimal 
method, Lindblom feels it is most effective.34 His model allows flexibility and the 
expression of divergent views. In such a model, objectives are always lucid and there 
are no disputes over what exactly has to be achieved. However, there is always the 
danger of the more powerful decision-makers gaining precedence, as Etzioni argued.35 
The study accepts Lindblom’s model only in terms of decisions being an ongoing, 
step-by-step process. It does not wholly draw from the model, because objectives 
during decision-making change and are not fixed (as Lindblom suggests) in a dynamic 
                                                           
33 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review, 1959. 
34 In this regard, Lindblom was influenced by Simon’s concept of ‘satisficing’ and settling for less than an optimal 
outcome. 
35 Etzioni transposed Lindblom’s model to a plural society, which has several divergent groups. He felt that it could 
breed a new system of domination by the majority over minority groups. See Amitai Etzioni,  The Active Society: A 
Theory of Societal and Political Processes. New York: The Free Press, 1968. p. 160. 
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and unstable organisational environment. Besides, decision-makers are not always 
guided by the need to avoid risk. Therefore, this study has adopted Mintzberg’s 
modified version of the Incremental Model.36 His model is more relevant for 
understanding the processes involved in AWARE’s decisions within an individual 
project.  
According to his model, decision-makers select a course of action by bargaining 
among themselves and their stakeholders. Sometimes a deadlock caused by conflict in 
interests of decision-makers, halts decisions. This causes decision-makers to return to 
earlier stages of decisions. Mintzberg calls them decision interrupts. Interrupts also 
occur when decision-makers realise the unsuitability of an action and return to earlier 
stages of decisions for alternatives, wherein they are guided by their preferences.  
This model was used to analyse the role of decision-makers within AWARE in 
individual project decisions and also how they resolved decision-interrupts. These 
interrupts were identified as pressure from various stakeholders, including AWARE 
members themselves. Each time such an interrupt was encountered, AWARE’s 
decision-makers reconsidered their decisions, by re-examining issues in that particular 
project.  
The third model used was the Garbage Can model developed by Cohen, March 
and Olson.37 In this model, decision-makers operate in a collective, organisational set 
up. With so many people getting together, there are abundant parallel processes, or 
problem solving. There is also negotiation and networking among various decision-
                                                           
36Henry Mintzberg, et. al, “The structure of unstructured decision processes,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 21, 1976.  
37M.D.Cohen, J.G.March and J.P.Olson, “A garbage can model of organizational choice,” in David J.Hickson (ed.), 
Managerial decision making. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995. p. 117.  
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makers. This makes decision processes appear complex, because multiple concerns, 
preferences, values and issues are brought to decision-makers’ attention. Actions and 
preferences of every decision-maker affect others and also influence further decisions. 
Apart from influence on subsequent decisions, even unresolved issues from one 
decision are carried over to the next. Nevertheless, decision-makers improve decisions 
through a process of organisational learning.38 
This model was used to understand the process of AWARE’s project decisions 
and goal achievement in a domain over a period of time. It helped in explaining how 
organisational decisions were made through varying influences of several decision-
makers in the NGO. Each decision-maker had different criteria for choosing an 
action.39 Through cycles of negotiations and compromises between them, a decision 
was finally reached. Yet, there were unresolved issues from project outcomes that crept 
into decisions of subsequent projects. But with experience from previous projects, 
AWARE’s planners learnt to improve outcomes of future projects.  
The discussion so far has been on what aspects of AWARE’s decision-making 
within projects have been examined and how they will be theoretically analysed. From 
this it is clear that AWARE’s decisions on landmark projects in each domain and their 
outcomes are dependent variables. The internal and external factors that affect 
decisions constitute the independent variable. Both the dependent and independent 
variables share a reciprocal relationship in this study. 
                                                           
38 Massimo Warglien, “Learning in a garbage can situation: a network model,” in Massimo Warglien and Michael 
Masuch (eds.), The Logic of Organisational Disorder. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996. p. 63. 
39 These criteria are either accountability towards AWARE itself, or towards stakeholders like the state, donors and 
beneficiaries. In other words, these are also internal and external influences on AWARE’s decisions. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This is a single-case study of one rural development NGO in India, called 
AWARE. A single-case study was preferred for intensive examination of a 
phenomenon that has been overly generalised in current literature.  
A longitudinal design has been followed for AWARE’s analysis, since it is 
appropriate for studying AWARE’s ongoing decision processes. Moreover the 
influence of internal and external factors cannot be captured in a limited time frame 
with few observations. Hence, a longitudinal design was chosen, because it could 
accommodate numerous decisions on projects made by AWARE since its inception. 
Such a design lends credence to theorists, who prefer examination of decisions through 
multiple observations rather than as close-ended, one-time events.40 
     AWARE’s decisions have been examined under the following domains – 
Health, Education, Women’s empowerment and Poverty Eradication. Landmark 
decisions, i.e. decisions that were undertaken in major projects under each of these 
domains from 1975 to nearly 2002, have been identified and examined. In this regard, 
the study has examined content of the project (what each project in a domain is about); 
how it was made; who participated in it; why the decision was made; what the outcome 
of a project was (whether or not it fulfilled goals); and finally what influenced the 
                                                           
 
 
40These scholars perceive decisions as an ongoing process. See J.G.March, “Understanding how decisions happen 
in organisations”, in Zur Shapira (ed.), Organizational decision making. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. pp. 89. See also Clem Tisdell, Bounded rationality and economic evolution: a contribution to decision 
making, economics and management. Cheltenham; Edwards Elgar, 1996. p. 336; David Martimort, “The life cycle 
of regulatory agencies: dynamic capture and transaction costs,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, October 
1999; Piet Verschuran and Laszlo Zsolnai, “Norms, goals and stakeholders in programme evaluation,” Human 
Systems Management, Vol. 17, 1998.  
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project’s performance. Having discussed how decisions are examined, it is important to 
operationalise these variables.  
Operationalisation of Variables 
Here the study’s independent and dependent variables are identified and defined. 
These variables are decisions on landmark projects, functional domains, process or 
stages of decision-making, components of project decisions, criteria of decision-
making, performance of projects and finally the internal and external factors that 
influence projects’ decisions.  
1. Decisions for Landmark Projects were identified in this study as decisions made 
for projects that affected a majority of AWARE’s beneficiaries, or faced 
tremendous pressure from stakeholders, or had objectives that were unique and 
different from other projects.
41
 Landmark projects were identified through 
interviews of AWARE’s members and academics, who researched on AWARE. 
Those projects, which most respondents called significant, were considered 
landmark projects. Other projects that were not considered significant by most 
respondents were not examined. 
2. Functional domains are the four functions that AWARE performs in Health, 
Education, Women’s Empowerment and Poverty Eradication. These are distinct 
from AWARE’s formal departments, which undertake budgeting and 
implementation of AWARE’s programmes. The functional domains have been 
identified according to published reports, articles and books on AWARE.  
                                                           
41Stakeholders include AWARE’s members, donors, beneficiaries Andhra Pradesh and central government. 
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3. Decision processes in a project include (a) role and influence of decision-makers 
upon a decision,42 (b) information gathering by decision-makers, (c) formulation of 
action plans to implement decisions, and (d) implementation of plans in projects. 
Hence there is a detailed examination of ‘how’ AWARE makes project decisions. 
In this regard, information has been obtained through interviews of AWARE’s 
personnel, founder, department heads, and non-AWARE members. 
4. Decision factors are the rationale that led AWARE to decide on a particular action. 
They are the reasons for a project’s decision to be made and include preference for 
cost efficacy; intention of AWARE to improve relations with stakeholders and 
external and internal influences. Data for this was obtained through interviewing 
AWARE respondents and consultants.  
5. Internal and external influences are important in decisions. Internal factors include 
nature of leadership, communication between organisational members, staff’s 
expertise, financial resources and organisational mission or principles. External 
factors include approach followed by the Andhra Pradesh government and the 
Central government, donors, and beneficiaries. These factors are significant in 
determining the reason for decisions, and also the goal fulfilling ability of projects.  
6. Project outcomes were evaluated primarily in terms of fulfilment of objectives 
within projects. For this, information was obtained through interview of 
beneficiaries, AWARE and non-AWARE members. Response from beneficiaries 
was to determine whether a project improved living standards; employment; 
                                                           
42Includes the founding leader, project managers and beneficiaries. Decision-makers’ role in project were examined 
to learn whether decisions were centralised or participatory 
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women’s rights; engendered beneficiaries’ social or economic emancipation; 
encouraged frequent feedback from beneficiaries; or other means pointed out by 
beneficiaries themselves. 
Techniques of Data Collection 
The primary method for collecting data was interview. Interviews enabled direct 
interaction with AWARE members, beneficiaries and academics/ consultants. It also 
allowed supplementary questions and overcame ambiguous responses. A structured 
and open-ended interview schedule was used to gather response from beneficiaries. 
This enabled noting of additional inputs from them on project performance. For 
AWARE members and non-AWARE academics / consultants, semi-structured and 
open-ended questions were used. Depending on their response, supplementary 
questions were asked to gather more information on the mode and processes of 
decision-making within projects.  
     During interviews, questions were asked about landmark projects mentioned in 
reports, e.g. AWARE’s leprosy campaign, education on legal and social rights, 
women's micro-credit called chaitanya nidhi (wealth of consciousness), women’s 
brigade called chaitanya shakti (power of consciousness) and other campaigns. This 
enabled respondents to discuss other landmark projects undertaken over the years. It 
also allowed an insight on decisions of AWARE’s major projects in health, education, 
poverty eradication and women’s empowerment.  
24 
     Apart from interviews, primary sources i.e. published documents of AWARE, 
recently published reports and papers on AWARE were consulted.43 Secondary 
published sources were also examined. These included books, reports, journals and 
newspaper articles that examined NGOs, organisational decision-making, NGO 
decision-making, Indian NGOs and other related issues.  
Categories of respondents 
Respondents, who were interviewed with an interview schedule, included 
AWARE members, beneficiaries and academics who researched on AWARE and other 
NGOs. From among AWARE members the Chairman, head of administration, 
treasurer, head of health services, head of education programmes, head of social action 
or poverty eradication programmes, and head of micro credit and loans programmes 
were interviewed. So seven AWARE respondents were interviewed. However, for each 
project in health, education, women’s empowerment and poverty eradication, six 
respondents were interviewed, because certain members were not with AWARE during 
the early projects.  
Interview of seven AWARE members from the top and middle level is justifiable, 
since the head of administration, head of health services and the treasurer are also 
active board members. Interview of the heads of AWARE’s social action programme, 
education and microfinance is worthwhile, since they have been associated with 
AWARE since its inception. However, heads of various departments have also been 
                                                           
43Anubhav. p.36; Fitzgerald Wils, et.al, AWARE and Its Work with Tribals and Harijans in Andhra Pradesh: An 
Impact Study- 1993. The Hague, Netherlands: Institute of Social Studies Advisory Service, 1993. p.253; Madduri 
V.B.N.S.  et.al, Smile That Must Continue: A Study of Dandakaranya Tribal Region. Hyderabad: Development 
Research Advisory Group; Hyderabad Central University, 1996. p.106. 
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associated with projects of other departments.44 Consequently, heads of various 
departments were interviewed for projects in departments other than their own, e.g. the 
head of social action programmes was interviewed for health and education projects.  
The academics and consultants, who were interviewed included professors from 
universities in Hyderabad; a former consultant to a funding organisation; a journalist 
who had researched on AWARE’s projects, and a former consultant to a research 
organisation.45 For each project at least four academics were interviewed.  
Finally, forty beneficiaries including twenty-two women and eighteen men were 
interviewed according to the following criteria. The first was accessibility and 
connectivity of rural centres (where most beneficiaries were located) from AWARE’s 
main office. Secondly, mostly beneficiaries who availed of services in more than one 
domain were interviewed.46 In doing so, both time and resources were conserved. A 
final criterion in selecting beneficiaries was their ability to interact freely with the 
researcher. Based on this, forty beneficiaries were interviewed in each domain. Out of 
these, the researcher interviewed twenty beneficiaries, while hired undergraduates from 
Andhra Pradesh interviewed the rest. 
                                                           
44This is because projects in each domain overlap with issues of other domains 
45These were Prof. R.R. Prasad and Dr. Suman Chandra from the National Institute of Rural Development (NIRD); 
Prof. Madduri from Hyderabad Central University; Dr. Narasimhan a researcher and journalist; Prof. K.C. 
Alexander from Osmania University; Dr. F. Wils from the University at Hague; Ms. Sameeksha Thakur a research 
assistant for FORD; and Mr. M.K. Bhat, former consultant to NOVIB.  
46 Consequently, among the beneficiaries, who were interviewed for projects in the three domains, most respondents 
were common. Among all domains, ten respondents were common. Twenty-one were common exclusively to health 
and education, while nine were common only to education and poverty eradication. Even between health and 
poverty eradication, nine respondents were common. Thus, twelve respondents in the poverty eradication domain 
were not common to either health or education. Yet, they were included in the sample to preserve numerical 
uniformity. Moreover the respondents, who were interviewed for projects in poverty eradication, were all women. 
This is because the domain primarily focused on women’s empowerment.  
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STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Besides this introductory chapter, this thesis has seven chapters.  
Chapter 2, entitled ‘Literature review’, examines gaps in literature on decision-
making and how this study fills it. This is a critique of NGOs in general and of Indian 
NGOs. It discusses current NGO activities in India and influences from the central 
government, donors and beneficiaries. The focus is on India’s rural development 
NGOs and the specific factors influencing them.  
Chapter 3, entitled ‘A Case from India – AWARE’, begins with the rationale for 
studying AWARE. Thereafter, it discusses AWARE’s organisational aspects, i.e. 
origin, mission or ideology, activities and achievements. Following this, AWARE’s 
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general functions and organisational goals are examined. Subsequently AWARE’s 
structure, departments, and staffing are analysed. Finally, the chapter briefly describes 
AWARE’s progress and challenges faced by it.  
Chapter 4, entitled ‘Health Programmes – AWARE’s experience’, examines decisions 
in AWARE’s landmark projects in health. Projects in each domain are traced from 
1975 to 2002. The chapter discusses how these projects were decided; who participated 
in them; and why decisions were made in terms of various constraining and conducive 
influences. Decision outcomes are also considered, i.e. whether projects achieved their 
goals under the influence of various internal and external factors.  
Chapter 5, entitled ‘Education Programmes – AWARE’s experience’, examines 
decisions in landmark education projects in a manner similar to health projects in 
Chapter 4. The method of examination and structure of discussion are also similar to 
the previous chapter.  
Chapter 6, entitled ‘Poverty Eradication and Women’s Empowerment programmes – 
AWARE’s experience’, examines decisions in landmark projects in poverty eradication 
and women’s empowerment. Once again, the structure of discussion is similar to 
chapters 4 and 5.  
Chapter 7 entitled ‘Decision-making – How Effective Has it Been?’ analyses decisions 
for each landmark project in terms of the reasons for performance of projects in various 
domains. This was done by considering the various influencing factors.  
Chapter 8 entitled ‘Recommendations and Conclusions’, provides recommendations 
for India’s rural development NGOs’. These recommendations are on how present 
shortcomings in NGO decisions can be surmounted. It also shows how gaps in this 
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study can engender further research. The chapter ends by showing that the thesis has 
been an ongoing study in search of a possible answer. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The most significant limitations were time limit and the need to keep data 
manageable. Consequently, longitudinal studies of many rural development NGOs was 
not viable. But a focus on one organisation can make it difficult to establish external 
validity. To surmount this, the study undertook numerous observations through a 
longitudinal design, since AWARE is broadly representative of other rural Indian 
NGOs. 
Another shortcoming is inaccurate response from beneficiaries. This is because 
they were asked to provide information about projects that were undertaken two 
decades ago. There might have been factual distortion from improper memory recall. 
Hence projects have also been examined through other sources, i.e. published records 
and interviews with AWARE and non-AWARE respondents. 
The above-mentioned limitation is understandable if the study’s intent is 
considered. It is not to examine maintenance of downward accountability alone. 
Rather, it is to learn how AWARE incorporated experiences from past projects to 
present ones; how internal and external factors influenced its decision-making; and 
how far AWARE learnt to fulfil its objectives.  
Apart from these limitations, it is possible to have obtained biased feedback from 
AWARE members. This was rectified by interviewing non-AWARE individuals, who 
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have specialised in the study of NGOs. Moreover published documents, reports and 
books on AWARE were also consulted study.  
There are numerous studies on performance of NGOs, NGO-stakeholder relations 
and significance of NGOs in the civil society. However not much has been done on 
decision-making within NGOs, which is this study’s aim. Consequently this study is an 
endeavour in an area that has not been exhaustively studied. Also these limitations 
should be viewed sympathetically in an exploratory study such as this. 
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CHAPTER TWO   
Literature Review 
The chapter defines NGOs and examines the causes of NGOs’ advent, especially 
in India. Thereafter, it analyses the importance of NGO decision-making and focuses 
on current studies that have dealt with it. Subsequently it highlights the present 
literature’s shortcomings and how this study attempts to address them. In this regard, 
studies on NGOs’ decision-making in general and those related to India’s rural 
development activities are considered. 
MEANING AND LOCATION OF NGOs  
Definition of NGOs 
Before discussing causes for the rise of NGOs, it is essential to define an NGO. 
Simmons and Martin rightly highlight the lack of an accepted definition of an NGO.47 
Ball and Dunn believe NGOs are voluntary and non-profit.48 They also believe that 
NGOs do not depend on any agency for sustenance, and are not part of the government. 
                                                           
47Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin, “Theories and empirical studies of international institutions,” in P.J.Katzenstein, 
R.Keohane and S.D.Krasner (eds.), Exploration and contestation in the study of world politics. Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1999. p.89; Mc. Carthy, et.al (eds.), The non-profit sector in the global community. San Francisco: Josey 
Bas, 1992. p. 520. 
48 Colin Ball, and Leith Dunn, Non-Governmental Organisations: Guidelines for Good Policy and Practice. 
London: The Common Wealth Foundation, 1995. p.11. 
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However Weiss and Gordenker suggest that NGOs are formal organisations.49 Mitlin, 
Green and Matthias add that they are non-membership organisations.50  
However Tvedt’s definition is most persuasive.51 He feels NGOs have to be non-
profit, autonomous and non-governmental, but not necessarily voluntary. This 
definition is germane to NGOs in developing countries, which sacrifice their 
voluntarism under foreign donors’ dictates or governmental statutes. The definition of 
NGOs in this study is borrowed from Tvedt. 
Location of NGOs 
NGOs’ features are dependent on their location vis-à-vis the state and civil 
society. Scholars contest the ideal location of NGOs due to varied sources of funding; 
different relations between NGOs, government and donors; and, NGOs’ diverse 
backgrounds. Besides, NGOs in developed and developing countries operate 
differently. Hence some scholars believe NGOs are civil society constituents, while 
others call them extensions of government.  
Uphoff feels NGOs are private sector’s sub-sector.52 However Cordtes suggests 
that NGOs are extensions of government, because they undertake development on 
government’s behalf and are financially dependent on it.53 Yet Ball and Dunn feel 
                                                           
 
49Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.). NGOs, the UN and global governance. Boulder; London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996. p.250.   
50 Amanda Bernard, et.al. (eds.), Civil society and international development. Published by North-South Centre of 
the Council of Europe and Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation, 1998. p.147. See 
also Andrew Green and Ann Matthias, Non-governmental Organization and health in developing countries. 
London: Macmillan Press, 1997. p. 23. 
51 Terje Tvedt, Angels of mercy or development diplomats: NGOs and foreign aid. New Jersey: African World Press 
and James Currey Limited, 1998. p. 156. 
52 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Non-Governmental Organizations: Performance and Accountability Beyond 
the Magic Bullet. London: Earthscan and Save the Children, 1995. p.259.  
53 Michael Cordtes, “Private non-profits in a public sector compendium,” Non-profit Management and Leadership, 
Vol.10, Spring 2000. p.325. 
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NGOs belong to the interface of government and civil society and are part of Uphoff’s 
third sector.54 They believe that NGOs address people’s needs in the civil society. 
Weiss and Gordenker feel these needs are addressed by making the government and 
market responsive.55  
Since NGOs are considered civil society’s components, the civil society according 
to Mitlin, is expanded to include formal organisations like NGOs and informal 
organisations like self-help groups.56 Tvedt believes this makes the civil society a 
residual category, which includes organisations that are neither governmental nor profit 
making.57 Nevertheless, he is against the arbitrary removal of certain NGOs from the 
third sector because they lack voluntarism, or are financially dependent on government 
and business corporations, or because many NGOs undertake development and not 
charity. He believes that working relations with government or market do not make 
NGOs constituents of the first or second sector. As long as the state and the market are 
not NGOs’ agenda makers, NGOs remain within the civil society.  
This study considers NGOs as civil society components, although they share 
working relations with government, business corporations and donors. However a 
specific conceptualisation is required for analysing Indian NGOs, since the unit of 
analysis could vary across countries, social and economic contexts and even amongst 
scholars. Therefore, this study adopts the approach of Tvedt, Salamon and Anheier. 
They maintain that an establishment specific categorisation is ideal, since it recognises 
individual NGOs’ struggles and strategies. It also considers size, activities and aims of 
                                                           
54 Ball and Dunn, NGOs.p.11. 
55 Weiss and Gordenker, “NGO participation in the international policy process,” in Weiss and Gordenker (eds.), 
NGOs. p.209.  
56 Bernard et.al (eds.), Civil society. p.147. 
57 Tvedt, Angels. p.246. 
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particular NGOs. Thus, a focus is maintained despite NGOs’ plurality, whilst 
recognising the uniqueness of NGOs in particular countries. 
Consonant with Tvedt, Salamon and Anheir’s call for establishment-specific study 
of NGOs, this study examines decision-making within an Indian NGO, i.e. AWARE. It 
not only recognises AWARE’s uniqueness, but also helps understand the activities and 
struggles of other Indian NGOs. Although AWARE is chosen, because it is one of the 
successful NGOs in the country, it also shares many basic characteristics with other 
Indian NGOs. These are objectives of community empowerment, bottom-up 
participation and centralised leadership.  
THE RISE OF NGOs AND ITS CAUSES 
Having discussed where NGOs should be located, this section examines the 
causes for their rise. These organisations arose due to shortcomings of the state and 
certain advantages of NGOs. There were also certain conducive political and economic 
factors. In this discussion, general factors for the rise of NGOs in literature is 
examined. Subsequently, the causes for rise and proliferation of Indian NGOs are 
examined. 
According to Weisbrod and Simmons, people’s social and economic needs are 
inefficiently addressed by the state, and even the market is apathetic.58 Consequently, 
NGOs arise to fill an institutional gap. Feeney also believes that NGOs fill the gap left 
                                                           
58 Burton Weisbrod, “Tax policy towards non-profit organizations: a ten country survey”, in Kathleen Mc Carthy 
et.al (eds.), The non-profit sector in the global community. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1992. p. 29; Martin and 
Simmons, “Theories and empirical studies of international institutions,” in Katzenstein et.al (eds.), Exploration and 
Contestation in the study of world politics. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998. p.89. 
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by the state and market.59 However unlike Weisbrod, she specifies why the state cannot 
address needs of the core poor. She feels it is due to state’s preponderance in every 
sphere of social, economic and political activity. But Green and Matthias attribute 
state’s ineptitude to its corruption, inefficiency, centralisation, lack of accountability 
and limited resources.60  
Tvedt, unlike Green and Matthias, feels that the state’s inability to address all 
sections of society is because it serves the median voter.61 This leaves many dissatisfied 
with the kind of public goods made available to them. Since the state and the market 
are unhelpful, they organise themselves into NGOs. Scholars like Riddel and Robinson 
also highlight the failure of the market and state-sponsored programmes to reach the 
poor as being responsible for NGOs’ proliferation.62   
Apart from inability of the state and market, NGOs possess advantages, which 
makes them better service providers and attractive to donors. These according to Billis 
and Glennerster are NGOs’ informal ordering, stakeholders’ ambiguous roles, and 
multiplicity of stakeholders.63 They also suggest that NGOs with their welfare mission 
can resolve social and personal disadvantage, while the state and market can only 
address economic disadvantage through fund disbursement. Green and Matthias also 
attribute NGOs’ advantage to their welfarism and ability to operate freely. However 
Weaver and Robinson feel it is NGOs’ cost efficacy, which attracts donors whilst 
                                                           
59 Patricia Feeney, Accountable aid: local participation in major projects. Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 1998. p.110. 
60 Green and Matthias, NGOs. p.39.   
61 Tvedt, Angels. p.246. 
62 Roger Riddel, Mark Robinson, et.al (eds.), Non-Governmental Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. p. 138. 
63 David Billis and Howard Glennerster, “Human services and the Voluntary Sector: Towards a theory of 
Comparative Advantage,” Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 27, 1998. p. 79. 
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providing competitive alternatives to the state.64 But Bebbington and Riddel contest 
this cost efficacy due to paucity of data.65 
There were also global and ideological developments, which as Simmons, Burton 
and Weisbrod reveal, enhanced NGOs’ significance.66 The first of these was the 
Western liberal concept, characterised by Evans’ espousal of state’s retreat from its 
stronghold in social and economic sectors, and replacement by the market or private 
property regime.67 Ball and Dunn believe this engendered liberalisation, where state’s 
role shrunk to that of a policy maker.68 Tandon believes this also caused greater divide 
between the rich and the poor, fall in welfare services and low public expenditure.69 
Riddel and Robinson feel this made bilateral organisations fund NGOs so that civil 
society institutions could empower the core poor.70 
Another international development that encouraged NGOs according to Princen, 
Finger, Weiss and Gordenker, was the end of the cold war and closer ties between the 
North and South.71 Muldoon feels this made NGOs prove their worth as peace 
                                                           
64 M.Robinson, “NGOs and rural poverty alleviation,” in M.Edwards and D.Hulme (eds.), Making a difference: 
NGOs and development in a changing world. London: Earthscan Publications, 1992. p.240; B.Weaver, et.al, 
Achieving Broad Based Sustainable Development: Government, Environment and Growth with Equity. 
Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1997. p.293.  
65 A.Bebbington and R.Riddel, “Heavy hands, hidden hands, holding hands?” in D.Hulme and M.Edwards (eds.), 
NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? New York: St Martin’s Press and Save the Children, 1997. p. 
107. 
66Martin and Simmons, “Theories,” in Katzenstein et.al (eds.), Exploration. p.89; Schiff, Burton and Weisbrod, 
“Competition between for-profit and non-profit organizations in commercial markets,” in Avner Ben-Ner and 
Benedetto Gui, (eds) The non-profit sector in the Mixed Economy. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 
p.127.  
67 Peter Evans, “Predatory development and other apparatuses: a comparative analysis of third world state,” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, 1989. 
68 Ball and Dunn, NGOs. p. 15. 
69Rakesh Tandon, “Riding high or nose-diving: development NGOs in the new millennium,” in Deborah Eade, and 
Ernst Ligteringen, (eds.) Debating development NGOs and the future: essays from development in practice. 
London: Oxfam for Oxfam International, 2001. p. 44. 
70 Riddel, Robinson et.al. (eds.), NGOs. p. 303. 
71 T.Princen and M.Finger, Environmental NGOs in world politics: linking the local and the global. London: 
Routledge, 1994. p.10; Weiss and Gordenker, “NGO participation in the international policy process,” in Weiss and 
Gordenker (eds.). NGOs. p.209.  
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negotiators and effective mediators in building partnerships with aid organisations.72 
Thus, these scholars suggest that NGOs filled the niche when global political order 
changed. This was also the period when electronic information brought the world 
closer. Weiss and Gordenker feel NGOs capitalised on this and along with their 
growing professionalism they attracted funds.  
Most of these explanations are broadly relevant to NGOs’ rise. However it is 
worthwhile to examine what specifically influenced Indian NGOs. In this regard, the 
primary factors were the coercive state, India’s democratic tradition, plural society, and 
donors’ preference to fund Southern NGOs. Still the most significant factor was the 
coercive state, which Chandhoke feels had caused people to become powerless and to 
demand rights from the state by organising themselves.73 
Sethi also examines why people organised themselves.74 He suggests that India’s 
middle class was disillusioned with the state’s inability to deliver basic services and 
formed groups, along with land-less farmers. The latter were discontented with the 
rural state machinery. So in the 1970s, India had many voluntary grassroots 
organisations. According to Frankel, Kohli, Gent, Brinkerhoff, Foley and Edwards, 
India’s democracy facilitated their advent and ability to conduct meaningful dialogue 
with the state.75  
                                                           
72 James Muldoon, “The challenges of the global economy for post cold war diplomacy,” in James Muldoon et.al. 
(eds.), Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations today. Colorado: Westview Press, 1999. p. 80. 
73 Neera Chandhoke, “The assertion of Civil Society against the State: the case of the postcolonial state,” in 
Mohanty, M. et.al (eds.), People’s rights, social movements and the state in the third world. New Delhi: Sage, 1998. 
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Weaver and Mohanty have further highlighted the central government’s inability 
to fulfil citizens’ needs, since India’s society is plural, where people belong to different 
religions, castes, social and economic order.76 Citizens in this society form associations 
as alternatives to the state’s inability to address their needs, according to Weaver, who 
is supported by Arizpe.77 Ben-Ner and Gui also agree that NGOs’ advent can be linked 
to a country’s demographic diversity.78 Eventually NGOs arise from such associations, 
which according to Douglas, attempt to address various social and economic needs.79 In 
this manner, Indian NGOs strive to address a plural society’s competing interests. 
The above-mentioned factors caused Indian NGOs’ advent. However Hulme and 
Edwards feel that funds from bilateral organisations sustained them.80 Sethi believes 
they funded Indian NGOs, because they found them cost effective, flexible and 
sensitive to local needs.81 Riddel and Robinson highlight another reason, i.e. the World 
Bank’s policy that recipient governments (Indian government in this case) should 
retreat and let private actors undertake development.82 This coincided with India’s 
economic reforms like liberalisation and Structural Adjustment Programme, which led 
to partnerships between Southern NGOs (SNGOs) and bilateral aid agencies. However 
Bebbington and Riddel are wary of attributing too many virtues to SNGOs, although 
they feel they do attract funds.83 
                                                           
76 Weaver et.al (eds.), Sustainable. p. 293; Mohanty, “Social movements in creative society,” in Mohanty, et.al 
(eds.), People’s rights. p. 63.  
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This study believes that the state’s inability, advantages of NGOs, and increased 
funding led to the rise of NGOs. However it does not feel that a defunct state 
encourages NGOs. Indeed, as Kothari, Alavi and Huntington suggest, the state is 
necessary for service delivery, welfarism and economic growth.84 A strong state is 
needed for the rise of NGOs. Even Gordenker and Weiss believe the state is needed for 
maintaining social order, redistributing resources, and controlling multiple interests in 
a plural society.85 In this regard, Feeney mentions that although the advent of NGOs 
signifies power devolution, it could exclude disadvantaged sections of society from 
decisions.86 So the state must monitor decentralisation and ensure participation. In fact, 
Gupta believes networking between the state, market and NGOs is essential.87 
Perhaps the most significant factor for sustenance of Indian NGOs has been 
governmental encouragement. In fact, as Tvedt and James suggest, NGOs’ activity is 
dependent on how much freedom the state allocates.88 This is borne out by Mohanty’s 
illustration of government’s actions.89 In the 80s, the central government established a 
group of consultative voluntary agencies, to further NGOs’ participation in official 
development and social welfare programmes. Since then, the government has 
recognised NGOs’ preponderance from the Sixth to the Ninth Five-Year Plans.  
Having examined the causes and conditions that engendered rise of NGOs, it is 
worthwhile to briefly examine the evolution and growth of Indian NGOs. This will 
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help in understanding how strategies and goals of NGOs in India changed, along with 
corresponding changes in policies of the Indian government. 
EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF NGOs IN INDIA 
India has a glorious history of organised voluntary work for public and social 
good. The country’s culture and values partially influenced the tradition of charity, 
relief work and philanthropic activities. Dana or offering alms, both at the individual 
and social domains, was significant for Dharma or moral code of conduct of Hindu 
life. Dana was believed to be essential for attaining Moksha or salvation.
90
  
In ancient and medieval India, voluntarism had many forms. For example, during 
natural calamities like drought, floods and earthquakes, communities volunteered their 
service to victims and pooled their resources. The primary driving force for people was 
their concern for the less fortunate. 
In later part of the 16th & 17th century, famines ravaged the country. Rulers and 
princes responded by offering royal charity doles, since they too were motivated by the 
spirit of Dharma. In fact, voluntary activities for the most part were undertaken by 
people motivated with collective interests. This resulted in planting saplings along 
pathways for the benefit of passers by, digging wells and tanks for drinking purposes, 
offering food to the poor and nomads, supplying buttermilk to itinerants, who passed 
through villages and allowing traders and strangers to spend the night while they were 
travelling.  
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Dharamshalas or free lodges were built all over the country. At the same time, 
adheenams existed in southern India. Under this system, educational programmes, 
including natural science and arts were organised by the community, along with free 
food and accommodation. Adheenams gave way to the system of Madhukari under 
which students supported themselves by taking food from households on a rotation 
basis.91 
Voluntarism developed further in the 19
th
 century through religious and social 
reforms. Reformers, like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Devendranath Tagore, Sayyed Ahmad 
Khan, Dayanand Saraswathy, Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, Ram Krishna Paramhamsa, 
and others influenced by western thought, mobilised the masses. Simultaneously, 
Christian missionaries also undertook charity and relief work in education and health. 
Their focus was however on untouchability and social disabilities. 
Voluntary institutions in the 20th century focused on welfare and childcare. This 
was the period when many orphanages were established. It was also the time, when 
religion was supplemented by rationalism. Religious reform was undertaken along with 
secular activities, thereby signaling a turning point in the history of voluntarism in 
India. Secular ideals celebrated diversity, especially in culture, religion and caste. Most 
significantly, it aimed at preventing domination of the majority groups. This spirit of 
voluntary action gained momentum, when M.K. Gandhi and his followers focused on 
uplifting the rural poor, tribals and untouchables, along with fighting for India’s 
freedom in the 1930s.  
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In the post independence phase, the increase of organised voluntary action was 
phenomenal. Many who participated in the freedom struggle or in allied national 
programmes, established several voluntary associations to nurture nationalism. 
Gandhian philosophy influenced these organisations.  
In recent times, Vinoba Bhave’s attempt to transform rural India gave rise to the 
historic Bhoodan and Gramdan movements.92 It is the identification of an individual 
with the community as a whole. The maxim of these movements was that landholders 
should offer land to the landless. This was modified into integrated rural development 
programmes, by grassroots voluntary organisations. Into such development models 
were introduced land and agriculture reforms, rural health care, education, literacy 
campaigns and only a few decades back – rural micro finance. This trend continues 
even today. 
The aim of voluntary action in ancient India was to support the State in charitable 
activity. This changed to social reform from the late 19th to early 20th century, which 
corresponded with the need to oust the British by harnessing the populace. After 
independence, an over-burdened Indian state thrust rural development activities on 
non-government bodies. The latter benefited further with the economic reforms of the 
1990s and moved from basic welfare services to community empowerment, micro 
finance and people’s action. Thus, at every stage, the decision of voluntary bodies in 
modifying their strategies has been critical in shaping India’s destiny. 
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DECISION-MAKING AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN NGOs 
This section examines why decision-making is critical to NGOs and why it should 
be studied. Since both issues are interdependent, they are examined together. This is 
essential given the focus of the study, which is decision-making within an Indian NGO. 
Powell and Friedkin believe NGOs face pressures different from commercial and 
governmental agencies.93 Consequently their function, interests and objectives are 
different. To understand NGOs’ distinctiveness, it is worthwhile to examine their 
strategies. This is possible only by studying their decisions. Such a study can also 
facilitate evaluation of NGOs’ performance. This is significant because, there is little 
research on NGOs according to Billis, who feels current theories are state or market 
oriented.94 Green and Matthias reiterate this by suggesting that no evaluation is 
meaningful, since they are undertaken by NGOs themselves. Thus, scholars believe 
that evaluation of NGOs is essential and the study addresses this by examining NGO 
decisions.  
Studying decision-making is worthwhile for another reason that Fowler 
highlights.95 He believes it is necessary to study NGOs’ strategic importance so that 
stakeholders can understand them. This cannot be gained by evaluating individual 
projects and attributing the success of NGOs to these isolated projects. He wants more 
time and resources to be spent on in-depth studies of NGOs. This Bava believes will 
highlight the importance of NGOs, which are perceived as positive gap-fillers vis-à-vis 
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the state and market.96 Besides, as Hailey posits, donors have emphasised on 
understanding the capacity and impact of NGOs.97 Ben-Ner and Gui similarly seek a 
study of non-profit organisations.98 The present study on NGO decision-making fulfils 
some of these needs, since it helps understand NGOs’ long-term importance. 
A study of decisions can also reveal what causes NGOs performance. In this 
regard, Green and Matthias believe it is important to understand whether an NGO’s 
success is due to its inherent organisational qualities or the nature of its services.99 If 
their logic is extended, it can be said that it is possible for NGOs to be influenced by 
both factors. An examination of decisions within NGO projects could help ascertain 
whether indeed NGOs are successful. 
Decision-making is important for NGOs too, since it determines their relations 
with stakeholders. There are donors, who fund NGO programmes and expect them to 
be successful. There is the state whose inefficiency is to be ameliorated through non-
profit sector’s supplementary services. Finally, there are leaders and staff of NGOs, 
whose commitment to organisational objectives, societal duty, altruism or even non-
philanthropic motives in establishing the organisation, are at stake. In fact, Weisbrod 
and others imply that all stakeholders have an equal claim on NGOs.100 Hartmut and 
Elsenhaus want to closely examine NGOs’ relations with these stakeholders, because 
they feel it would help determine NGOs’ role in society.101 This study goes beyond 
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studying NGOs’ relations with stakeholders, to exploring how decisions help balance 
their accountability. Whaites and Keet are intrigued by this issue of accountability.102  
Balancing accountability among stakeholders is critical. If NGOs give importance 
to one stakeholder, their relation with others could suffer. Consequently, the need for a 
right balance in their relations with stakeholders is considered in NGOs’ decisions. 
However different scholars have differently interpreted this balance in accountability. 
Although Ben-Ner and Gui feel that accountability is ambiguous, others like Hulme, 
Edwards, Ramesh, Parmesh and Meera Shah clearly emphasise downward 
accountability towards beneficiaries.103 Feeney also feels NGOs must involve people in 
project decisions and uphold downward accountability.104 Conversely, Uphoff argues 
that since NGOs depend upon donors and the state for survival, their interests should 
be given primacy.105  
Thus, most scholars uphold downward accountability. Nevertheless, when NGOs 
plan projects, they have to decide on whether to give importance to their relation with 
beneficiaries, or to the state and donors. If decisions were made to bring beneficiaries 
closer, it would invite pressure from donors and the state. Even otherwise, donors and 
the state exert extreme control to ensure that NGOs decide on projects that favour 
them. SNGOs, as Hailey highlights, compromise their values due to donors’ 
pressure.106 Satish and Prem Kumar’s studies on India’s agricultural NGOs illustrate 
this.107 Similarly Riddel and Robinson’s case studies on India’s rural development 
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NGOs posit that local politicians and landlords being dominant stakeholders, prevent 
NGOs from networking with the poor.108 
The GoI, another dominant stakeholder, seeks to control NGOs through certain 
instances mentioned in UN-ESCAP’s report.109 These include selective funding, ‘Trust 
Act’, ‘Societies’ Registration Act’, ‘Companies’ Act’, the ‘FCRA’, and ‘code of 
conduct’. Moreover, government banks pressurise NGOs undertaking rural micro-
finance. Besides, CAPART sets policy guidelines for rural development NGOs. Hence, 
the government hinders NGO actions. 
Bebbington and Mitlin show that apart from the GoI, donors negatively influence 
NGOs, by luring them with additional funds when they undertake certain projects.110 In 
fact, current foreign finances of NGOs, according to Robinson, Farrington and Satish, 
are more than 10% of GoI’s annual poverty alleviation expenditures.111 Riddel and 
Robinson believe donors prefer projects that are popular in their own countries.112 So 
Fisher feels NGOs are forced to decide in favour of such projects and maintain their 
financial sustainability.113 In the process NGOs, according to Gronbjerg, decide to 
sacrifice their responsibility to beneficiaries.114  
NGOs can decide against domination by donors. However Giordano, Satish and 
Farrington highlight in their study of Auroville Greenwork Resources Centre in south 
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India that this can result in donors delaying or withdrawing funds.115 Besides, Edwards 
and Hulme feel that when NGOs have to choose between donors or beneficiaries, they 
decide in favour of donors.116 Often such decisions make NGOs focus on the less poor 
than core poor. One such decision is undertaking micro-credit, because donors have 
encouraged it in South Asian NGOs following Grameen Bank’s success.117 In fact, 
popular Indian NGOs like AWARE, MYRADA, SEWA and WWF have also chosen 
micro-finance. Tandon finds this problematic, because as Woller and others have 
posited, such NGOs exclusively focus on donors’ funds.118 
NGOs could decide to network with government and donors by expanding their 
area of operation and overcoming pressure from powerful stakeholders. This decision 
can be beneficial, since it brings NGOs close to the market, donors and the state. In 
fact, Natsios mentions that such SNGOs can network with the United Nations and 
northern organisations.119 Arsenault even suggests that NGOs can overcome differences 
with donors through partnerships.120 However as Bebbington, Riddel, Fisher and 
Feeney mention, there are shortcomings, because NGOs can ignore their responsibility 
towards beneficiaries.121 It can also adversely affect the quality of services they deliver. 
NGOs might focus on receiving funds from the relief market and competing with other 
big NGOs. Nevertheless, the criticality of this decision cannot be underplayed, because 
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it can prevent organisational liquidation. In fact, Czariniawska and Wolff highlight the 
importance of such decisions for organisational survival.122 
Such decisions give credence to Green and Matthias’s argument that NGOs can 
confront constraints from state, donors and beneficiaries.123 Satish and Prem Kumar 
corroborate this in their study on Indian NGOs that undertake artificial insemination.124 
Similarly, Chakraborty posits that non-profit organisations like Ramkrishna Mission 
and Lok Siksha Parishad have benefited from governmental support.125  
Decision-making is important for NGOs to forge ties with stakeholders.126 The 
ESCAP study suggests that by studying NGO decisions, government agencies can 
network with NGOs. The lack of synergy between NGOs and government caused by 
the former’s non-transparency and the latter’s dominance, can be surmounted. It can 
also help stakeholders appreciate the constraints under which NGOs operate and can 
help them judge NGOs’ ability to supplement state’s efforts.  
Understanding of decisions can foster closer ties between NGOs and stakeholders, 
but decision-making per se is important to NGOs, since it helps them become cost 
effective and efficient. In fact, through projects, NGOs decide how to reach more 
beneficiaries by keeping costs low. This is important, because a lot is at stake on how 
they offer cost-effective alternatives to the state. Avina, Smillie and Helmich believe 
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NGOs reach a small percent of the core poor, but Tendler and Griffiths think 
otherwise.127 
Riddel and Robinson also feel there is a trade-off between decisions to keep costs 
low and decisions to reach the core poor.128 They believe that rural projects by Indian 
NGOs during mid 1990s did not change socio-economic conditions of the core poor, 
although people below the poverty line were assisted. They differentiate between core 
poor and those below the poverty line. The core poor are economically backward and 
lack access to basic necessities like food, shelter, medical services and, education. 
Secondly, the socially and economically dominant groups in society exploit them. 
Finally, their mindsets and value systems make them psychologically un-empowered. 
However, people living below the poverty line are only economically weak, i.e. earn 
less than average subsistence levels of income.129 
     Decision-making is also significant because it enables NGOs to adopt 
strategies for empowering beneficiaries. This empowerment can be either through 
extant village associations or through new ones.130 If the decision is for the former, 
Riddel and Robinson feel NGOs could face rural elite’s domination. If NGOs decide to 
form new associations, beneficiaries might not adapt to them. Therefore, rural 
development NGOs in India, like MYRADA, AWARE and Tilonia decided to work 
with extant village associations. However they also had to decide on how to balance 
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pressure from rural elite and sustained empowerment of beneficiaries. Since most rural 
NGOs face this dilemma, one has to be wary before judging like Desai and Howes that 
Indian NGOs cannot work with extant village associations.131 
     Other critical concerns in decision-making are the nature of NGO management. 
The management, according to Hailey can be adapted to suit organisational changes 
and demands from stakeholders.132 In this regard, Haq, Riddel and Robinson feel 
leaders are responsible for NGOs performance.133 According to Riddel and Robinson, 
centralised leadership has worked only in some Indian NGOs. Otherwise it can 
encourage nepotism, according to Woods and hinder participatory decisions.134 But this 
can be prevented by developing expertise of NGO staff and increasing their 
responsibility. To learn how leadership has influenced Indian NGOs, it is essential to 
examine their decisions like this study.   
     Despite research on NGOs and their projects, Weisbrod feels it is inchoate.135 
Due to this limitation in present literature, it is premature to conclude that NGOs have 
succeeded or failed. So Sethi’s conception of NGOs is realistic.136 He believes that one 
should not hastily judge NGOs, since they are still adjusting to changes in the domestic 
and global environment. The present study on NGO decisions has captured this 
dynamism, which is often ignored by other studies that have focused on project 
performance. It also attempts to add to the vast but inadequate literature on NGOs. 
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PAUCITY OF CURRENT LITERATURE AND THE STUDY 
NGOs became more important after the Cold War, according to Princen, Finger 
and Weiss. This was further compounded, according to Muldoon, by their efficacy as 
peace negotiators.137 These scholars however focus on negotiations between NGOs and 
state agencies rather than decisions that NGOs make to handle international power 
brokers. An examination of their decisions would reveal what they considered for 
negotiation. Perhaps NGOs were constrained by state agencies and decided to yield 
during negotiation.  
There are many studies on NGOs in terms of projects, relations with stakeholders, 
role as alternatives to the state, and role in socio-economic development, as discussed 
earlier. However not many have specifically examined these organisations’ decision-
making, especially in the Indian context.  
There are certain studies on India’s non-state institutions by Chandhoke, 
Balagopal and Hargopal, who believe that these institutions arise to assist those 
communities, which a dominant and over-burdened state has neglected. Weisbrod and 
Feeney also believe that NGOs cater to the socially and economically disadvantaged 
sections of society, and fill the niche left by the state and market in developing 
countries.138 But none of these scholars consider whether NGOs justify their niche 
filling roles. Only a study of NGO decisions will reveal whether they possess any 
advantage; whether they too are hindered by similar shortcomings like the state and 
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market; or whether they are constrained by different problems. The present study on 
rural development NGO decision-making in India focuses on these issues.  
There is a paucity of literature on NGOs in India and other developing countries in 
terms of their decision-making mechanism. This is critical according to Billis, Fowler, 
Powell and Friedkin, since NGOs’ distinctiveness makes it imperative to study them 
separately. In this regard, Weisbrod attempted to understand the distinctiveness of 
NGOs through their organisational form, goals, mission and interaction with 
stakeholders.139 However this too is insufficient. It is essential to examine NGOs 
through their decisions like the present study, which looks at AWARE’s decisions. 
Decision-making and attributes of NGOs 
Billis and Glennerster feel NGOs are gifted with ambiguous command structure, 
ability to deal with social problems and multiplicity of stakeholders.140 However they 
do not consider how NGOs decide to function despite their informal organisational 
structure. They also ignore the possibility that multiple stakeholders exert multiple 
pressures, leading NGOs to concentrate on strategic decisions to surmount constraints. 
It is insufficient to identify so-called advantages of NGOs. In fact, Padaki feels they 
possess an inherent advantage of organisational values.141 But to understand this, it is 
essential to study NGO decisions and see how values can guide it. The present study 
attempts to fill this gap and learn how NGOs use their advantages in decisions.  
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     Edwards and Hulme also consider advantages of NGOs in terms of their ability 
to operate freely.142 Unfortunately, they ignore constraints from stakeholders and even 
problems within NGOs. The freedom that these scholars highlight, are obtained 
through NGOs’ strategic decisions in their relations with stakeholders. This strategic 
decision-making by NGOs is developed further in this study, whilst buttressing Klein’s 
thesis that organisations survive through informed decisions, despite constraints.143 
     Edwards, Hulme and Weaver highlight other attributes like cost efficacy, which 
makes NGOs supplement governmental services.144 However they ignore the fact that 
cost efficacy could be from a conscious decision by NGOs to conserve their limited 
resources. In this case, there is a trade-off between maintaining cost efficacy and 
reaching the core poor, which Riddel and Robinson highlight in their studies on Indian 
NGOs. If NGOs decide to keep costs low, they could compromise upon project scale. 
In fact, many rural development NGOs in India like AKRSP, as Shahs suggest, reckon 
with resource crunch during project implementation.145 So to understand NGOs’ 
putative cost-efficacy, one must examine the rationale behind their decisions, which is 
done in this study.  
     Most studies, according to Hulme and Edwards, inadequately evaluate the so-
called cost efficacy of NGOs146. They feel studies on cost efficacy, are inadequate, 
since they should examine NGOs’ potential as supplements to the state in terms of 
their flexibility and ability to reach the poor. Such studies, they feel should also 
consider how NGOs can either become political and change their modus operandi due 
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to negative relations with the state, or can change state’s policies through positive 
relations. For example, many Indian NGOs have modified their non-political stance 
following years of governmental influence. This can be learnt by studying decisions 
taken by NGOs in the course of their relations with stakeholders.  
Influences on decision-making within Indian NGOs 
NGOs are particularly significant in India, as Weaver, Mohanty and Arizpe 
suggest, due to India’s multi-ethnic civil society.147 They feel NGOs can cater to needs 
of the minorities and bring them to the mainstream. Tvedt corroborates this. However 
scholars ignore the compromises that NGOs make to sensitise the state to the needs of 
marginalized sections of society. In fact, some Indian NGOs that decide to confront the 
state and campaign for the rights of minorities, could risk sanctions. Others could 
decide to address only economic needs of the poor rather than antagonise the state by 
pressing for social rights. Still others might decide to gradually sensitise the state by 
initially pursuing poverty eradication programmes.  
     Thus, it is inadequate to merely discuss the potential of NGOs. It is necessary 
to examine what constrains them in using their potential and how they confront 
constraints through decisions. This is precisely the focus of this study on decision-
making within rural development NGOs in India. Such a study upholds Salancik and 
Brindle’s suggestion that despite dependencies, i.e. constraints, built in their structure, 
organisations achieve objectives through decisions.148 
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 Constraints, as mentioned earlier, are stakeholders’ negative influence. Smith 
focuses on decisions when one stakeholder, i.e. government, negatively influences 
NGOs.149 He posits that NGOs subsequently decide to become non-political, non-state 
and non-profit. Although Smith studies NGO decisions, he considers only negative 
influences of stakeholders. The present study however examines both positive and 
negative influence of stakeholders on NGOs. In fact, as Green and Matthias suggest, 
NGOs decide to build networks and co-ordinate with governmental agencies.150 
Vasimalai shows in a case study how India’s Central Tasar Research and Training 
Institute and the Ministry of Textiles helped PRADAN, an Indian NGO, following the 
latter’s networking.151 
Unlike Smith, Brown considers positive influences of powerful stakeholders upon 
NGO decisions.152 However his study too is inadequate, since he considers particular 
instances where NGOs developed positive relations with stakeholders. These are too 
sporadic to be considered a norm and extrapolated to other NGOs. Besides, Brown 
ignores the evolution of relations between NGOs and their stakeholders over a period 
of time. The present study overcomes this shortcoming through a longitudinal design 
of AWARE’s decisions since the period of its inception. It also considers how 
stakeholders have influenced AWARE over the years and how it has learnt to address 
them. 
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Alexander also examines how negative influences from stakeholders make NGOs 
decide to adjust their goals, causing goal complexity.153 Even this insightful article is 
inadequate, since it considers only external influences upon NGOs’ decisions. Like 
Alexander, Weisbrod also examines the interplay of constraints from state, donors and 
beneficiaries affecting NGO decisions and goals.154 However in explaining goal 
achievement and organisational behaviour, they have ignored the internal working of 
NGOs. 
Internal and external influences upon NGO goals are critical. This is seen in 
certain Indian NGOs like SEWA and WWF, whose strong leadership has inspired 
them, apart from external influences from the state, donors and beneficiaries.155 
Consequently, the present study fills the gap by considering external and internal 
influences on NGO decisions and their ability to achieve goals.  
     Closely related to influences upon NGOs is their ability to address these 
influences. Hailey feels this aspect of organisational learning is essential for NGOs.156 
However he considers its importance only with regard to donors, rather than all 
stakeholders. Edwards also examines this issue.157 He discusses how NGOs are 
accountable to the state and donors. Consequently, NGOs have to learn from past 
mistakes and tackle stakeholders. He feels learning should be translated into action. 
Yet, his version of organisational learning is normative and not empirically verifiable. 
The present study is a practical endeavour that shows how NGOs use organisational 
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learning to achieve their objectives through strategic decision-making. The study 
focuses on AWARE’s landmark project decisions since this NGO’s inception to learn 
how it achieved its objectives despite stakeholders’ influence. Such studies, according 
to Barker and Camerata are significant, since they show how an organisation can 
survive.158 
Thus, scholars have posited that stakeholders constrain NGOs. In this regard, 
Fowler discusses how NGOs ought to network with donors and the state without losing 
their objective or autonomy.159 However his suggestions are normative. An empirical 
study like the present one would be more cogent than mere prescription. Another 
shortcoming of Fowler’s study is that it judges an NGO’s efficacy entirely by its 
impact on beneficiaries. This criterion is inadequate, because many decisions are made 
for enhancing NGOs’ organisational image. So even if stakeholders have not benefited, 
a programme could have achieved its objective. The present study has filled the gap by 
examining how project decisions satisfy organisational goals (where satisfying 
stakeholders is one among several considerations).   
However there is no universal strategy to effectively address pressure from 
stakeholders, according to Fowler, because each NGO devises its own means.160 Yet he 
believes that there are certain effective standard responses in certain contexts. Only by 
using the right strategy appositely, can NGOs surmount stakeholders’ negative 
influence. This argument is consonant with the present study, which examines how 
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NGOs respond effectively, by making decisions that aim at overcoming pressure from 
stakeholders. 
Research on AWARE’s decision-making 
Apart from filling the gap left by previous studies, the present study is significant 
for another reason. It examines whether India’s rural development NGOs reached the 
poor, following the inefficacy of government’s integrated rural development 
programme (IRDP). In this regard, Narasimhan highlights that IRDP was to benefit 
20,000000 families of which 30% were scheduled castes and tribes and 30% were 
women.161 However a midterm study revealed that only 12% reached the target group. 
Consequently, NGOs like AWARE arose to assist villagers. It is worthwhile to 
examine how this NGO through its project decisions undertook rural development to 
fill the niche left by the state. 
     However Narasimhan’s study on AWARE only considers how far it has been 
successful as a non-governmental alternative. She examines project performance rather 
than causes of performance. Her study relies on feedback from beneficiaries. The 
present study on AWARE does not evaluate performance merely in terms of service 
delivery. Instead, it focuses on goal achievement through AWARE’s decisions in 
response to influences from stakeholders.   
Other researchers like Wils, Madduri and Sohoni have also examined AWARE.162 
Like many impact studies, they rely on interviews of beneficiaries. Since objectivity in 
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interviewing cannot be attained in such studies, it appears that AWARE has succeeded 
in all aspects of rural empowerment. Moreover, they do not examine how AWARE, 
despite constraints, achieved goals through project decisions. Like most studies, they 
also address project performance rather than decisions. The present study does the 
needful by examining how AWARE actually achieved its goals through decisions. 
The third study on AWARE by Madduri, Rao, Chandra, Laxmi and Murthy, 
compares villages where AWARE was active with villages falling outside AWARE’s 
purview.163 It concludes that socio-economic conditions in the former villages 
improved, while latter areas continued facing socio-economic problems. Like the 
previous study by Wils, this too is a project evaluation report and provides information 
on how AWARE’s programmes affected people. However it does not explain how and 
why these programmes were decided upon and what influenced their outcome.  
Evaluation of NGO decision-making 
Not only is there inadequate study of decision-making by Indian NGOs, but even 
the approach used to evaluate them is flawed, according to the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO).164 Most studies adopt 
standard tools of measurement, although specific evaluation measures are needed for 
different kinds of NGO projects. These standard measures are suitable for developed 
countries. In fact, Smillie and Helmich feel SNGOs should not be studied from a 
northern perspective.165 Beckman, Mamdani, and P.N. Mukherjee also reiterate this by 
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suggesting that Indian NGOs cannot adopt northern recommendations.166 Riddel and 
Robinson feel it is impossible to use the same standard to measure any NGO’s social 
programmes.167 
Hence, a Western standard cannot be used on NGOs in the non-western world. In 
this regard the present study firstly, does not adopt a standard tool to judge NGOs. It 
uses a context-sensitive approach by focusing on NGOs’ decisions in health, education, 
women’s empowerment and poverty eradication. It examines the specific strategies 
used by an NGO to circumvent stakeholders’ pressures and to overcome shortcomings 
from within the organisation itself. Secondly, it focuses on Indian NGOs. Hence its 
conclusions can be conservatively extrapolated to other NGOs in developing countries.  
In a manner similar to the UNESCO study, Anderson, Nelson and Fowler prefer 
proper evaluation of NGOs.168 They feel that apart from general evaluation studies, the 
NGOs themselves should develop effective evaluation methods by not equating 
success in projects with success for NGOs. There should be in-depth studies that invest 
more time and resources. The present study follows Fowler’s call and attempts to 
examine NGOs closely, which can best be done by examining their decision-making 
process, since it is not a one-time study on goal achievement.  
This study has a longitudinal design for evaluating an NGO’s performance since 
its inception. It fulfils Fowler’s call for proper evaluation and also addresses 
shortcomings in evaluation studies of Indian NGOs. Riddel and Robinson feel that one-
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167 Riddel, et.al (eds.), NGOs. p. 138.  
168 Anderson, “Northern NGO advocacy: Perceptions, reality and the challenge,” in Eade and Ligteringen, 
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time evaluation ignores the proper time period to evaluate projects.169 This is because 
projects could fail sometime after implementation, or it could even fail during 
implementation. Studies neglect this, because they consider the project status at the 
time of evaluation. These shortcomings are recognised in this study. It also addresses 
another shortcoming highlighted by Riddel and Robinson that most studies focus on 
project failure caused by external versus internal factors. This study considers both 
internal and external influences upon project decisions and performance. 
One of the pioneering studies on NGOs in developing countries, including India, 
is by Korten.170 His work has no Western bias, although it suffers from inadequate 
evaluation. He suggests that NGOs learn to address problems facing society’s 
disadvantaged sections. Initially NGOs consider poverty alleviation, delivery of health 
services, and education, but gradually focus on gender rights and community 
empowerment. Korten’s study is relevant to most Indian rural development NGOs that 
have undertaken empowerment after delivering basic services for years. However 
Uphoff calls his study inadequate, since it ignores how NGOs decide and confront 
influences of stakeholders.171 
Korten has ignored external influences, which Salancik and Brindle consider as 
significant for organisational survival.172 This is however resolved in the present study, 
which examines how NGO decisions help them address stakeholders, i.e. external 
influences. The second shortcoming in Korten’s study is his assumption that NGOs 
move along a unilinear, evolutionary scale, where each successive project is an 
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improvement from the past. However the present study recognises that NGOs repeat 
mistakes during projects, but ultimately learn how to overcome certain constraints. 
This is similar to Rubinstein’s claim that organisations learn to improve decisions 
through experience.173 
Thus, there is a fundamental inadequacy in current research. In fact, Uphoff feels 
that most evaluations of relations between NGOs and stakeholders are boundedly 
rational, i.e. they are subjective and ignore ground reality due to the reviewer’s 
environmental limitation.174 He feels such studies should be supplanted by studies on 
long-term sustainability of NGOs per se. The present study examines sustainability of 
NGOs and their project performance. It also extends Uphoff’s logic by attributing 
bounded rationality to NGOs, whilst attempting to overcome the inadequacy of 
previous researches.  
Theoretical tools to study NGO decision-making 
The rational choice theory (RCT), which has been used in this study, has certain 
shortcomings. Cohn calls it method-driven rather than problem-driven, causing the 
subject of study to modify itself for RCT.175 The present study addresses this by using 
RCT to empirically study decisions within NGO projects, along with theories like the 
Garbage Can and Incremental theory. This study also fulfils Kaufman’s call for making 
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RCT empirical and representative of the real world.176 It even addresses Taylor’s thesis 
that RCT alone cannot explain phenomena.177  
Scholars like Musselin have objected to another theory that this study has used, 
i.e. garbage-can theory.178 Firstly she feels it under emphasises decisions in an 
organisational context and that it is not empirical. Secondly, it ignores routine 
decisions. These shortcomings are addressed by the present study. Firstly, garbage can 
theory is used to study how organisational learning takes place in AWARE through its 
project decisions, and thereby addresses the first two problems. Secondly, it considers 
AWARE’s decisions for all landmark projects and thereby resolves the second 
shortcoming.  
Thus, dynamic organisations like NGOs suffer from the approach, objectives, and 
inadequate measurement tools adopted by current studies. Although this study does not 
claim to overcome these shortcomings, it does attempt to minimise them. It begins 
where earlier studies on Indian NGOs, specifically those on AWARE, ended. It 
examines how and why AWARE undertook projects, what factors influenced its 
decisions, and how it addressed various influences upon its decisions to achieve 
objectives.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
A Case from India – AWARE 
 
This chapter introduces Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment 
(AWARE) to readers. It begins with a very brief vignette of Andhra Pradesh’s political 
terrain for an understanding of the context in which AWARE operates. This is 
followed by justification for choosing AWARE and examination of its organisational 
history. Thereafter, its general functions, mission and organisational goals are studied. 
AWARE’s staffing, structure, functions of its departments and networks between them 
are subsequently discussed. The final section of this chapter briefly examines 
AWARE’s progress and challenges faced by it in health, education, women’s 
empowerment and poverty eradication.  
ANDHRA’S POLITICAL TERRAIN  
Andhra Pradesh has witnessed many significant socio-political movements, like 
the Telangana movement (a communist uprising against feudal rule), fight for a 
separate state in the 1950s and a movement for Andhra’s bifurcation in 1969. 
Simultaneously, many new political parties have also won people’s mandate to rule the 
region. For example, the Swatantra party won in the 1960s, the BJP in 1998 and the 
TDP became increasingly popular from early 1980s. Yet, it was the Congress Party that 
ruled Andhra till 1956.  
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The TDP challenged Congress in 1983 at the Legislative Assembly elections, 
although Congress regained power in 1988. Nevertheless it was clear that TDP was 
there to stay, due to the charismatic leadership of its founder, NT Ramarao. His 
followers were influenced by policies and actions of parties like DMK and AIADMK 
in neighbouring Tamil Nadu. Ramarao’s message through his party was that the Telugu 
people had been neglected for years by central governments from the north. He 
invoked the glory of Telugu culture and history and promised clean administration and 
economic development.179 AWARE apparently enjoyed Ramarao’s support in this 
period, because his focus was on reaching the rural masses.180 
One of Ramarao’s most successful campaigns was to make rice available to the 
poor at modest prices, through the PDS. His popularity increased with the introduction 
of midday meals to rural schools.181 Yet, his party lost the 1988 elections, possibly 
because his election promises were unfulfilled. Mr. Chenna Reddy, the next chief 
minister, retained the low-cost-rice scheme. But, he also focused on self-employment 
programmes to raise income levels and eventually phase out the rice scheme. 
Education and employment for women were encouraged. This corresponded with 
AWARE shifting its focus from providing primary health care, to formulating action 
plans for women’s education and economic independence.182 
Although the TDP returned to power in 1994, Ramarao died in office. During the 
subsequent general elections, his son-in-law N. Chandrababu Naidu gained power. In 
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fact, in the national elections of 1996, a hung parliament engendered the rise of 
regional parties like TDP at the national level. This trend continues to define Indian 
politics even today. 
Along with TDP’s success, Andhra has been battered by subversive forces like the 
Naxalite movement. The Naxals have been active since the 1970s, especially in the 
Srikakulam district. For the last decade they have resumed terrorist activities under a 
new banner, People’s War Group (PWG). PWG is said to be dominant in Telangana, 
where its activists and sympathisers control most property. AWARE’s primary struggle 
has been against Naxalites and Communist parties, since most of its projects in the 
education and poverty eradication domains were in Telangana.183 
The TDP government, under Naidu (which was defeated in the 2003 election) had 
committed itself to the use of IT in public and private enterprises, to improve people’s 
living standards and help them achieve higher incomes and employment.184 The state 
government considered IT and ITES as providing an unprecedented opportunity for 
leapfrogging into the future. The government also developed content for literacy 
programmes and health care over the electronic media. AWARE was encouraged by 
the government’s move to undertake projects in the health domain, like telemedicine 
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Despite modernizing trends like promoting IT and ITES, Andhra has not 
overcome traditional issues like caste in regional politics. Tension between two main 
communities, the Kammas and the land owning Reddys has manifested into a major 
source of conflict between the Congress and TDP.
186
 In rural areas this has combined 
with exploitation by landlords towards landless tenants, both of who belong to different 
castes. It is for this reason that AWARE encountered hostile landlords and Congress 
politicians, in its efforts at financially and psychologically empowering beneficiaries in 
the 1980s. Despite these constraints, AWARE has sustained and even expanded in size 
and influence.187 The subsequent section considers this achievement as a justification 
for studying AWARE.   
JUSTIFICATION FOR CHOOSING AWARE 
Goals and functions 
AWARE’s goals are similar to other rural development NGOs in India. Like 
MYRADA, AKRSP, PRADAN, Association of Sarva Seva Farms and Ahmedabad 
Study Action Group, it undertakes empowerment through health, education, micro 
credit, vocational training, employment generation, agricultural improvement, 
watershed management and other services. Its mode of operating with rural 
communities is similar too; i.e. it undertakes people’s participation in projects. It also 
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encourages development of village communities like most grassroots organisations.188 
AWARE also follows phased withdrawal, like most of India’s rural NGOs.189  
Apart from this, AWARE has departmental and project heads for programmes in 
health, education and women’s empowerment, like other rural NGOs. Also, the 
villages of Andhra Pradesh (where AWARE operates) typify the poverty stricken, 
feudal and rural stereotype of Indian villages. It shares the ills of women’s exploitation, 
caste exploitation, illiteracy and agricultural mismanagement, with other Indian 
villages.  
It is one of the larger states in India, with an area of 275,000 sq. kms, i.e. slightly 
bigger than the UK with 245,000 sq. kms. Its 2001 population of 75.7 million accounts 
for 7.37% of India’s total population. The annual per capita income was about $320 in 
1999-2000. Estimates of Andhra’s poverty incidence range between 22.2 and 27.7% 
for the year 1993-1994. 73% of the total population resides in rural areas and 
agricultural activities contribute about 30% of the gross state domestic product 
(GSDP).190 In fact, Andhra also figures as one of the fourteen regions of India in the 
lowest quartile.191 
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In terms of indices like infant or maternal mortality rates, life expectancy and per 
capita incomes, Andhra falls in the middle. Besides, it accounts for maximum Indian 
villages that have been exposed to development activities (approximately 3000 villages 
of the 8,620 covered).
192
 Therefore, it is the most representative sample for this study. 
Relations with stakeholders 
AWARE’s relationship with the state and donors is similar to most Indian NGOs. 
It interacts closely with the state and local government during project formulation and 
implementation. Also, it undertakes projects on behalf of foreign donors.193 
Interestingly, AWARE has tried to distance itself from foreign donors and obtain 
indigenous funds for its projects. This is similar to many rural NGOs in India, who 
have tried to assert their independence.194 Other NGOs prefer co-operating with donors, 
due to lack of alternatives.195  
Size and influence 
Apart from objectives, functions, and relations with stakeholders, which are 
similar to other rural NGOs in India, AWARE is chosen, because it is the only Indian 
NGO, which has systematically and extensively undertaken implementation of public 
policies for rural communities.196 It is located in South India with outreach projects in 
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the North. Its head office is in Hyderabad (capital of Andhra Pradesh), but operates in 
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh.  
AWARE has one of the largest networks among India’s rural NGOs. It has 
reached nearly 10,000 villages and annually reaches 600 villages. It has reached nearly 
5,000,000 people since its inception, with over 4,000,000 direct beneficiaries. Its 
economic programmes have assisted nearly 900,000 people.197 It has a large budget and 
over a thousand staff members.198 
Success and achievements 
Other reasons for studying AWARE are its achievements. AWARE and its leader 
have been conferred numerous awards and honours, such as the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry award (for outstanding achievement in rural 
development), National Citizens Award (contribution to rural development), Jamnalal 
Bajaj Endowment Award (for contribution to rural development); G.D.Birla 
International Award (for contribution to tribal development), Award for Excellence in 
National Development (for contribution to overall development of the country), 
Bharatha Jyoti Award (for contribution to rural development and peace) and others.199 
It has also actively participated in large-scale relief activities like Uttarkashi earthquake 
in 1991, Latur earthquake in 1993 and Gujarat earthquake in 2001. 
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AWARE’s ORIGIN  
AWARE was formed due to the commitment of Mr. P.K.S. Madhavan, who was 
disappointed with the bureaucracy’s inefficiency and quit the Indian Administrative 
Services. He decided to study Andhra Pradesh’s Chenchu tribals for his doctorate, but 
was still dissatisfied. He felt this would not free them from their social and economic 




AWARE was built upon Madhavan’s knowledge about local culture, geography 
and group dynamics of the tribals. He gathered information about the politics and 
policies of the state government. He learnt that the government’s top-down approach 
did not deliver goods to these tribals and that there was rampant fund misappropriation. 
In fact, 62% of what was allocated for rural development went in maintaining the 
bureaucracy. Even the balance of 26% was misappropriated. So barely 7% reached 
tribals, of which the tribals themselves misused 5%.201 
Apart from misappropriation of funds, landlords exploited the tribals. They 
practised bonded labour although the GoI by means of Fundamental Rights had 
constitutionally banned it. In fact, Mr. Madhavan was appalled by the inhuman work 
conditions of bonded labourers in Telangana. Besides, women were badly affected, 
because they were exploited by landlords and also faced ordeals at the domestic 
front.202 Therefore, he felt that AWARE could emancipate the poor in this region.  
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AWARE’s beneficiaries were exclusively the tribals (Girijans) and depressed 
classes (Harijans), who lacked access to infrastructure and the capability to develop. 
They formed one fifth of Telangana’s population. Mr. Madhavan’s close associates – 
Mr. M. V. Kumar and Mr. B. Babu Rao – helped him to empower these beneficiaries 
by making existing benefits accessible to the rural poor. 
Thus, AWARE’s formation was led by Mr. Madhavan’s concerns on human 
resource development, which became this organisation’s objective. This was to be 
achieved through socio-economic empowerment of beneficiaries and their participation 
in development projects. Hence, sustainable development was to continue even after 
AWARE’s withdrawal. Community development is need-based, because a certain need 
identified by the community triggers a response.
203
 This principle guides AWARE’s 
programmes as will be seen in the subsequent section. 
AWARE’S OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 
AWARE’s prime goal is to help Girijans and Harijans identify their problem and 
make them devise their own ways to resolve it. It plays the role of a facilitator, because 
its focus is to make people aware of their strength and train them to fight for their 
rights. To this end it motivates beneficiaries through health, education, poverty 
eradication and women’s empowerment projects. Village based training camps are 
organised to disseminate information on development infrastructure and rights. In this 
regard, three means for empowerment are adopted - awareness building and 
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organisation, income and employment generation and finally basic needs strategy,204 
which can be categorised under four domains of AWARE’s activities, as follows.205 
Education 
AWARE’s primary objective here is increasing beneficiaries’ awareness. It 
organises ‘gram sabhas’ (village meetings) and ‘maha sabhas’ (mass meetings) to 
stimulate non-formal education. In these meetings, information about development 
infrastructure and rights of the weaker sections of rural society is disseminated. Such 
meetings are regularly held by AWARE’s cadre. Through this, beneficiaries are 
educated in social, legal, health, cultural and political issues prior to economic 
empowerment. 
Poverty eradication 
Economic empowerment follows consciousness-raising, as part of poverty 
eradication efforts. It is an income and employment generation strategy that uses local 
resources and skills. Agriculture is developed, because it is the main source of rural 
livelihood. Besides, the productivity of local economy is sought to be increased 
through minor irrigation works, wells, pumps, high-yielding crops and fertilisers. 
Knowledge is imparted on latest farming techniques, soil conservation, land-levelling 
activities, poultry farming and animal husbandry. These are also part of AWARE’s 
education efforts.  
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The next step in poverty eradication is marketing of local produce. For this, 
AWARE encourages co-operative marketing for farmers to sell their produce and buy 
provisions. So, beneficiaries become familiar with marketing and financial 
management. However, landless beneficiaries cannot gain from agricultural reforms. 
Therefore, AWARE created co-operatives and outlets for manufacture and marketing 
of leaf plates, shoes, pottery and baskets. Hence, development of local skills is another 
objective of this domain.  
Local skills are harnessed for development of handicrafts and also for specialised 
training in other skills. Once again, it overlaps with the education domain. Tribal 
youths are trained as carpenters, fitters, diesel mechanics, and other ancillary activities. 
The objective is to meet the needs of village economy and recruitment needs of 
industrial plants in the region, in order to stem urbanisation and modernise village 
economy. The Gandhian principle of ‘self-sustaining rural communities’ guides this 
objective of AWARE for poverty eradication.  
Health 
To consolidate activities in economic empowerment and awareness raising, 
AWARE uses the strategy of “basic needs”, which includes community health, 
maternal and childcare and disaster relief. These are undertaken to meet the 
community’s felt needs.206 Under the health programme, Community Health Centres are 
established in villages. The objective is to focus on curative care initially and later 
introduce preventive care through inoculation and health education. Hence, the 
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domains of education and health overlap just like the domains of education and poverty 
eradication. 
Women’s empowerment 
These programmes in socio-economic empowerment are based on collective 
action. To develop this, AWARE’s objective was to motivate women among the target 
groups. This is because they undertook major economic and social activities among 
beneficiaries. Mobilisation of women is part of AWARE’s consciousness raising 
approach. Even economic regeneration programmes focus on women by training them 
in poultry farming, animal husbandry and new farming techniques. Vocational training 
is also given to women in general health care.  
From this discussion it can be inferred that one of AWARE’s prime goals is to 
foster people’s self-reliance. It does not espouse a relation of dependency between 
itself and its beneficiaries, because it feels that would be detrimental to genuine 
empowerment. Hence, AWARE’s presence in villages is time bound. It withdraws 
after beneficiaries have risen to a certain level of empowerment.  
During withdrawal, AWARE’s Cluster Development Officer (CDO) is replaced 
by a CDO from the village. It usually takes six or seven years of AWARE’s presence 
for people to build their capability and independence. However, the minimum period of 
intervention is three or four years. It depends on the level of deprivation and ability of 
beneficiaries to function independently. AWARE feels this ability depends on the 
community’s motivation. It believes poverty is lack of psychological empowerment. 
Consequently, the objective is to release the potential trapped within beneficiaries 
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through education, awareness and psychological and material empowerment. Besides, 
an informal concept of social security is encouraged among people. 
AWARE’s objective in all these four domains has changed over the years. The 
aim in the health domain was to enable people build their capability, by providing them 
curative and preventive care. This changed to ensuring returns on all health projects, as 
is seen in the latest project that instituted health loans.207 Another objective has been to 
consolidate earlier health programmes. Consequently, the Shantivanam multi-speciality 
hospital was established. A similar trend has occurred in education. Earlier, the focus 
was to empower people by educating them about their rights. This changed to 
consolidating education projects under ‘Bliss’ – AWARE’s human resource 
development institute. Even in the domains of women’s empowerment and poverty 
eradication the focus has been on consolidation. Hence, ‘Aware India Foundation’ 
(AIF) was established to oversee poverty eradication and women’s empowerment 
projects. Another objective (similar to the health domain) has been to obtain returns by 
establishing ‘Mutually Aided Co-operative Society’ (MACS), which disburses loans 
with interest.  
In terms of organisational structure, AWARE was initially centralised, but claims 
to be decentralised now. Still the Chairman is the ultimate deciding authority. This is 
natural, because organisations delegate more power, as they grow bigger. In fact, 
policies are said to be decided jointly by the chairman and heads of departments like 
health, education, micro credit, watershed management and women’s cell. Such claims 
about power devolution can be verified by studying AWARE’s project decisions. But a 
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discussion of organisational structure, which is done subsequently, can also shed some 
light.  
AWARE’s STRUCTURE AND STAFFING 
AWARE is registered under the Indian Public Societies’ Registration Act, as a 
non-profit, rural development organisation. It has more than a thousand full time staff 
working in villages and staying with beneficiaries, apart from 50,000 volunteers 
involved in rural people’s development programmes.208 It is said to have a democratic 
set up, where the lower bodies elect the upper echelons periodically. At the very 
bottom are Yuvajana Sangams (youth associations), Mahila Mandalis (women’s 
associations) and Bala Sangams (children’s associations). Ten such associations form 
the Cluster Development Service Society (CDSS) that works for development, 
mobilisation and training in villages. Presidents and secretaries of each CDSS form the 
Taluk Development Service Society, which addresses human rights, legal support and 
presents people’s grievances to government officials.  
Above the CDSS is the Area Development Service Society (ADSS), which is 
responsible for political rights, governmental matters and protecting minorities’ rights. 
CDSS and ADSS are people’s organisations from grassroots up to the regional level. 
Representatives from ADSS form AWARE’s General Assembly, which defines 
policies and programmes. Target group representatives primarily constitute these 
organisations. They network with the Cluster Development Organiser and Zonal 
Organisers, who are AWARE’s trained staff. They carry out integrated programmes in 
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literacy, legal education, health, nutrition, sanitation, housing, skill development, 
employment generation, marketing schemes and others.  
The backbone of all development activities are AWARE’s village associations, 
which became more decentralised since 1980s.209 This was because beneficiaries felt 
that AWARE was becoming bureaucratic and made efforts to stem the decay. 
Consequently, it changed its village administration model. It managed to consolidate 
geographical areas (where target groups were located) and its own functions, into 
viable administrative units and adopted a cluster system.210 Apparently this structural 
change made the organisation more decentralised.  
Today AWARE’s village administration programmes are organised in five zones. 
Each zone is made up of 25 or 30 clusters. Each cluster has 20 villages. Each village 
comes under a Village Organiser (VO), while each cluster is managed by a Cluster 
Development Officer (CDO). The CDOs report to Area Co-ordination Officers (ACO). 
All ACOs report to Zonal Officers (ZOs). Thus, ZOs oversee villages and clusters. 
More than 10,000 village officers and volunteers below the CDO, motivate people. 
These village officers work closely with AWARE’s village associations.  
The VOs assist village volunteers in project implementation. Above them are 
CDOs, who monitor programmes in villages. The CDOs have to meet AWARE’s 
targets through project amounts to be raised locally. The ACO is responsible for co-
ordination and development of programmes. Financial and administrative duties come 
under the purview of regional offices. In all this, the head office has ultimate 
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supervisory power. In fact, the Chairman and his core group of managers, programme 
officers, project directors and zonal officers make major policy decisions.  
At the centre is AWARE’s general body. This 241-member body elects the nine-
member governing body once every five years. General body members are guided by 
Gandhian principles and support constitutional directives. It has lawyers, 
educationalists, other professionals and housewives, apart from rural beneficiaries. 
Once in five years, the secretary, treasurer and chairman are elected from among the 
governing body. These are AWARE’s office bearers. 
Apart from this, AWARE has a National Administration office at Hyderabad, 
which is also its main office. It has six major departments, namely Project 
Implementation, Human Resource Development, Human Rights and Legal Service, 
Women’s Development, Research, Finance and Administration.211 The following 
discussion examines the functions performed by them. 
Human Resource Development Centre: This is located on the outskirts of Hyderabad 
and is called Bhagvatipuram. It is a non-formal university and provides practical, 
vocational education to tribal women. It has libraries, training rooms, hostels, canteens 
and kitchen gardens. Rural leaders, animators, youth, women, Panchayat (village 
government) functionaries and co-operative members share a common platform here. 
Training in legal rights, social development, administration, agriculture, health, 
leadership, consumer laws, and soil and water management is provided through 
classroom lectures by trainers. The mode of teaching is interactive. 
                                                           
211The study domains of health, education, women’s empowerment and poverty eradication take cognisance of the 
functions performed by these departments. 
79 
Centre for Human Rights Education and Development: This trains lawyers, social 
investigators and barefoot legal workers. Of the two hundred and odd barefoot workers 
in AWARE villages, about 60% are women. The centre equips these functionaries to 
instil awareness in villagers and help them win their rights. Through this department, 
AWARE could free thousands of bonded labourers.212  
Community Health Centres: These are AWARE’s rural hospitals at Padkal 
(Mahbubnagar district), Naidupet (Khammam district), Chinnapuram (Krishna 
district), Kamalapur (Gajapati district), Muniguda (Rayagada district) and Laxmipur 
(Koraput district, Orissa). These centres provide physical and mental health care to 
200,000 families and are run by over 300 paramedics. Apart from service delivery, 
these centres impart health education and promote sanitation.  
Rural Vocational Training Centre: This is located in Khammam. It provides skill 
training and technical education to villagers, which enables them to run cottage 
industries. These centres choose economic empowerment as the means for villages to 
surmount poverty. More than 1800 tribal youths are trained as carpenters, mechanics, 
fitters, electricians, and other vocations.213 
There are also specific programmes meant for the social, economic and political 
empowerment of women alone. Women are organised into “mahila mandalis” 
(women’s associations) and function as pressure groups. Many mandali members have 
contested in village elections, and have fought alcoholism, bonded labour and 
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illiteracy. The women’s wing is organised under Chaitanya Shakti and Chaitanya 
Nidhi, whose functions and organisation are as follows 
 
Chaitanya Shakti: This is a team of women, who are trained to initiate other women 
from within the community in leadership, decision-making, rights awareness, 
economic independence, and other maxims of empowerment. More than 6000 women 
are trained in this field. Among them, some form “mahila mandalis”, which acts as 
pressure groups fighting for women’s rights. Many have been elected as village 
administrators (Sarpanches) and cluster administrators (Mandal Presidents).214 
 Chaitanya Nidhi: This was launched in 1989 and is a women’s group that functions 
like a chit fund. Each member contributes five rupees a week. However, there is a 
difference, since the foreman and sponsor do not take their share. Instead, the 
beneficiary of the week is decided by a lucky dip. AWARE lends as much money as is 
collected, which beneficiaries repay in instalments. It takes back its money after nearly 
nine months. In the meantime, members invest the capital productively so that it 
generates more money.   
The total amount collected and disbursed in a decade has been nearly rupees ten 
lakhs (approximately US$21,800),215 half of which comes from AWARE and the other 
half from tribal and harijan villages. This shows that all AWARE villages have 
adopted the concept of lending. However, these loans have been useful to harijans, 
who lead a settled life. Tribals do not fall under the purview of these loans, since the 
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ills of settled life have not affected them. This credit scheme, which benefited 37,000 
women initially, has now led to a ‘People’s Bank’. This bank has twenty branches in 
Andhra and Orissa and covers nearly 50,000 beneficiaries.216 
These programmes are primarily local efforts. Still, AWARE believes in 
networking with other Indian organisations to fight poverty. In this regard, it has 
provided funds to other development organisations for social motivation and 
community empowerment. It has also trained other organisations in social motivation 
and building of people’s groups.  
The above-mentioned functions form part of domains that have been examined in 
this study. However, certain functions come under more than one domain, because 
there is no watertight compartmentalisation between domains. The ‘health’ domain 
encompasses the Human Resource Development Centre and the Community Health 
Centres. The former focuses on developing physiological and psychological capability 
of beneficiaries and hence forms part of this domain. This centre comes under the 
domain of education too, because it provides non-formal learning. Also part of the 
education domain is the Centre for Human Rights Education and Development and the 
Rural Vocational Training Centre.  
Incidentally, the Rural Vocational Training Centre also forms part of AWARE’s 
poverty eradication domain, because it helps beneficiaries overcome poverty by 
training them in certain vocations. Even Chaitanya Nidhi comes under the same 
domain, due to its focus on micro finance. But this scheme also forms part of 
‘women’s empowerment’, because its beneficiaries are women. Similarly the 
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Chaitanya Shakti with its focus on women’s mobilisation is part of the same domain. 
Today, many other activities have been undertaken within each domain, due to 
AWARE’s intention of diversifying itself.  
AWARE’s aim is to network with other agencies, because it wants to strengthen 
the bonds with those who are involved in empowerment. It believes that networks help 
gauge the extent of a problem, foster replication of successful efforts, and also improve 
feedback. In Andhra Pradesh, AWARE has encouraged district networks of voluntary 
organisations in Prakasam, Guntur, East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Cuddapah and 
Ranga Reddy districts. Besides, it is a member of many local and national networks.  
At the local level, AWARE is a member of the Andhra Pradesh Federation of 
Voluntary Organisations and Andhra Pradesh Voluntary Health Association. At the 
national level, it is associated with a network of voluntary organisations like 
Association of Voluntary Agencies for Rural Development and Voluntary Action 
Network India. It is also a member of Family Planning Association of India. 
Internationally, it is associated with Asian Development Bank, Greenpeace 
International, Earth Action, Amnesty International, Japan Tropical Action Network, 
International Rivers Networks and other organisations. Networks helped AWARE to 
obtain funds from several sources. This helped the implementation of wide-ranging 
projects and also expansion of AWARE’s influence.217  In all this, government and 
international aid were both a blessing and a bane.  
                                                           
217Today AWARE claims to be almost self-financed and its members call this successful. 
83 
FUNDING SOURCES 
AWARE’s funding is similar to that of many NGOs. Initially foreign donors 
funded it, but from the past five years it has been almost self-financed. This is because 
AWARE claims that dependence on foreign and domestic donors made it compromise 
its goals. It believes that it has ensured the sustainability of its credit networks and 
thereby its organisational mission, by letting beneficiaries manage micro-finance. This 
is said to have made AWARE financially self-sufficient.  
Previously 40% of its annual budget, i.e. 40,000,000 rupees (approximately US$ 
872,504) came from overseas funders. Another 25% were received as credit from 
banks, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, and district level 
government agencies.
218
 People’s contribution was 24%.
219
 Central and state 
government grants accounted for about 6% of funds. The remaining came from 
AWARE’s revolving fund and from income generating projects.220  
As was mentioned before, AWARE depended on foreign donors for some of its 
finances. These donors included ICCO, Memisa (Netherlands), Deutsche 
Welthungerhelfe (Germany), SIDA (Sweden), Help the Aged (London and Canada), 
Community Aid Abroad (Australia), Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Ford 
Foundation (India) and CIDA (Canada). But, this has changed recently with AWARE 
becoming self-financed. However, funding of rural programmes is unchanged. Here, 
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AWARE provides 30% of the total cost. The rest is raised through contribution from 
people or the government.    
The following section briefly examines the hurdles faced by AWARE in its 
projects. These have been in the form of constraints from the state, donors, and 
beneficiaries. Problems have also arisen from the nature of the socio-economic issues 
that AWARE has addressed. 
AWARE’s CHALLENGES 
AWARE’s constraints from the state, donors, beneficiaries and from its own staff 
are similar to what is faced by other rural development NGOs. Some have been 
surmounted by AWARE, while others are still to be identified and a strategy developed 
to resolve them. In fact, initially it faced hostility and passivity from beneficiaries.221 
The Chairman was attacked by tribals, who perceived him as a threat. However, 
AWARE continued to persevere and now claims to have built an understanding with 
all its beneficiaries.  
Even the traditional mindset of beneficiaries was constraining. Alcoholism, gender 
inequality and rural indebtedness were built into people’s psyche. In fact, the landless 
found it difficult to surmount the culture of bonded labour, because the landed elite 
was powerful, and there was no alternative employment. Caste and gender inequality 
prevailed, because people were not exposed to empowerment and were ignorant about 
their rights. This made people less receptive to AWARE’s efforts in the early years.  
                                                           
221Newstime, May 24, 1992. 
85 
Initially, this NGO faced pressure from donors. In fact, there was an instance when 
a study team examined AWARE’s activities.222 The team was sponsored by a funding 
organisation and was even allowed to observe the working of this NGO. But, when it 
attempted to recommend organisational changes, it was not appreciated, since 
AWARE perceived it as interference.  
Yet, the most significant hurdle faced by AWARE was the state government’s 
unrelenting approach on land laws.223 Since AWARE’s initial struggles dealt with 
releasing bonded labour and land for the ‘sons-of-soil’, its relations with government 
were not smooth. It was charged of indulging in illegal activities. But, it was later 
acquitted. This helped people regain their land. In another instance, it faced the wrath 
of local elite and politicians, when it enforced a constitutional ban on bonded labour.  
Apart from these external pressures, AWARE has faced many internal constraints. 
One of them is lack of skilled professionals in all levels and departments, especially in 
health programme.224 This is because no skilled doctor or paramedic finds it lucrative, 
nor has the incentive to stay in a distant tribal village. 
Yet another internal constraint for AWARE is its centralised leadership. The 
Chairman’s charisma has undermined power delegation in the past. Despite his 
principles of participation, he has been accused of squashing dissent.225 Although this is 
necessary when running a large organisation, it can cause organisational breakdown in 
the leader’s absence. However, Mr. Madhavan believes that his organisation has 
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outgrown its leader. So, he is confident that it can continue even without a benevolent 
leader.226  
Despite these constraints, AWARE has advantages like its spontaneity and active 
learning. It is said to have learnt from field experiences. However, these lessons are not 
recorded methodically for future reference. This could be disadvantageous in the long 
run, since AWARE may not effectively use previous experiences. It would also be 
detrimental to its efforts at building networks and exchanging information. But, since 
the past decade it has undertaken impact studies, and has even stored information in the 
form of written records. Nevertheless, not every experience has been negative for 
AWARE. Certain influences from stakeholders have been beneficial in the long run. 
Besides, there have been many positive actions taken by AWARE. Some of these are 
briefly discussed below.   
AWARE’s ACHIEVEMENTS  
AWARE began in three villages in 1975 but has now spread to 6,000 villages. It 
was conceived in Andhra Pradesh, but has now spread to neighbouring states like 
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Orissa and even to some northern states. However, its 
main office is still in Andhra. The uniqueness of AWARE lies in its ability to 
disseminate welfare services, ensure sustained development and also provide relief to 
those areas affected by natural disasters. 
Many impact studies have empirically observed AWARE and concluded that it 
has the highest rate of rural participation. To assess the level of participation 
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maintained by AWARE villages, it was compared to other agencies. It was found that 
for government programmes, participation was 35.5%, and 42.5% where villages came 
up with their own schemes. However, participation was highest in AWARE schemes, 
i.e. 97.2%. But, paradoxically it fell to 30.5%, when AWARE and the Andhra Pradesh 
government together invited participation in their schemes.227 
This high rate of participation in AWARE’s projects and improvement in the 
economic status of beneficiaries are revealed in impact studies. These studies reveal 
that the two major target groups, i.e. girijans and harijans suffered from different 
problems. The former had access to rich resources but lacked marketing ability. The 
latter had market awareness but lacked resources. So, the ideal situation was for the 
two communities to co-operate, which it is claimed was possible through AWARE’s 
intervention and its twin programmes that integrated girijan and harijan 
empowerment.228 This led to a marketable surplus, and development of assets and 
occupations. Consequently, household income is said to have improved along with an 
improvement in access to community resources. This improvement is claimed to have 
been over 80% on an average in AWARE villages.229  
Here are some statistics to demonstrate the difference AWARE made to the lives 
of beneficiaries. It is based on evaluation studies, which compared AWARE villages 
with control villages that had all the features of the former. It was observed that the 
number of landed households in first generation villages (with ten years of AWARE 
presence) was 65% higher and in second-generation villages (five years of AWARE 
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presence) it was 43% higher, as compared to control villages.230 Thus, AWARE’s 
poverty eradication efforts appear to have been effective.  
Even the number of crops cultivated by households increased after AWARE’s 
intervention. In control villages only 9.1% households increased their produce. But, in 
second and first generation villages, it increased to 27.3% and 34.4% respectively. 
Consequently, surplus sold (which is an indicator of farm management) was higher in 
AWARE households. In fact, middleman in control villages played an important role in 
60% of the cases studied, but in AWARE households, their presence was redundant. 
Hence, AWARE’s food production and marketing seems to be effective.231 
As previously mentioned, AWARE’s projects are time-bound, thereby 
engendering phased withdrawal after beneficiaries reach a critical level of 
empowerment. This is said to engender autonomization, through which people develop 
independently. It is to AWARE’s credit that 10 villages from Amangal district became 
self-reliant thus.232 Subsequently, AWARE withdrew from there. In 1987 seventeen 
more clusters similarly progressed. By 1996, withdrawal occurred in about 300 
villages.233  
Yet another achievement was that AWARE improved the irrigation techniques of 
tribals.
234
 Water supply in these villages was strengthened, although tribals had 
cultivated no additional land. This enhancement in water supply is endorsed by impact 
studies, which suggest that the gross value of production (GVP), in villages, improved. 
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In first generation villages it was 60% higher and in second-generation villages 6% 
lower than the overall averag Therefore, GVP is directly proportional to the length of 
AWARE’s involvement and lowering of poverty levels.
235
 
One of the most significant achievements was AWARE’s movement against 
bonded labour. Moneylenders and landlords despite its constitutional ban practised this 
form of exploitation. The poor were forced to mortgage services of their family for 
many years to these rural elite.
236
 AWARE made eradication of bonded labour an 
important agenda of its agitation. According to impact studies, it existed in 34.4% of 
control villages, but its percentage reduced to 8.5% in second-generation, and was 
nonexistent in first AWARE generation villages.237 The process of release and 
rehabilitation took many years and it is said to be a credit to AWARE that it succeeded 
where the government was ineffective. Besides, AWARE also addressed the twin 
issues of poverty and women’s exploitation.   
However, women beneficiaries seem to have done better in health care, education, 
housing, wage incomes and raising of milch animals, after ten years of AWARE’s 
presence. In other areas like land, loans, crop, real estate schemes, male beneficiaries 
seem to have benefited. One of the likely reasons for this is that services like health 
and education are easier to access for women than domains that are traditionally 
considered men’s prerogative. Consequently, AWARE has tried to make its services 
gender sensitive. Now loans can not be sanctioned unless women directly ratify it.238  
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In fact, it is claimed that from 1996 onwards, AWARE’s women have better 
access to crops than in control villages. Loan accessibility is more in the former with 
66.7%. In control villages only 40.2% loans are available to women. Besides, 61.7% 
women participate in savings scheme in AWARE villages. A comparison between 
AWARE and control villages reveals, that AWARE’s beneficiaries have 50% to 90% 
access to land, crops, dairy, loan, education, health and wage income.239 
Besides poverty eradication and women’s empowerment, AWARE has been 
involved in health and education projects. According to reports of mid-term impact 
studies, this NGO seems to have succeeded in lowering illiteracy among girijans and 
harijans. In 1992, illiteracy was nearly 80.3%, whilst in 1996 it was 68.8%. Illiteracy is 
claimed to be higher in non-AWARE villages, where primary education level is low. 
Besides, 27.2% received primary education in AWARE villages, compared to 19.3% in 
non-AWARE villages. Also, there are more matriculates in the former than in the 
latter.240 
Even in the area of health, evaluation studies claim that AWARE has done well in 
the following manner. Firstly, tribals in control villages traverse greater distance for 
medical facility as compared to beneficiaries in AWARE villages. Secondly, infant 
mortality is high in non-AWARE than in AWARE villages. This seems to suggest that 
AWARE has better child care services. Thirdly, immunisation programmes appear to 
be better developed in AWARE villages. Moreover, 73.1% children in AWARE 
villages are annually inoculated against polio, diphtheria and tetanus, whilst only 
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55.2% are inoculated in non-AWARE villages. Finally, AWARE villages use modern 
medicines.241  
The above discussion suggests that AWARE aims to deliver services and welfare 
along with addressing broader development issues. Hence, it has adopted the twin 
strategy of delivering services and facilitating empowerment. This shows it has 
understood that social issues are interdependent. Besides, it intends promoting rather 
than protecting the poor, so that they can fight for their rights. Hence, AWARE has 
undertaken empowerment by simultaneously introducing social programmes in health, 
education, employment generation, vocational training, micro credit and agricultural 
reforms.  
CONCLUSION 
AWARE’s achievements have been significant, given the constraints it has faced. 
From a preliminary study its success can be attributed to the commitment of its founder 
and members. Support from beneficiaries has also been critical for its success. People 
were motivated to participate in programmes. This was ensured by recruitment of 
volunteers from the target group. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how far this 
strategy has really helped AWARE in fulfilling its purported objectives. 
Apart from a participatory approach, another factor that has helped AWARE is the 
diversification of its activities. Since it expanded its focus, it has managed to increase 
its influence and popularity.
242
 This is supplemented by networking between its 
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beneficiaries and departments. Such a strategy is useful for NGOs, because it fosters 
broad-based decision-making, which helps to maintain consensus and weakens 
autocratic leadership. In fact, broad-based decision-making is essential, since NGOs 
have multiple stakeholders and accountabilities. But, it also causes goals to become 
complex.  
From all this, it can be gathered that AWARE has been operating within the 
confines of certain bounds. These are imposed by its stakeholders, its organisational 
structure, objectives, and by the nature of socio-economic issues that AWARE 
addresses. Some of these bounds have a positive influence on the NGO, whilst others 
do not. Only certain constraints have been surmounted. A first step towards 
understanding AWARE’s performance in the presence of these influences, is to 
identify and define what the influences are. Also, it is necessary to examine how they 
have been resolved by this NGO through its project decisions. These issues will be 
examined in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Health Programmes – AWARE’s Experience 
The need and potential of NGOs in social development have been examined so 
far. AWARE’s organisational details have also been discussed. Now, it is worthwhile 
to examine specific aspects of AWARE’s decisions in various domains since 1970s. 
This chapter considers decisions in nine landmark health projects, to learn how the 
project was made, who participated in it, what factors influenced it, and what the 
outcomes were. Landmark projects in health were the Chinnapuram Centre, Mobile 
Clinic, Midwives and VHWs, Food and Nutrition programme, Boat Hospital, Padkal 
Health Centre, Latur earthquake relief, Shantivanam, and Health Loans. All projects 
will finally be analysed through Mintzberg’s ‘Incremental Model’.243 
Information about decisions in these projects was obtained by interviewing 
AWARE respondents, i.e. Mr Madhavan (AWARE’s Chairman and leader), Mr. 
Satyanarayana (treasurer), Mr. Ramana (Director Administration), Mr. Ravi Kumar 
(head of Bliss Foundation), Mr. Srinivas (head of MACS), Mr. Murlikrishna (Head of 
AIF) and Mr. Suresh Babu (head of health services). Non-AWARE respondents like 
Dr. Madduri (professor in Hyderabad Central University), Ms. Sameeksha Thakur 
(independent researcher), Dr. Suman Chandra (professor at Osmania University), Dr. 
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Narasimhan (journalist) and Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) were also 
interviewed. Ten respondents were interviewed for each project.244 For information on 
project outcomes, forty beneficiaries were interviewed.  
AWARE’s health projects aimed at improving health of Girijans and Harijans. 
Hence, it undertook curative health campaigns, followed by preventive care. This is 
noticed in AWARE’s first landmark project, the Chinnapuram centre, followed by the 
mobile health clinic, boat hospital and nutrition programmes. To strengthen its 
projects, AWARE trained and deployed Voluntary Health Workers and midwives in 
tribal areas. Lately, it consolidated its programmes and launched projects like the 
multi-speciality hospital and health loans. Each project decision is discussed 
subsequently.   
Landmark projects in Health from the 1970s to 2000 
Health Centre at Chinnapuram (1979) 
This was one of AWARE’s earliest rural health centres. It began as a relief 
operation following a cyclone in Chinnapuram, which was a coastal province. The 
health centre was built due to these relief operations. It functioned as a wayside clinic 
for disaster victims, but later provided health care regularly.  
Out of ten respondents, seven, including five AWARE respondents and two non-
AWARE academics / consultants called Chinnapuram centre, significant. They 
believed it impacted many beneficiaries and covered a large geographical area. They 
suggested that the cyclone’s magnitude made most villagers come under this project’s 
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purview. Others felt it was significant, because of constraints, like AWARE’s 
incipience, paucity of resources, beneficiaries’ reluctance to accept preventive health 
services and the management’s reluctance to introduce health service projects. 
According to respondents, AWARE’s Chairman, board, Centre’s team leader, 
head of administration, AWARE’s middle-ranking staff and villagers of Chinnapuram 
participated in this project. Beneficiaries initiated the conversion towards a permanent 
community health centre in 1979. They wanted AWARE to provide health services 
regularly and sent a petition to its Chairman. However, the board was against a health 
centre and informed villagers that it would not be built immediately. Subsequently, 
villagers contributed a small sum and helped AWARE build this centre.  
After the centre was built, its team leader noticed that its members lacked 
expertise. He informed Madhavan, who contacted doctors with public and private 
practice. They were screened by the head of administration and recruited. AWARE 
also hired medical students for a modest sum. Meanwhile, the team leader suggested 
that people should be educated on preventive health, since most diseases were caused 
by lack of sanitation. Subsequently, the head of administration sent middle-ranking 
staff to interact with beneficiaries, where it was learnt that people preferred curative to 
preventive care. Consequently, the Chairman and board decided to continue with 
curative care.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
Beneficiaries initiated the centre’s establishment despite AWARE’s refusal. They 
provided the initial finance. But, they exerted negative influence by not accepting 
preventive health services. In fact, most rural patients disobeyed doctors’ advice on 
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preventive health. Consequently, AWARE treated only symptoms of diseases, without 
addressing root causes, i.e. lack of sanitation. This led to recurrent ailments. 
Limited funding was another external constraint, which made board members 
reluctant to launch this project.245 Funds could cover relief operations, but not a health 
centre, which was to be a regular feature. Nevertheless, people’s initiative prompted 
donors to release some funds. But, project co-ordinators economised by hiring target 
group volunteers. 
Among internal factors, AWARE’s incipience made it difficult to adopt a time 
consuming strategy like preventive health care that primarily involved changing 
beneficiaries’ mindset.246 Consequently, AWARE decided to forego preventive health 
care and used curative health to learn about people’s diseases. 
AWARE’s incipience caused other problems. Firstly, it made AWARE unable to 
deliver emergency services. Consequently, patients were taken to government or 
private clinics. Secondly, AWARE’s incipience made it unfamiliar to those target 
group members, who had not contributed towards the centre’s establishment. So 
establishing rapport with them was difficult.247 In fact, some respondents feel that this 
project suffered, due to AWARE’s incipience and beneficiaries’ reluctance for 
preventive health. 
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Another internal factor was the board’s personal preference. They refused a health 
centre, because they felt it was financially unsound. They felt poverty eradication 
activities needed more attention. The Chairman argued that since beneficiaries needed 
a health centre, it was an opportunity to build ties with them. The board agreed on the 
condition that patients should pay for their treatment.  
Meanwhile, a middle level staff member positively influenced the project through 
his suggestion of hiring medical students. This was helpful, because doctors left 
AWARE’s team after their contract ended, causing short staffing. Since this was an 
economical alternative, it was accepted 
Major impacts 
All AWARE and 33% non-AWARE (one out of three) consultants called this 
successful, because nearly 12,000 out of 20,000 people were inoculated. Typhoid and 
cholera reduced.248 Moreover, it engendered the mobile clinic. Other poverty 
eradication and social action programmes were halted and focus was on health for 
sometime. It was claimed that CDOs and VA leaders managed the centre after some 
years.249 But, 20% AWARE (one out of five) and 33% non-AWARE consultants (one 
out of three) called it moderately successful, because only 10,000 beneficiaries were 
inoculated and people’s lifestyle remained unchanged.250 Still, it encouraged projects 
like food and nutrition project and mobile van. But, 33% non-AWARE consultants 
(one out of three) called it unsuccessful, because beneficiaries continued unsanitary 
practices like carrying night soil, which led to recurrence of disease. Besides, 
                                                           
248The head of AIF suggested that death from typhoid, cholera and hepatitis fell by 30%, although the Chairman 
claimed there were no deaths. 
249AWARE’s treasurer and head of administration mentioned this.  
250Prof. Chandra felt that lack of change in lifestyle was inevitable, because people themselves were unwilling to 
change their lifestyle and mindset through preventive health care.  
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preventive health care was neglected. The project was successful according to 70% 
beneficiaries, because they got regular health services. However, 30% called it 
moderately successful, because many diseases were untreated.251 
Table 4.1 Impact of Chinnapuram health centre as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE              5   4 (80%)   1 (20%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            3   1 (33%)   1 (33%) 1 (33%) 
Beneficiaries            40 28 (70%) 12 (30%)  
Beneficiaries dominated decisions here, because they initiated the centre and 
prevailed despite board’s reluctance. However after its establishment, the centre’s head 
decided to supplement his team’s lack of expertise and educate beneficiaries in 
preventive health. Role of AWARE’s head office (especially Chairman and Director 
Administration) was secondary, because they acted upon feedback from the centre’s 
leader. Still, the Chairman’s role in persuading the management to decide in favour of 
this project is significant, as was his final decision that favoured curative health. 
Therefore, decisions were not wholly centralised. In fact, accountability towards 
primary stakeholders was maintained, because people initiated the project, and 
AWARE decided against launching preventive health care following their feedback.  
Mobile Health Clinic (1981) 
This project was for informally interacting with beneficiaries and educating them 
in basic health. Preventive health care was introduced inchoately, which addressed 
causes of diseases like impure drinking water and unsanitary living conditions. The 
                                                           
251About ten respondents mentioned that emergency cases were untreated at the centre. Another six respondents 
...continued on next page… 
99 
clinic catered to health needs of villages within a radius of twenty kilometres from 
Chinnapuram centre. It was equipped to treat common ailments.  
Out of ten, six respondents, including four AWARE and two non-AWARE 
consultants called the mobile clinic significant, because it affected many beneficiaries 
in and around Chinnapuram. This was natural given the project’s intention to support 
health centre. So, it spread over a vast area. Moreover, it faced constraints, like 
beneficiaries’ reluctance towards preventive health care, Naxalites’ hostility, limited 
funds and AWARE’s incipience. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, Chinnapuram’s medical 
team leader and head of administration participated in this project. Chinnapuram’s 
chief doctor and his team informed the Chairman that they needed an auxiliary for the 
centre. The board had no objections and Madhavan suggested a van for the purpose. 
Subsequently, the medical team decided what items should be carried in the van. 
Meanwhile, the chairman delegated the task of hiring vans, drivers and attendants to 
his junior staff, whilst ensuring that its team was drawn from the Chinnapuram centre.  
After donors released funds, three vans were deployed. Meanwhile, project co-
ordinators felt that the clinic as Chinnapuram’s appendage should also identify the 
community’s specific medical ailments and help the centre address their causes. 
AWARE’s central office approved this. Subsequently, head of administration 
suggested that middle level staff should work with mobile clinic’s personnel as an 
investigation team. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
mentioned that the centre did not treat asthma, heart diseases and complicated child delivery.   
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Factors influencing project decisions 
External influence from beneficiaries constrained Chinnapuram’s medical team, 
since patients were averse to preventive health practices that also entailed changing 
their mindset and lifestyle. Consequently, doctors could not prevent recurrence of 
ailments among patients.252 This prompted the centre’s chief to seek an auxiliary health 
service. He felt it would increase interaction with beneficiaries, learn their health 
problems and consolidate Chinnapuram’s efforts.   
A positive external influence helped decision-makers. This was the existence of 
grocery vans, which provided food to cyclone victims. The Chairman borrowed this 
idea by modifying the use of vans to providing health services. However, central office 
was concerned about financial resources and sanctioned the use of only three vans. 
This internal factor was addressed by a positive external influence, i.e. donor’s 
willingness to fund. 
Yet, not every external influence was salutary, for example, influence from local 
communist politicians called Naxalites. They distrusted AWARE and even attacked the 
clinic’s personnel. However, AWARE did not retaliate, since it felt that a fledgling 
project could not engage in confrontations and delay future projects.253 Besides, 
Madhavan was convinced that once AWARE consolidated itself, all local bodies 
would support it. Yet, certain respondents feel this project’s success was modest, due 
to constraints, like inability to handle emergencies and limited access to people. 
                                                           
252 Mr. Srinivas (head of MACS) said, “First people visited the centre with ailments. The doctor prescribed drugs 
and how the disease can be prevented. However our project co-ordinators and medical team realised that their 
medical instructions were not being followed.”  
253This was implied when Mr. Ramana (head of administration) mentioned, “Naxals pressured us during our mobile 




This project was considered successful by 75% AWARE (three out of four 
respondents) and 50% non-AWARE academics / consultants (one out of two 
respondents), because it helped Chinnapuram consolidate its efforts and identify 
diseases. Secondly, water borne diseases reduced.254 It even increased clientele for the 
food and nutrition and boat hospital campaigns and a beginning in preventive health 
was made.255 But 50% academics /consultants (1 out of 2 respondents) called it 
moderately successful, because health did not improve immediately.256 Still it helped 
AWARE in the long term, because it combined preventive and curative health. 
However 25% AWARE respondents (one out of four) called this unsuccessful, because 
emergencies were not addressed. Moreover, limited patients and places could be 
visited each time.  
Nevertheless 50% beneficiaries called it successful, because health services were 
provided at their doorstep. Due to the clinic’s timely help, many patients did not visit 
the centre. But 37.5% called it moderately successful, because ineffective medicines 
were prescribed.257 Nearly 13% beneficiaries called it unsuccessful, because the clinic 
did not reach them at all.258  
                                                           
254As mentioned by the treasurer.  
255As mentioned by Prof. Madduri and the head of administration. 
256As claimed by Dr. Narasimhan (journalist).  
257Twelve respondents mentioned that doctors would not tell them specifically how the drug should be taken. So 
they waited till the personnel visited them again.  
258These beneficiaries lived in village interiors during launch of project.  
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Table: 4.2 Impact of Mobile Health Clinic as perceived by respondents 






AWARE              4   3 (75%)  1 (25%) 
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            2   1 (50%)   1 (50%)  
Beneficiaries            40 20 (50%) 15 (37.5%) 5 (12.5%) 
Decisions here were centralised. It was the centre’s head and his team, who 
decided to initiate the project and fix its objectives. Project co-ordinators aided him by 
suggesting that the clinic should identify causes of diseases. The middle and lower staff 
initiated the project, but the upper staff made strategic decisions. In fact, the board 
decided to launch the project and Madhavan decided that vans should function as 
mobile clinics. He voiced the concerns of the centre’s head that an auxiliary for his 
centre was needed. Also, he decided that the clinic’s staff must belong to the target 
group. Finally, whatever the middle level staff proposed was implemented only after 
central office’s approval. But downward accountability was fulfilled by the decision 
that mobile clinics should treat common ailments and investigate people’s health 
problems by interacting with them. 
Midwives and Voluntary Health Workers (VHWs) (1982) 
Here, AWARE trained women from Telangana in childcare, childbirth, maternity, 
healthy methods of preparing food, storing and consuming water, and personal 
hygiene. Only village women, who knew midwifery were trained in maternal and 
childcare and sent to villages equipped with new skills. In fact, midwives and VHWs 
were made the agents of change for introducing healthy lifestyle to people.  
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Out of ten, five respondents including three AWARE and two non-AWARE 
consultants called this project significant. They felt it impacted many beneficiaries and 
covered most of Telangana. The project’s issues made women eventually identify with 
it, causing more beneficiaries to join the project. Also, this project faced significant 
constraints, like difficulty in implementation (due to lack of expertise), high 
remuneration demanded by experts and limited funds.  
According to respondents, the Chairman, governing body members, middle level 
staff, beneficiaries (through their cluster development officer - CDO and village 
association leaders - VA leaders) participated in the project. Madhavan initiated it after 
touring Telangana and witnessing lack of basic health care among tribals. Subsequently 
middle and lower staff were deputed to collect field data. Later the Chairman suggested 
recruiting either experts to train villagers, or training village midwives themselves to 
disseminate their knowledge among tribals. He consulted the board. Next AWARE 
hired paediatricians and obstreticians with private practice to train village midwives. 
Midwives and VHWs were then sent to their community to disseminate their services. 
VA leaders and CDOs were deputed for follow up exercises. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The very first external influence was beneficiaries’ unhealthy living condition, 
which Madhavan witnessed on his tour of Telangana. He saw a child was delivered 
with the mother undergoing extreme labour pain. He learnt from interviewing tribals 
that the women were often weak after delivery. So, he and others felt that health in this 
region needed improvement.  
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The next influence was internal, i.e. field data collected by AWARE’s middle 
level staff. This provided additional information on how to plan the project based on 
statistics that in the 1980s, the mortality rate among tribals (who formed 6% of the 
state’s population) and backward caste villagers (or Harijans, who formed 15% of the 
population) in Telangana was high.259 Hence, mortality rate among a quarter of the 
state’s population was high. It also showed that minor diseases became epidemics. 
However, there were certain external constraints. One was with regard to hiring 
health professionals to instruct midwives. These junior doctors and paramedics from 
local government and private clinics demanded high remuneration. Consequently, 
alternatives were considered, in which a positive internal influence i.e. board members 
helped AWARE. A board member contacted his friends (who were private doctors), 
who agreed to provide services.260 Another external constraint was beneficiaries’ 
mindset. To overcome this, instructors used audio-visual aid for beneficiaries to 
understand the subject.  
Apart from external factors, there were internal influences. These were board and 
the head of administration’s preferences for cost efficacy. They wanted to train target 
group midwives, instead of sending health professionals to tribal hamlets. The head of 
administration calculated and found recruiting health professionals was expensive.261 
Nevertheless, CDOs and VA leaders predicted that midwives would be against 
performing their trade differently. Madhavan argued that once midwives were 
convinced, they could convince other villagers. Consequently, midwives and VHWs 
                                                           
259 Anubhav – Experiences in Community Health; Ford Foundation, Delhi, 1988. 
260The head of administration mentioned, “Madhavan rejected the unfair demand of government doctors. But we 
were lucky that our board member persuaded his medical friends to volunteer.” 
261 The head of administration mentioned, “We wanted to conserve our financial resources. I myself sat and 
calculated how we would save by directly training village midwives.”  
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were trained. However, some respondents feel that the difficulty of overcoming their 
mental blocks affected this project’s success. 
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 66% AWARE (two out of three) and 
50% non-AWARE academics / consultants (one out of two), because nearly 80% 
beneficiaries were aware of diseases like AIDS and Cancer. In fact, many midwives 
were trained in other districts of Godavari.262 Moreover, maternal and childcare 
improved. There was greater interaction between AWARE, CDOs and VA leaders. 
However 33% AWARE (one out of three) and 50% non-AWARE respondents (one out 
of two) called it moderately successful, because it took a long time to convince people 
to accept the new methods of basic health care, which made the project less efficient.263 
Still, 75% beneficiaries called it successful, because they said childbirth and maternal 
care improved. They could trust their own midwives to use better methods and did not 
have to depend on government clinics.264 The remaining 25% beneficiaries called it 
moderately successful, because health conditions did not improve dramatically. Some 
also said they found it difficult to adjust to new methods.265  
                                                           
262According to the treasurer and head of AIF, between 2,000 to 2,500 beneficiaries were trained from the original 
target of 3,500.  
263According to Prof. Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central University), the project depended on donors. So 
although more time was spent to train people (making the project less efficient), it had the support of resources.  
264One respondent said, “we did not doubt whether our daughters would survive after delivery.” 
265All ten respondents said they could not understand how the new techniques could help them and hence refrained 
from using them.  
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Table: 4.3         Impact of introducing midwives and VHWs as perceived by respondents 







AWARE              3   2 (66%)   1 (33%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            2   1 (50%)   1 (50%)  
Beneficiaries            40 30 (75%) 10 (25%)  
Decisions here were centralised. The project itself was initiated at the Chairman’s 
behest, after he visited Telangana. For other decisions, he consulted central office, 
including the board and head of administration. Even when CDOs and VA leaders 
expressed doubts about training village midwives, the Chairman’s decision was final. 
Nevertheless, decisions maintained downward accountability, because middle and 
lower staff obtained information from beneficiaries before project finalisation. 
Moreover, it was decided that target group members themselves should be trained as 
midwives and VHWs. 
Food and Nutrition programme (1983) 
This was undertaken for a year and targeted 300 families in five villages at Padkal. 
Health instructors studied people’s food habits and observed their low nutritive status. 
Thereafter, dieticians showed beneficiaries how highly nourishing and low cost food 
could be prepared. There were audio-visual courses to familiarise villagers about basic 
nutrients. This project also introduced the “Padkal powder” for lactating women, which 
was prepared using local knowledge system. 
Out of ten, seven including four AWARE and three non-AWARE consultants 
called the Food and Nutrition programme significant, because of its scale and number 
of beneficiaries. Secondly, it faced many constraints, like lack of health experts within 
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AWARE, cessation of funds, difficulty in managing AWARE’s incipience and the 
need to increase its influence. Thirdly, it was the first project that tried changing 
people’s lifestyle through health education.  
According to respondents, the head of Chinnapuram centre, governing body, head 
of administration, mobile clinic’s head and AWARE’s Chairperson participated in this 
project. Chinnapuram centre’s head initiated this project, since he supervised the 
mobile clinic and edited its exploratory study report. It highlighted people’s poor 
nourishment and pressed for preventive health programme. These issues were 
discussed at the central office. The Chairman suggested that if a project on nutrition 
was undertaken, then volunteers from the target group must be recruited. After 
discussing the project’s strategy, AWARE partnered with Hyderabad’s National 
Institute of Nutrition (NIN), which provided technical expertise during project 
execution. NIN trained beneficiaries in food and nutrition, which was later continued 
by AWARE. Subsequently, VA leaders, middle and lower staff monitored this project 
at the grassroots.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first influence was external, i.e. mobile clinic’s survey report, which showed 
that improper nutrition, lack of potable water and improper cooking methods caused 
diseases. So the central office had to launch a preventive health programme through a 
nutrition campaign in Padkal. However, the report mentioned another external factor, 
i.e. target group’s reluctance for preventive health care. Therefore, governing body 
voiced its concerns that became this project’s internal influences.  
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Their concern was that people should not be antagonised. Consequently, they 
wanted the project to be launched after a year. This engendered another internal 
influence, i.e. Madhavan’s reluctance. He argued that Chinnapuram centre was 
pressured by constant recurrence of diseases, since it was forced to provide curative 
care, which rendered AWARE’s projects unsustainable. Subsequently, the board 
agreed. However, implementation of this project was difficult, due to internal factors 
like lack of health experts in AWARE’s cadre and shortage of staff.266 Moreover, its 
medical team was involved in other programmes and could not assist this project. So 
AWARE contacted NIN for technical assistance. This was critical, since governmental 
funding ceased after sometime. Besides, AWARE decided not to borrow funds from 
overseas. With cessation of funds, the project could have been abandoned, but for 
NIN’s assistance and its student volunteers’ nominal service charges. However, 
respondents suggest that beneficiaries’ reluctance to change their diet inhibited this 
project’s success.  
Major impacts 
This project was called successful by 50% (two out of four) AWARE and 33% 
(one out of three) non-AWARE consultants, because more than 200 families followed 
new food habits and used ‘Padkal powder’ (a locally prepared health tonic for pregnant 
and lactating women). Cholera, typhoid, malaria and dysentery decreased. In fact, this 
project institutionalised preventive health care as AWARE’s strategy.267 Yet, 50% 
AWARE (two out of four) and 33% non-AWARE consultants (one out of three) called 
it moderately successful, because out of every 300 families, only 100 followed the new 
                                                           
266 Dr. Chandra mentioned, “The project did not fail. There was a problem due to short staffing and lack of health 
experts.” 
267 Prof. Chandra calls this a major achievement.  
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diet.268 Still, it showed AWARE capable of networking with government agencies like 
NIN. But, 33% non-AWARE consultants (one out of three) called it unsuccessful, 
because people’s diet remained unchanged.269 Nearly 38% beneficiaries called it 
successful, because frequency of illness fell. Some said they grew new vegetables on 
their farms, which was profitable. Yet 50% beneficiaries called it moderately 
successful, because it was difficult to change diet. Moreover, instructors assumed that 
everything followed by beneficiaries was unhealthy.270 Nearly 13% called it 
unsuccessful, because their lifestyle did not improve. Neither did they consider the new 
method easily adaptable.271 
Table: 4.4          Impact of Food and Nutrition campaign as perceived by respondents  
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE              4   2 (50%)   2 (50%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            3   1 (33%)   1 (33%) 1 (33%) 
Beneficiaries            40 15 (37.5%) 20 (50%) 5 (12.5%) 
Decisions were somewhat participatory, because Chinnapuram centre’s head 
(rather than central office members) decided to act upon the study’s findings. The 
report itself was made after interacting with people. It also made AWARE realise that 
people’s reluctance for preventive health care needed sensitive handling. So downward 
accountability was maintained. Moreover lower staff participated, because VA leaders, 
middle and lower staff monitored project training and reported to central office. Yet, 
centralisation is evident, because Chinnapuram’s head needed the permission of the 
                                                           
268This included older methods of water consumption and cooking, according to the head of administration, head of 
AIF, and Ms. Thakur (independent researcher).  
269As claimed by Dr. Narasimhan (journalist).  
270The attitude of instructors was not very encouraging, according to four respondents.  
271At least three respondents said the frequency of gastric problems remained unchanged. They also mentioned that 
the Padkal powder was just a local herb that had long been in use.  
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Chairman and board to launch a nutrition programme. Moreover, the Chairman made 
key decisions, like recruiting volunteers from target group and introducing preventive 
health services. 
The Boat Hospital (1984) 
The boat hospital or “Jeewan Shravanti” plies along Godavari River, near Bison 
Hill ranges and provides medical aid to 300 tribal villages. A doctor, attendant and 
boatmen form the medical team. It starts at 7 a.m. and halts at five health centres along 
the bank, everyday. In forty-eight hours, it covers eight villages, and reaches nearly 
60,000 people. It provides emergency treatment, routine treatment and outpatient care, 
with special focus on women and children. In each village it contacts the base hospital, 
which has six beds, labour room, minor operation theatre, laboratory and training 
room. 
Out of ten, seven respondents, including four AWARE respondents and three 
consultants / academics called this project significant, because it covered many 
beneficiaries and geographical areas, as mentioned above. They also felt it undertook 
provision of medical services that no government or private organisation had done 
before in Andhra. Moreover, it faced many constraints like, corrupt lower level 
bureaucrats and the state government’s hostility.  
According to respondents, Madhavan, board members, upper staff and tribals were 
the project participants. Like the project on VHWs and midwives, this was conceived 
after the Chairman toured tribal villages (in this case the Bison Hill country), where he 
noticed maternal and childcare was underdeveloped. However, people were not against 
(although unenthusiastic) modern health services. Subsequently, he, project co-
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ordinators and middle level staff considered ways to make health services accessible to 
tribals. After it was decided that a boat should provide health care, other project details 
were discussed. 
During project formulation, target group volunteers provided information on 
Bison Hill’s terrain and people’s life style. Subsequently, the Chairman and board 
finalised the project and approached government for funds. In the joint meeting, 
AWARE persuaded the State Secretary that health services were necessary and 
requested a no objection certificate. Meanwhile a financial shortfall was filled with 
beneficiaries paying 51 rupees each. In fact, AWARE collected 2,500,000 rupees 
(Approximately US$ 50,000) and began the hospital. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
Madhavan’s visit to Bison Hill and subsequent feedback from tribals about their 
living conditions initiated the project. Through this, it was learnt that gastro-enteritis, 
cholera and typhoid were prevalent, because tribals consumed brackish water during 
monsoon. Subsequently, the Chairman met central office members, which brings the 
discussion to internal factors, i.e. concerns of decision-makers. The first factor was 
staff’s suggestion to take few beneficiaries to nearest rural health centres regularly, 
thereby reaching the community in a piecemeal manner. But, there was a limit to the 
number of people who could be taken to centres each time. This engendered the second 
internal factor, i.e. board’s concern that resources would be wasted on frequent trips. 
They also argued that emergency patients could not travel long distances.272  
                                                           
272According to the head of Bliss, “Our project co-ordinators felt it was easier to bring tribals here for treatment, 
than carry complex medical equipment there. But board rejected it.”  
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At this stage, a positive internal factor influenced decisions. This was the 
Chairman’s recollection that tribals used boats as their primary transport. He 
announced that boats could even be used to provide succour to people. His idea was 
received with scepticism, but he prevailed. Subsequently, the head of administration 
and project co-ordinators decided upon the equipment to be fitted in the boat; members 
to form its medical team; and number of boats to be deployed.  
There were other internal influences like decision-makers’ concern about 
Godavari’s course, speed and direction. Since the boat hospital had to ply on this river, 
it was important to address these issues. For more information, Madhavan consulted 
professionals and his staff. Based on their feedback, he and the board decided that 
boats should operate throughout the year by taking different routes each season.  
However, some influences were negative too, i.e. presence of corrupt, lower level 
bureaucrats and state government’s attitude. The former delayed delivery of cheques 
and certificates, which delayed project execution. Still AWARE overcame this through 
a positive internal influence, i.e. a middle level staff’s suggestion that each tribal, who 
came to garland the Chairman, should contribute Rs 5. Thus, AWARE collected nearly 
2,500,000 rupees (approximately US$ 50,000), which financed the project for three 
years. 
The second constraint was the State Secretary’s refusal to grant a no-objection 
certificate.273 Without this, AWARE could not be funded by the centre. Consequently, 
Madhavan informed the Joint Secretary that he preferred to forego the grant. As a 
                                                           
273The Chairman said, “He (The State Secretary) politely warned me to suspend the project. I told him that I would 
provide health services to this distant region. He said every inch of that land was covered by their health 
programmes, so there was no space for us.”  
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reaction, the Joint Secretary personally contacted the State Department and sent the 
Deputy Secretary to meet the State Secretary. Ultimately the latter was persuaded to 
send a director to investigate the need for health facilities in Bison Hills. Later, State 
Government handed a no-objection certificate to AWARE. Even after project 
implementation, some respondents suggest that limited funds from donors and limited 
number of boats affected the project’s outcome. 
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 75% AWARE (three out of four) and 
66% non-AWARE consultants (two out of three), because deaths from gastro-enteritis 
fell from 300 in 1984 to none in 1990. Moreover tribals easily followed new methods 
of health care, because AWARE gained their trust.274 AWARE’s organisational image 
received a boost, because of its rapport with the Joint Secretary. This project brought 
more rural clientele, because they began visiting rural clinics independently.275 In fact, 
it controlled diseases effectively, because only one boat operated in the region in the 
1990s. However, 25% AWARE (one out of four) and 33% non-AWARE consultants 
(one out of three) called it moderately successful, because success came after two 
years, whereby more resources were used.276 Besides, the project’s momentum fell after 
funds stopped. The project was successful for 70% beneficiaries, because, they had 
access to health services.277 They learnt about various health services and how diseases 
were actually curable. However, 30% called it moderately successful, because it was 
                                                           
274According to Dr. Narasimhan (journalist), this trust was built a year after the project’s implementation. 
275As claimed by Prof. Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central University).  
276As suggested by the head of MACS and Ms. Thakur.  
277According to one beneficiary, “we did not dread diseases. We knew anything was curable and we knew how to 
reach it.”  
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difficult for limited boats to address all ailments. Often people’s ailments could not be 
addressed till boats stopped near their village.278   
Table: 4.5                   Impact of Boat Hospital as perceived by respondents 
            RESPONDENTS                    OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY       TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE              4   3 (75%)   1 (25%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            3   2 (66%)   1(33%)  
Beneficiaries            40 28 (70%) 12 (30%)  
Decisions maintained downward accountability, because beneficiaries were 
consulted regarding their lifestyle and health problems. Besides, lower staff aided the 
board with information on flow of Godavari, boat hospital’s schedule and equipment 
for the hospital. Still decisions were centralised, because lower staff’s suggestion to 
take beneficiaries to health centres in a piecemeal manner was overridden by the 
board’s concern for cost efficacy. Moreover the Chairman with his tour of tribal 
hamlets, initiated the project. He also wanted boats to deliver health services. Even the 
budget was decided between board members and the Chairman. Besides, Madhavan 
and board members negotiated with state and central government for no objection 
certificate and funds.  
Community health centre at Padkal (1987) 
The health centre was established at Padkal in Mehbubnagar district to treat and 
rehabilitate leprosy patients for nominal fees. It began as a campaign in Naidupet but 
was extended to Padkal. Leprosy and non-leprosy patients were provided treatment. 
Their rehabilitation included employment as sweepers, gardeners, watchmen and junior 
                                                           
278This problem was mentioned by eight respondents.  
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paramedics, and training in weaving, goat rearing, farming, basket making and towel 
making. AWARE also arranged matrimonial alliances for cured individuals.  
Out of ten, six respondents (including three AWARE respondents and three 
academics / consultants) called Padkal centre significant, because it covered a large 
area from Naidupet to Padkal and affected many beneficiaries. Many felt it faced 
numerous constraints, making it a landmark project. These constraints were villagers’ 
attitude, donors’ policies and passivity of beneficiaries.  
According to the Chairman, board members, VA leaders, director administration, 
project co-ordinators and middle ranking staff participated in this project. Like the 
projects on VHWs and the boat hospital, this too was initiated after the Chairman 
visited Naidupet. Subsequently, he consulted the board, director administration and 
middle ranking staff and sent the latter to Naidupet for further investigation.279 The 
investigating team’s report showed that non-communicable leprosy was more 
prevalent, as against 15% ‘Lepramatous’ or infectious strain.  
Subsequently, campaigns were organised to mobilise people and educate them 
about leprosy. AWARE also enlisted services of village women’s association, youth 
associations and singing groups, to dispel people’s ignorance about leprosy. It was the 
Chairman’s idea that lepers should be rehabilitated after treatment. For this, people’s 
contribution and donors’ funds were used. 
                                                           
279According to the head of administration, AWARE’s staff was aided by junior doctors from the district’s 
government hospital.  
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Factors influencing project decisions 
The external factor that initiated this project was poor social status of lepers in 
Padkal, which Madhavan witnessed during his visit. He noticed that certain families 
mourned the loss of their burnt huts. Upon enquiries it was revealed that this was how 
lepers were hounded from the village. Hence villagers’ hostility was a significant 
external influence. This constrained AWARE when it established its health centre for 
both leprosy and non-leprosy patients following governing body’s preference.  
The board’s preference for cost efficacy was a significant internal influence. They 
felt that resources could be conserved, if one clinic catered to both lepers and non-
lepers. However, villagers’ hostility towards lepers (an external constraint) constrained 
project implementation. This was apparent because non-leprosy patients did not 
frequent the centre, which lowered its clientele.280 But, this was addressed by a positive 
internal influence, i.e. project co-ordinators’ initiative in organising meals cooked by 
former lepers so as to increase interaction with villagers. Still, some respondents feel 
that villagers’ prejudice towards leprosy adversely affected project outcome.281 
This facilitated a positive external influence, i.e. sympathy among locals, from 
whom AWARE collected contributions. This was useful in facing an external 
influence, i.e. donors’ condition that they would fund if AWARE shared the cost. The 
decision to approach donors, was prompted by an internal factor, i.e. Madhavan’s 
reluctance to use governmental grant, since the State Government was unlikely to aid a 
project similar to its own in the same region. Still, some government officials were 
                                                           
280 Mr. Srinivas (head of MACS) said, “We did not know what to do with few patients in the hospital.”  
281Non-AWARE respondents and some beneficiaries felt thus.  
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helpful; for example, Khammam’s district collector Mr. P.V.R.K. Prasad provided the 
site for the centre.282  
Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 66% consultants / academics (two out of three) 
called this project successful, because Leprosy did not recur. Secondly, it removed 
people’s prejudice about leprosy.283 Thirdly, Padkal’s cured lepers were invited to 
neighbouring areas to contribute to village economy. Finally, many felt it succeeded in 
material rehabilitation of beneficiaries. However, 33% academics/ consultants called it 
moderately successful (one out of three), because ‘lepramatose’ was untreated, 
although leprosy was successfully eradicated from Padkal. Also, only material 
rehabilitation of patients occurred, because the inherent prejudice towards this disease 
remained.284 Nearly 58% beneficiaries called it successful, because they got a new lease 
of life. Some were not employed before, but after the project they were economically 
independent. But 42.5% beneficiaries called it moderately successful, because they 
obtained employment after a long time. Many felt they were not socially accepted even 
after being cured.285  
                                                           
282The Chairman, the head of administration and head of Bliss mentioned this.  
283 The heads of Bliss and AIF felt thus, but non-AWARE respondents refuted this.  
284Prof. Madduri attributes AWARE’s modest performance to lack of social assimilation. However, Prof. Chandra 
feels it was a gradual process and should not be considered a shortcoming.  
285Eight respondents felt AWARE’s leprosy education was inadequate.  
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Table: 4.6               Impact of Padkal Centre as perceived by respondents 
              RESPONDENTS                     OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY       TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE              3   3 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            3   2 (66%)   1 (33%)  
Beneficiaries            40 23 (57.5%) 17 (42.5%)  
Decisions here were centralised, because the Chairman consulted top staff and 
initiated the project. Moreover, it was the board’s decision to treat lepers and non-
lepers together. Also, only central office made budgetary decisions. However, there 
was some participation, like lower staff’s initiatives, which helped AWARE overcome 
beneficiaries’ fear of leprosy. Yet their involvement was more in data. Still downward 
accountability was maintained, because of the decision to involve village groups in 
project implementation. Besides, people’s feedback was obtained before deciding 
project details.  
Latur’s earthquake relief (1993) 
This project provided relief to earthquake victims. It was a six-month project 
where AWARE collaborated with funders to provide succour to 80,000 families, whilst 
setting up twenty wayside medical centres. Four of these were converted to tent 
hospitals with thirty-bed capacity and ambulance services.  
Out of ten, six respondents, including four AWARE respondents and two 
academics / consultants called Latur’s programme significant, because it covered many 
beneficiaries. Secondly, it was a massive operation that used enormous human and 
monetary resources. Thirdly, it was AWARE’s first relief programme outside the state. 
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Moreover, it faced many significant constraints like government’s conditions, donors’ 
control, personnel’s lack of expertise and rivalry amongst relief agencies. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, head of AWARE’s 
health services, Memisa’s (Netherlands) representative in the Indian office, and a 
representative from the Home Ministry were the project participants. The project was 
initiated when Madhavan’s associates in the Home Ministry informed him that 
AWARE’s aid was needed in Latur and that the GoI would partially bear the expenses 
for these operations. They however insisted that AWARE should network with the 
District Collector and ‘Tehsildar’ and report daily to the Ministry. Meanwhile, Memisa 
announced it could fund 80% rehabilitation efforts and send its researchers to supervise 
AWARE. Subsequently, the Chairman met his staff and board to decide the relief 
team’s composition. The heads of AWARE’s rural hospitals in Khammam, 
Mehbubnagar, Padkal, Nellore and Vishakhapatnam and certain VHWs were asked to 
join the team by AWARE’s head of health services. Finally, 300 doctors and medical 
staff left for Latur. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
A positive external influence was that government sought AWARE’s participation 
in relief operations. But AWARE faced an external constraint from donors, i.e. 
Memisa’s condition to supervise AWARE’s activities. This faced an internal factor, 
i.e. board’s refusal to allow any funding agency official join AWARE’s team. 
Subsequently, AWARE’s management had a joint meeting, where a critical internal 
constraint was identified, i.e. lack of expertise among AWARE’s medical team in relief 
operations. Finally, AWARE accepted Memisa’s condition.    
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At the field another external problem constrained AWARE. This was the claim by 
Latur’s relief agencies that they were in charge of those clusters, which had been 
assigned to AWARE. In this case, AWARE claims to have relinquished its claim, since 
it did not wish to delay relief.286 But, for other instances of discord, AWARE 
approached the district administration.  
Internal constraints affected this project. This was the tension between AWARE 
and Memisa’s team, due to the latter’s supervisory role, which alienated AWARE’s 
team. Another problem was lack of co-ordination between AWARE’s tent hospitals 
and medical camps. There were instances when medicines would not reach tent 
hospitals on time, due to non-availability of ambulance vans. Consequently, tent 
hospital members used their conveyance to fetch medicine from the camp. Yet, when 
the van arrived it delivered the same medicines because it followed old orders. In fact, 
respondents suggest that lack of networking with other relief agencies and with 
MEMISA’s team affected project outcome.287 
Another external factor was government’s constraining influence at Latur. Firstly, 
the state government sent unexpected visitors, including the Tehsildar to inspect 
AWARE’s activities, despite the team’s refusal.  Secondly, the GoI did not respond to 
the team’s reports, in which it mentioned its intention to implement new plans during 
the project. Yet, when the operation was undertaken, the GoI claimed ignorance. 
However, in all this, AWARE had a positive external influence, i.e. the Indian Army’s 
help in transporting victims to medical camps. 
                                                           
286As revealed by Mr Suresh Babu (head of health services).  
287Certain beneficiaries felt the project’s success was limited, because there was confusion in providing information 
and assistance to victims’ families.  
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Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 50% academics/ consultants (one out of two) called 
this project successful, because 20,000 to 25,000 victims were assisted. Moreover, it 
showed that AWARE could undertake relief operation outside Andhra without prior 
notice.288 It even earned governmental recognition. Consequently, AWARE won 
national status and ensured greater networking with MEMISA in future projects.289 
However, 50% academics (one out of two) called it moderately successful, since 
AWARE could not rehabilitate victims, albeit modest monetary aid was provided. 
Moreover, it was unable to network with other NGOs in Latur. Yet 50% beneficiaries 
called it successful, because they received prompt assistance from AWARE.290 Even 
victims’ relatives felt the personnel were prompt in providing information and 
assistance. But, 50% beneficiaries called it moderately successful, because there was 
confusion regarding where victims should be transferred and what treatment they 
should be given.291  
Table: 4.7                    Impact of Latur relief as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE              4   4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            2   1 (50%)   1(50%)  
Beneficiaries.292            40 20 (50%) 20 (50%)  
 
                                                           
288Mr. Ramana (head of administration) and Mr. Murlikrishna (head of AIF) mentioned this.  
289This was possible, because of AWARE’s fortuitous networking with Maharashtra government and MEMISA, 
according to Prof. Chandra. 
290Eleven respondents credited AWARE for managing initial treatment and first aid.  
291Most respondents felt that other relief agencies in Latur were better organised. 
292Feedback from beneficiaries was based on the report by Prof. Madduri’s team sometime after this project was 
undertaken. It was difficult to track disaster victims (beneficiaries) in the state of Maharashtra after a decade. 
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Decisions were centralised, due to the project’s nature. The lower staff 
participated by following central office orders. The Chairman and board consulted each 
other and accepted government’s request to assist relief operations. They even decided 
not to accept MEMISA’s aid. Later, they accepted it. Nevertheless, when problems 
were encountered on the field, lower and middle staff decided how to address them. 
Still when there was the pressure of governmental supervision, it was left for the 
Chairman and board to decide. Decisions were more accountable to donors and the 
government, than beneficiaries, because AWARE decided to network with the GoI and 
MEMISA. Beneficiaries were not actively involved in this project, so decisions were 
indirectly accountable to them.  
“Shantivanam” - the Multi-Speciality Hospital (1999) 
Shantivanam is a referral to AWARE’s rural health centres and treats cancer. It 
has medical, surgical and radiation oncology. New departments were added to treat 
more diseases and more patients. These were cardiology department, urology and 
nephrology department, neurology and neurosurgery department, orthopaedics and 
orthopaedic surgery department, obstretics and gynaecology department, infertility 
clinic, paediatrics and neonatology department, gastroenterology department and 
finally surgical gastroenterology department. It has a twenty four-hour emergency and 
pharmacy. Shantivanam also conducts health workshops and free monthly medical 
camps in rural and tribal heartland. Nearly twenty senior doctors and paramedical staff 
are involved in such camps where more than thousand people are treated.  
Out of ten, seven respondents, including four AWARE respondents and three 
academics / consultants felt Shantivanam was significant, because it was large-scale 
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and consolidated previous programmes. It encompassed more beneficiaries and 
geographical areas than other projects. Secondly, it faced significant constraints like 
disagreement with architects, designers, donors’ refusal to fund and lack of clientele.  
Respondents suggested that the Chairman, board members, A.I.F’s head, 
architects and doctors were the project participants. However, the project itself was 
initiated after Madhavan visited Machalipatnam in 1995 and met cancer patients. 
Machilipatnam’s Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and district leaders wanted 
an accessible cancer hospital. Consequently, the Chairman suggested that district 
authorities should raise some money, while AWARE would provide the rest. He 
consulted the board, who wanted awareness camps, which middle level staff undertook 
for three months.  
This camp was to understand the recurrence of cancer among people. The head of 
Bliss supervised it. Meanwhile, the Chairman and board members left for America and 
Europe to learn about cancer treatment. Later the heads of AWARE’s health services 
and administration organised a research team of junior doctors and graduates to 
examine the status of cancer treatment in India’s public and private health facilities. 
After the team’s report was released, AWARE launched Shantivanam.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first external factor, which prompted AWARE to launch Shantivanam was the 
presence of cancer patients in rural Andhra and the MLA’s and district leaders’ request 
for aid. These external influences combined with an internal factor, i.e. Madhavan’s 
concern about paucity of information on cancer. Consequently, AWARE’s 
management toured cancer hospitals in USA and Europe. 
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However, a critical internal influence on AWARE was its investigation team’s 
field report, which showed a gap between the large number of cancer patients and those 
who actually received treatment. Besides, there were other internal concerns that 
influenced decision-makers, like Shantivanam’s location, its layout and its strength, i.e. 
whether 50 or 100 beds were suitable. The original plan outlay was for 1000 beds, but 
through mutual consent it was changed to 300 beds.293  
Apart from Shantivanam’s strength, the Chairman, board members and others 
were concerned about departments to be opened here, since cancer patients needed 
treatment in other ailments. For this, health experts and field reports were consulted, 
following which it was decided that Shantivanam should be multi-speciality and cater 
to cancer and other diseases too. This way Shantivanam could monitor AWARE’s rural 
clinics in all major districts of Andhra Pradesh. So, AWARE’s management decided to 
consolidate its health programmes through centralisation.294  
Yet, Shantivanam faced external constraints during its construction from 
architects and civil engineers. The former considered the central office’s suggestions 
on design and lay out as interference. This led to disagreement between them and 
AWARE’s management. Consequently, these engineers and architects withdrew and 
Madhavan himself designed and planned the hospital. 
Another external constraint was donors’ refusal (especially NOVIB’s refusal) to 
release US$ 109,063 for Shantivanam.295 Not only did they feel that AWARE should 
                                                           
293The head of Health services mentioned that all AWARE members agreed that 300 beds were suitable, since they 
could later increase it to the limit of 1000 beds. 
294As mentioned by the head of health services and corroborated by the Chairman, Ms. Thakur, Prof. Madduri and 
Mr. Bhat.  
295According to the head of health services and the Chairman, AWARE approached donors, since the Chairman had 
assured beneficiaries of finances. 
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not interfere in a field, which was the government’s prerogative but were also reluctant 
to fund, since NOVIB had charged AWARE of fund misappropriation at Hague’s 
International Court of Justice. Consequently, AWARE was asked to abandon this 
project and continue with health education and primary health services. AWARE 
approached private contacts, co-operatives and banks for financial assistance; because 
the government’s limited finances and statutes made it a difficult funding source.  
However, Shantivanam faced constraints even after its establishment. Firstly, 
urban middle class patients, who could afford treatment, preferred known public or 
private hospitals.296 Thus, Shantivanam had no surplus and began advertising its 
services in cities. But this did not increase urban clientele due to an internal factor, i.e. 
Shantivanam’s incipience. Hence, people’s trust had not yet developed. The second 
external constraint was central government’s delay in empanelling Shantivanam. 
Through empanelling, AWARE was eligible for medical reimbursement for treating 
government employees under the Central Government Health Scheme. But 
empanelling requires governmental inspection of Shantivanam, which is done once in 
five years. Consequently, AWARE has to wait till 2004. Moreover, other private 
agencies will not empanel till this is done. Until these constraints are addressed, 
Shantivanam’s clientele will remain low. Therefore, many respondents believe that low 
clientele and low surplus generation have affected the outcome of this project.  
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 75% AWARE respondents (three out of 
four), because it targeted all rural beneficiaries and even received urban patients. 
                                                           
296 Had these affluent patients patronised Shantivanam, AWARE could have generated between 5 to 8% surplus, 
according to head of AWARE’s health services. 
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Besides, Shantivanam has the latest health equipment and expertise that can compare 
with private hospitals. It facilitated better networking between the head office and rural 
clinics. It even earned many important contacts from the Ministry of Health, which 
could be helpful.297 Still, 25% AWARE respondents (one out of four) called it 
moderately successful, because its urban clientele is insufficient. Similarly, all 
academics / consultants called it unsuccessful, because Shantivanam lacked urban 
clientele. Its clients are villagers, whose support was already consolidated before. In 
fact, this hospital faced losses, because it could not break even. Some felt it might shut 
down. Yet 25% beneficiaries called it successful, because they received treatment 
under one roof with all the latest equipment. However 42.5% beneficiaries called it 
moderately successful, because Shantivanam was distant from villages, which made it 
difficult to refer emergency cases.298 32.5% called it unsuccessful, because they were 
unfamiliar with its services, as compared to well-known public hospitals. They even 
doubted the expertise of Shantivanam’s doctors.299 
Table: 4.8                 Impact of Shantivanam as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE              4   3 (75%)   1 (25%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            3     3 (100%) 
Beneficiaries            40 10 (25%) 17 (42.5%) 13 (32.5%) 
Decisions were centralised, because the very first decision of undertaking a study 
of cancer treatment abroad was the Chairman’s. Secondly, the issue of opening specific 
departments in Shantivanam was decided between the board, Chairman and head of 
                                                           
297The head of AIF calls this important.  
298Fifteen respondents believed AWARE’s rural clinics were more convenient, although they lacked Shantivanam’s 
wherewithal.  
299These respondents mostly belonged to urban areas.  
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health services, although health experts and field reports were consulted. Thirdly, 
Shantivanam was built according to the Chairman’s specifications. Finally, the central 
office decided the budget. Besides, decisions did not maintain accountability towards 
powerful stakeholders nor beneficiaries. Instead, it was towards AWARE itself. 
Health Loans (2002) 
In this programme, AWARE disburses loans from MACS at 12% annual interest. 
Loans are given upon a reliable person’s surety. Loans are also given if genuine 
property documents are produced. Based on this, MACS’ branch managers sanction 
loans. Loans have to be repaid between one to three years and can be repaid in 
instalments. Unlike Chaitanya Nidhi, loans are not given to groups but individuals. 
Hence, peer pressure cannot ensure repayment. Instead, defaulters are fined, or 
debarred from further loans. These loans are for availing Shantivanam’s services. 
Out of ten, seven respondents, including five AWARE respondents and two 
academics / consultants, called health loans significant, because it covered large 
geographical area and included many beneficiaries. They also suggested it was 
significant, because henceforth AWARE’s focus was on surplus generation rather than 
service delivery. Also, they felt this project faced significant constraints like donors’ 
refusal to fund, resource crunch and fall of clientele.  
The Chairman, heads of AWARE’s Health Services, MACS, Bliss, head of 
administration and governing body members were the project participants. Heads of 
health services and MACS identified Shantivanam’s low surplus and clientele. They 
believed if health loans were instituted it could solve the problem. Subsequently, they 
approached the Chairman, board, and heads of AIF and Bliss Foundation. The 
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Chairman and others accepted their proposal for health loans. Since most board 
members favoured health loans, it was formally instituted. MACS was to issue loans 
for AWARE’s health department. Therefore, heads of health services and MACS were 
responsible for these loans. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The very first factor, which prompted AWARE to institute health loans, was an 
internal influence, i.e. concern shown by heads of health services and MACS regarding 
Shantivanam’s lack of surplus and clientele.300 They noticed Patients obtained free 
treatment due to their inability to pay even nominal charges and this financially 
affected AWARE. Consequently, Madhavan and the board accepted the proposal. 
Besides, they foresaw that banks and insurance companies would empanel only after 
GoI, which would take time, because of which Shantivanam could face closure.301 
Donors’ refusal to fund any new project by AWARE was an external influence on 
this project. This refusal was because AWARE’s legal battle with NOVIB tarnished its 
image.302 Hence AWARE approached other donors, who were keen to undertake only 
microfinance. Consequently the central office decided to use their funds for health 
loans. Later when the project was launched, a positive external factor (the non-core 
poor availed the loans) aided AWARE. This was especially true of Machilipatnam 
district. But, the constraints faced by Shantivanam hindered the success of this project. 
In fact, certain respondents believe that low clientele hindered surplus generation.  
                                                           
300According to the head of health services, head of MACS and head of administration, Shantivanam’s resource 
crunch was due to lack of patronage from urban middle class and lack of governmental empanelling.  
301According to the former consultant to NOVIB, “Health loans were to aid Shantivanam generate surplus. But it 
also drew AWARE away from beneficiaries.” 
302As revealed by Prof. Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central University) and Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant 
to NOVIB).   
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Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 75% AWARE respondents (three out of 
four), because it increased Shantivanam’s clientele by 12% and generated surplus. 
Moreover, all rural patients, who could not afford health services, were covered. 
Nearly 75% loans were recovered. It improved the link between AWARE’s rural 
clinics and Shantivanam, thereby hastening centralisation. However, 25% AWARE 
respondents (one out of two) and 50% consultants (one out of two) called it moderately 
successful, because loans did not significantly increase urban clientele, although rural 
patients increased.303 Similarly 50% academics / consultants (one out of two) called it 
unsuccessful, since Shantivanam’s clientele did not increase, nor was sizeable surplus 
generated. Besides, it made AWARE concentrate on non-core poor.304 But, 30% 
beneficiaries called it successful, because they found Shantivanam’s services 
affordable.305 Another 35% called it moderately successful, because the interest made 
loans expensive in the long run. However 14% respondents called it unsuccessful, 
because they wanted to use loans for other purposes, but could not, because it was 
exclusively for Shantivanam. They called it superfluous, because they would not have 
visited Shantivanam even without loans.306 
                                                           
303As suggested by Mr. Suresh Babu (head of health services) and Prof. Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central 
University).  
304According to MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB), only a minority with basic income level availed these 
loans.  
305One respondent said, “My son broke his leg. Rural clinics directed us to Shantivanam. I could not have borne 
those expenses but for these loans.” 
306One respondent said, “we were being referred to other private and public hospitals by Shantivanam. What was 
the use of these loans?” 
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Table: 4.9                   Impact of Health Loans as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE              4   3 (75%)   1 (25%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
            2    1 (50%)   1 (50%) 
Beneficiaries            40 12 (30%) 14 (35%) 14 (35%) 
Decisions were top-down, but the Chairman did not decide everything. As was 
noticed from the discussion, the initiative came from other top ranking staff, like heads 
of MACS and health department. Although they approached Madhavan, the latter 
consulted other board members. It was a joint decision that led central office members 
to accept the proposal. During decision-making, some central office members informed 
the Chairman that donors preferred microfinance. This shows that top-level staff was 
involved in decisions and that beneficiaries were not. In fact, decisions were not 
accountable towards beneficiaries, or donors. Accountability was towards AWARE’s 
financial stability. 
THE INCREMENTAL MODEL AND DECISIONS IN HEALTH 
PROJECTS  
Having examined decisions within landmark health projects, it is worthwhile to 
further analyse them theoretically. The model that is considered in this section is the 
Incremental Model. This model is relevant for organisations like NGOs and it posits 
decisions as mini projects, rather than one major decision in an organisation’s lifetime. 
This is germane to AWARE’s decisions, which are also in the form of numerous 
projects undertaken over the years. 
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Incrementalists believe organisational decision-makers initially ‘identify’ a 
problem. Subsequently, they gather details to understand or diagnose it. Then they 
undertake ‘development processes where a suitable response for the problem is 
fashioned. Either the response is selected from organisational records, or it is specially 
developed. Some organisational members may be dissatisfied with this response, due 
to their personal preference, inability to implement this solution, appearance of a new 
solution, change in circumstances and other reasons. If the response is rejected, it is a 
decision-interrupt, which forces decision-makers to re-evaluate their strategy and 
reconsider earlier stages of decision-making. Through continuously reshuffling within 
decision-loops, a solution is finally chosen.  
Decisions of health projects can be somewhat explained by this model, as follows. 
For Chinnapuram centre, AWARE did not gather information separately, since the 
cyclone shelter was already present and people’s health was already being addressed. 
So the model’s thesis that organisations do not always gather information to learn more 
about decisional issues is pertinent. However, in the mobile clinic project, incremental 
model’s problem diagnosis is applicable, because data was gathered on the problem of 
recurrent illness. Similarly there was problem identification in the project on VHWs, 
because the Chairman visited Telangana to identify the problem of tribals’ unhealthy 
living conditions. Later AWARE’s middle and lower staff learnt more about people’s 
health, which makes incremental model’s sequential order of problem identification 
and diagnosis, relevant. 
However this model’s sequentialism is inapplicable to food and nutrition project, 
because problem identification and diagnosis were combined when mobile clinic learnt 
that lack of nutrition caused ill health and also identified health problems. Similarly, 
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sequential ordering is irrelevant in the boat hospital project, because Madhavan’s 
interaction with tribals engendered simultaneous problem identification and diagnosis. 
But, the model’s sequential ordering can explain Padkal project, like the mobile clinic 
and VHWs project.  
Even Latur project undertook problem diagnosis and identification, albeit 
differently. GoI rather than AWARE identified the problem. The model cannot explain 
this, because it assumes decision-makers themselves identify problems. However the 
model considers emergencies with no time for diagnosis, which was the case in this 
project. Diagnosis was done on the field whilst addressing the problem. Diagnosis was 
also done on the field in food and nutrition and boat hospital projects, but that was 
along with problem identification. Like the project on VHWs, boat hospital and leprosy 
campaign, even for Shantivanam, identification and diagnosis were undertaken 
sequentially. The Chairman identified the problem, whilst the research team gathered 
data about cancer by way of diagnosis. 
Problem identification and diagnosis were done for health loans. But, it was 
different. In identifying the problem of low surplus generation and diagnosing it as lack 
of empanelling and clientele, AWARE’s previous experience in loans was helpful. 
However, Mintzberg does not consider decision-makers’ previous experience in 
problem identification and diagnosis. He considers it only to explain selection of 
responses to resolve problems. 
Apart from problem identification and diagnosis, this model has other features, 
which can explain these projects. For example, decision-interrupt can be used to 
explain the disagreement between the board and the Chairman in Chinnapuram project. 
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The project was nearly abandoned, but, beneficiaries’ initiative made AWARE revert 
to earlier decision loops, which the model’s concept of recycling decisions can explain. 
Interrupts were also present in the mobile clinic, i.e. Naxalites’ opposition. But, 
AWARE did not revise decisions. So, the model’s recycling of decisions is 
inapplicable here. Even the project on midwives faced interrupts, i.e. CDOs and VA 
leaders’ scepticism about AWARE’s ability to convince midwives to change their 
traditional methods, health professionals’ demand for higher remuneration and board’s 
concern to economise. To address them, AWARE reconsidered strategies, which the 
model can explain.  
However, for food and nutrition project, incrementalists’ explanation is 
inapplicable, because AWARE did not recycle decisions to resolve constraints, like 
beneficiaries’ reluctance for preventive health care and board’s reluctance to 
antagonise people. However, lack of expertise was an interrupt, which made AWARE 
rethink its strategy. Subsequently, NIN’s assistance was sought, which forestalled a 
potential interrupt, i.e. cessation of government’s funds. But, incrementalists cannot 
explain pre-emptive decision-making. 
Nevertheless, incrementalists’ explanation of interrupts is applicable for Jeewan 
Shravanti. The interrupt occurred when the board vetoed the staff’s suggestion to reach 
beneficiaries in a piecemeal manner. Subsequently, AWARE reconsidered its strategy 
and decided to have a boat. Another interrupt was delay of funds and release of no-
objection certificate. For this, AWARE reconsidered beneficiaries’ socio-economic 
condition, and made them pay a modest sum.  This model’s decision recycle also 
explains AWARE’s reaction to an interrupt like villagers’ hostility in the Padkal 
project. Although not a typical interrupt, since it involved non-organisation members, 
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still AWARE reconsidered alternatives, i.e. undertook further diagnosis through anti-
leprosy campaigns and learnt more about villagers’ antipathy. 
The model’s theory of recycling decisions explains AWARE’s rationale in 
reneging its decision of initially refusing Memisa’s help in Latur project. It 
reconsidered its decision, because of an interrupt like lack of expertise. Other interrupts 
were competing claims of relief agencies, but AWARE decided not to address it. It did 
not revamp decisions even for interrupts, like lack of co-ordination with MEMISA’s 
team and GoI’s inspections. Incrementalists cannot explain why organisations 
compromise (like AWARE did) by not reconsidering their strategies. 
The model’s recycling also explains how AWARE resolved interrupts regarding 
departments in Shantivanam. It ‘retraced’ decisions, by consulting research reports. 
Another interrupt was donors’ refusal to fund. But, the model cannot explain this, since 
it ignores disagreement between organisation members and outsiders. Besides, 
AWARE resolved it without recycling decisions. Still, it can explain AWARE’s 
response to the interrupt of limited funds in health loans project. It reconsidered 
decisions, repeated the same action as Shantivanam, and approached other donors. 
Thus it is seen that AWARE developed decision loops, which it improvised in its 
latest health projects. This created an organisational repertoire. In fact, its decision 
loops (which the model can explain) became complex as more projects were 
undertaken and more issues were decided. Even problem identification, diagnosis and 
selection of response changed. A similar trend is also noticed in decisions within 
education projects, which are examined in the subsequent chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Education Programme - AWARE’S Experience 
In this chapter, AWARE’s decisions in landmark education projects undertaken 
from 1970s to 2000 are examined. This is to learn what each project entailed, who 
participated in its decisions, what factors influenced it and what the outcome was. 
Decisions are also studied through the Incremental Model, like decisions in the 
previous chapter. Here too, ten AWARE respondents and Academics / consultants 
were interviewed for information on decisions in nine landmark projects like Property 
Rights, Legal Rights, Chaitanya Nidhi personnel’s training, Yenadi project, Good 
Voters’ programme, Bliss, TFRD training, Veterinary training, Deemed University. For 
information on project outcome, forty beneficiaries and the above-mentioned ten 
AWARE respondents and consultants were interviewed.  
Education projects addressed health, poverty eradication and women’s 
empowerment issues, because social issues are interrelated. Early projects addressed 
women’s empowerment and poverty eradication. Hence focus of projects like ‘property 
rights’, ‘legal rights’, ‘training in Chaitanya Nidhi’ and ‘Yenadi programme’, was on 
socio-economic empowerment and awareness. But later projects like good voters’ and 
‘veterinary training’ programmes addressed complex issues like increasing political 
awareness and skill training. Moreover, AWARE wanted to consolidate education 
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programmes. Therefore, it established ‘Bliss Foundation’ and even trained ‘TFRD’ 
officers to oversee rural education.  
Landmark projects in Education from the 1970s to 2000  
Education in Property Rights (1975) 
This was undertaken in Khammam, Mehbubnagar, East and West Godavari and 
Nellore, where farmers lost their lands to landlords and local politicians. Therefore 
AWARE’s legal cell instructed farmers on their right to property ownership, as 
mentioned in the Indian Penal Code. They were taught that losing property to others 
through coercion was an offence. They were taught to regain their property by 
contacting authorities and were given basic lessons in simple interest and loans too. 
Out of ten, seven respondents, including five AWARE respondents and two 
academics / consultants, called this project significant, because it impacted many 
beneficiaries and covered a large geographical area. Secondly, it was one of the first 
projects that undertook educating beneficiaries in basic rights. Thirdly, it faced 
constraints like pressure from landed elite, donors’ reluctance to fund and AWARE’s 
incipience. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, CDOs, VA leaders and 
project co-ordinators participated in the project. CDOs identified the problem, whilst 
the Chairman interviewed villagers about landlords exploiting them. He consulted the 
board, attorneys from Andhra Pradesh High Court and bureaucrats. It was decided that 
along with releasing property, tribals should be educated in property rights. So 
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AWARE hired private lawyers to train 250 beneficiaries from each district and release 
their property. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first external factor, which initiated the project, was that tribals lost their 
property to landed elites. Nearly 100,000 acres of tribal land had been seized 
unlawfully on pretext of non-repayment of loans. During project implementation 
AWARE faced limited funds. This was related to an internal constraint, i.e. AWARE’s 
incipience and lack of networking with donors, which made donors reluctant to fund.307 
It was overcome by an internal influence, i.e. Madhavan’s initiative in using his money 
for the project.  
During project implementation, a critical external constraint appeared; i.e. hostility 
of landed elite and local politicians, because it aimed at releasing property, which they 
had unlawfully held. Subsequently legal workers were attacked, leading AWARE to 
secure police protection. Many communist parties were adversely affected by this 
project and launched a negative campaign against the Chairman.308 This engendered 
cessation of funds on State Government’s orders, which delayed the project. AWARE 
then approached the High Court and was vindicated. However landed elite’s hostility 
significantly affected this project’s outcome. It even limited the project’s success, 
according to certain respondents. 
                                                           
307The Chairman said, “Ours was a young organisation. We wanted funds and they asked ‘what guarantee do we 
have that you will perform?”  
308The Chairman mentioned, “I was accused of being a CIA agent..…. They (state government) stopped funds. But I 
was confident even when they went to the High Court.” 
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Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 80% AWARE respondents (four out of 
five) and 50% academics / consultants (one out of two), because there was no more 
illegal land occupation in Mehbubnagar.309 Besides, it helped people materially, 
because they could grow crops in this land and market them. However 20% AWARE 
respondents (one out of five) called it moderately successful, because there were delays 
(caused by landed elite) before the impact was felt.310 Similarly 50% consultants (one 
out of two) called it unsuccessful and inefficient, because its impact was felt after five 
years. Meanwhile more resource was spent in overcoming legal battles with the elite. 
But, 32.5% beneficiaries called it successful, because they regained control of land and 
could improve their income.311 However 67.5% called it moderately successful, 
because it temporarily reduced dependence on elite.312 
Table: 5.1               Impact of Property Rights project as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE               5   4 (80%)   1 (20%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
             2   1 (50%)  1 (50%) 
Beneficiaries             40 13 (32.5%) 27 (67.5%)   
 
Decisions here were top-down and centralised. The central office decided upon 
this project, although lower and middle staff identified beneficiaries’ problems. Still it 
                                                           
309The Chairman and the head of Bliss called this important. In fact, the latter claimed that illegal land occupation 
fell by 20% after a year and 60% after four years. However, Dr. Narasimhan said it fell by 55%. 
310As mentioned by the head of MACS.  
311Eight beneficiaries said that the land was used for cultivation. Household income apparently improved, because 
surplus was sold in the market. Besides, they did not depend on landed elite for employment.  
312These respondents suggested that although this project reduced dependence on elite, it was a temporary 
phenomenon. This is because the elite discovered other ways of exploiting them. 
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was not the Chairman’s decision alone, since he consulted central office and non-
AWARE members. But, it was his decision to finance this project. Moreover it was his 
initiative to approach the High Court, following the State Government’s accusation. 
Despite centralisation, decisions maintained downward accountability, because lower 
staff and Chairman interacted with beneficiaries and learnt their problems at the outset. 
Training in Legal Rights (1982) 
Here, AWARE taught Girijans and Harijans in Vishakapatnam, Padare, 
Khammam, Nellore and parts of Orissa, their legal rights (especially rights against 
bonded labour). They were also taught how to obtain legal redress. This was targeted at 
areas where legal violation and detention persisted and covered nearly 50,000 
beneficiaries. A year after project implementation, there were follow-up training 
programmes till 1985.  
Out of ten, seven respondents, including four AWARE respondents and three 
academics / consultants called this project significant, because it impacted many 
beneficiaries. Also, it faced constraints, like limited funds, landed elite’s hostility, 
Naxalites’ infiltration into AWARE and beneficiaries’ passivity. Although respondents 
did not call it novel, they felt the project addressed many controversial legal issues.313  
According to respondents, VA leaders and CDOs of Padare, the Chairman, board 
members, head of administration, lawyers from Andhra Pradesh’s High Court, and 
CEC leaders were the project participants. VA leaders reporting atrocities to CDOs and 
CEC leaders. Subsequently legal workers were dispatched from Nellore, who 
                                                           
313According to Sameeksha Thakur (independent researcher), “Legal issues had already been addressed in the first 
major project on property rights. This was an extension.”  
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monitored 500 villages, conducted legal training camps and released many illegally 
detained villagers and bonded labourers. Meanwhile, the Chairman consulted Andhra 
High Court’s junior lawyers regarding illegal detention. Most offences should have 
been legally settled within six months. Therefore, the head of administration suggested 
hiring private lawyers to release illegal detainees and bonded labourers. 
However even after their release, further harassment had to be prevented. So the 
Chairman wanted beneficiaries to be trained. To organise training in villages, he 
consulted CDOs, VA leaders, and project co-ordinators. He also appointed private 
lawyers (who had released illegal detainees) to impart legal education. Along with this 
training, AWARE launched health camps, based on the suggestion of CDOs and other 
VA leaders. After the project was implemented, Philips (based in Netherlands) 
provided funds for sometime.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The external factor, which initiated this project, was increasing exploitation of 
villagers by police, landlords and local politicians. These politicians belonged to the 
Communist Party of India (CPI). As CPI members they had close links with their 
grassroots revolutionary outfit - the Naxalites, who were well entrenched in the 
Telangana region, where this project was launched. It is ironic that while they 
championed the cause of the poor and rights of labourers in the State Legislative 
Assembly and Centre, they perpetrated bonded labour in these villages. Although they 
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had some support from the Congress government at the centre, due to its socialistic 
leanings, the CPI had not yet developed alliance with the newly formed TDP.314 
The police practised illegal detention, while landlords and politicians practised 
bonded labour. In fact, the police imprisoned nearly seventy villagers and illegally 
detained others on minor charges. Subsequently AWARE’s legal cell released many 
detainees on bail. Apart from illegal detention, many poor farmers had pledged their 
service and freedom to their debtors.  
Once AWARE launched this project, it was influenced by an internal factor, i.e. 
board’s concern for cost efficacy. It was keen to undertake projects, which addressed 
more than one social issue, so that with common resources more socio-economic 
problems could be resolved.315 In this they were aided by CDOs’ suggestion that legal 
camps should be combined with health education.    
     However during project implementation, Naxalites and Communist Party 
cadres, who practised bonded labour, constrained AWARE. Some of them joined 
AWARE as its staff and demanded wage hikes according to the minimum wage act.316 
Many staff members supported them. However AWARE’s management refused saying 
that nearly 75% to 80% funds would be drained in staff maintenance alone.317 
Subsequently new recruits, supported by the communist party and AWARE staff, 
staged a strike.   
                                                           
314 The basic ideology of both CPI and the newly formed TDP was different. For CPI, it was emancipation of the 
poor and rejection of a market economy. For TDP, it was upholding Telugu culture and also reconstructing caste 
identities, thereby gaining popularity.  
315The head of administration said, “We (i.e. the Board) were trying to see where we can fit in two or more social 
issues…To save time and money.”  
316In this the Naxals had the full support of local politicians from the Communist Party, according to the Chairman 
and Head of Bliss. 
317The Chairman claimed, “I reminded them that we were not for profit and cannot expect luxuries like other 
companies.”  
142 
     In this struggle, certain external factors aided AWARE. First was media’s 
publicity. Due to newspaper reports of the dispute between AWARE and Naxal 
members, AWARE won the sympathy of locals, social activists and some 
bureaucrats.318 This helped AWARE win beneficiaries’ support. The combined support 
of all these bodies caused suspension of strike and dismissal of those responsible for it.  
Second external constraint was pressure from landlords, who practised bonded 
labour. They opposed AWARE’s campaign and felt it threatened their authority. 
Consequently they rioted in areas where AWARE undertook legal training. In fact, 
there was a nexus between landed elite and Naxalites. While the latter used its 
members to infiltrate the ranks of AWARE, landlords launched protests at the field. 
Another external constraint hindered AWARE. This was limited funding from 
donors, since Philips stopped funds after six months of project execution. Thereafter 
AWARE depended on beneficiaries’ modest contributions. This was insufficient and 
the project was postponed for sometime. Nevertheless, it was resumed when other 
donors provided funds. The hiatus caused AWARE to again launch training camps in 
villages, because beneficiaries had to be re-motivated. In fact, beneficiaries’ passivity 
along with police harassment and landlords’ exploitation were considered responsible 
for impeding the project’s success, according to respondents.  
It was people’s lack of motivation and their passive acceptance of bondage under 
landlords and police harassment, which was a significant external constraint for project 
co-ordinators and legal workers. This is because beneficiaries feared repercussions 
                                                           
318Prof. Madduri said, “The journalists supported AWARE and even devoted full page stories to AWARE.” 
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from landed elite if they protested. Consequently, it took nearly a year for the field staff 
to address this mental block. 
However AWARE was aided by an external factor, i.e. the assistance of local 
politicians.319 These politicians campaigned before assembly elections and were 
attracted to AWARE’s programme against bonded labour and illegal detention. They 
felt it could help them win people’s support and aided AWARE in releasing many 
villagers.  
Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents called this project successful, because 50,000 people 
were trained. Bonded labour and illegal detention ceased. In fact, beneficiaries revolted 
against its occurrence.320 It even spread to Mehbubnagar and Nellore. Nevertheless, all 
non-AWARE experts called it moderately successful, because its impact was delayed 
and instances of bonded labour continued. Secondly, other forms of police harassment 
continued, although illegal detention ceased. Thirdly, AWARE earned the hostility of 
landlords and local politicians, which hindered future projects. Still they called it 
advantageous, because AWARE integrated legal education campaign against bonded 
labour and detention in future projects within Godavari. But 45% beneficiaries called it 
successful, because they were freed.321 However 55% beneficiaries called it moderately 
                                                           
319 These local politicians (not to be confused with CPI members) belonged to the TDP and were also its full-time 
cadre. They helped AWARE, because of their political rivalry with the Communist party. They were also fuelled by 
the desire to make inroads into rural Andhra, at a time when NT Ramarao was trying to gain popular mandate, 
according to the Chairman  
320The head of administration claims that in Vishakhapatnam people formed associations, which identified instances 
of bonded labour and reported to the Mandal officer. 
321Beneficiaries said they got a new lease of life after being released. Nine beneficiaries narrated instances of how 
they protested against police harassment, or how they refused to blindly sign papers drawn by landlords.  
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successful, because justice was delayed. Some felt their fighting spirit was destroyed, 
so, despite release from bondage, they were unsure about their future.322  
Table: 5.2                Impact of Legal Rights project as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS  OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY       TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                4   4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              3    3 (100%)  
Beneficiaries              40 18 (45%) 22 (55%)  
Thus decisions were centralised with some elements of participation. Legal 
problems were identified and notified to upper staff by lower personnel. It was the 
latter, who told the Chairman that health and legal training camps should be combined. 
Their suggestion was heeded, which shows that decisions were participatory. Yet, 
certain decisions were top-down, for example, the head of administration’s decision to 
hire legal experts to free villagers, and the Chairman’s decision to impart legal training 
to people. Nevertheless non-AWARE members like legal experts and local politicians 
played a role in deciding how to release illegally detained villagers. Downward 
accountability was retained, because people themselves were trained in legal rights. 
Besides, AWARE knew it was not enough to free detained villagers, but also important 
to help them fight further harassment. 
Training given to Chaitanya Nidhi’s resource people (1984) 
The Chaitanya Nidhi microfinance programme was part of AWARE’s poverty 
eradication efforts to materially empower women of East and West Godavari, 
Khammam, Mehbubnagar and Nellore districts. The actual project implementation and 
                                                           
322 18 beneficiaries said that they had spent a much of their life in servitude, before they were released by AWARE. 
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its impact on beneficiaries have been examined under AWARE’s poverty eradication. 
This section examines training given to resource personnel to manage the project. 
Nearly 250 resource personnel were recruited and trained. Training included ways 
of interacting with beneficiaries, i.e. how to handle situations where loanee could not 
repay; how to lend money from a pool to villagers; how to encourage savings among 
them and finally how to keep account of finances. Each batch was trained in 
accounting, book keeping and banking in Bhagvatipuram for a month. New batches 
were trained and dispatched to areas targeted by AWARE for the introduction of this 
credit scheme.  
Out of ten, eight including five AWARE respondents and three academics / 
consultants called this project significant. It impacted many beneficiaries in five major 
districts of Telangana. Secondly, it was novel, because it changed AWARE’s 
empowerment pattern. Thirdly, it faced many constraints, like lack of expertise in 
microfinance, difficulty in training personnel and landed elite’s hostility. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, head of administration, board members, 
VA leaders, CEC leaders from Khammam, Mehbubnagar, East and West Godavari and 
Nellore participated in the project. CDOs initiated it by reporting cases of rural 
indebtedness and bonded labour to CEC leaders. The latter informed the Chairman, 
who realised that a rural credit programme was needed and consulted the board and 
head of administration. Subsequently he sent CEC leaders, CDOs and head of 
administration to consult the state government on its microfinance programmes. 
Meanwhile, he and others visited Bangladesh to study its rural credit project.  
146 
After these visits and consultation, it was decided that villages should be divided 
into clusters.323 It was also felt that a separate training on microfinance was essential 
before implementing microfinance schemes. VA leaders decided who should be trained 
from the village. Meanwhile, instructors from Grameen Bank were requested to assist 
AWARE.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first influencing factor was Madhavan’s insistence that AWARE should have 
interest-free loans. This primary consideration guided the rest of the programme, 
including funding from donors and how training should be undertaken. In the latter 
case, an external influence aided AWARE, i.e. information from Grameen Bank and 
the state government’s finance board. This helped in training resource members and 
executing the project. Besides, certain instructors from Grameen Bank assisted 
AWARE in training. 
Another positive external influence was donors’ willingness to fund the training of 
resource personnel and execution of microfinance scheme on the field. Consequently, 
the training, which extended beyond the stipulated period, was still funded. Donors 
even suggested certain changes in the training schedule. AWARE accepted them, since 
donors were experienced in funding microfinance projects of other NGOs.  
However certain internal constraints affected programme implementation. This 
was lack of expertise in microfinance among staff members. No personnel could train 
resource people. In fact, certain respondents called the project moderately successful, 
                                                           
323Details of the formation and constituents of these village clusters for microfinance will be mentioned under the 
Chaitanya Nidhi’s poverty eradication efforts. The focus here is only on the “training and education” imparted for 
this programme. 
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because they could not initiate their community members. However this was overcome 
by hiring experts from the Grameen Bank. The other internal problem was in educating 
resource personnel. It was difficult to train older target group members. This was 
compounded by landed elite’s attempt to disrupt training by rousing people against 
AWARE. 
Major impacts 
This is one of the few projects that all AWARE respondents and academics called 
successful. It made trainees understand what the scheme involved and how to benefit 
from it.324 In fact, other organisations invited these trainees to assist in microfinance 
projects. The programme also extended to Orissa and led to a similar credit scheme for 
men, which brought more funds from donors.325 Most importantly, it led to the 
establishment of MACS years later, which institutionalised rural credit. However 
67.5% beneficiaries (resource personnel) called it successful, because they could 
manage microfinance programmes independently on the field. They felt it was easy to 
initiate their community members.326 Yet, 32.5% resource personnel called it 
moderately successful, because they did not have similar training skills as those, who 
taught them at AWARE’s training centres.327 This made it difficult for them to initiate 
others.  
                                                           
324The Chairman called this important for any programme’s success.  
325As suggested by the heads of AIF and Bliss and corroborated by Prof. Madduri, Prof. Chandra and Dr. 
Narasimhan.  
326Twenty personnel felt it was easy to disseminate their knowledge among their own people, because they knew 
how best to interact with them.  
327Interestingly, resource personnel called this project moderately successful for the opposite reasons as those 
personnel, who called it very successful. 
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Table: 5.3  Impact of training Chaitanya Nidhi’s resource personnel as perceived by 
respondents 






AWARE                5   5 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              3   3 (100%)   
Beneficiaries              40 27 (67.5%) 13 (32.5%)  
Like the previous project, decisions here were quite participatory, because VA 
leaders decided who should be trained, and CDOs decided that rural indebtedness or 
bonded labour needed attention. Even non-AWARE members, like state government 
officials and Grameen Bank members were consulted on financial matters. Moreover, 
donors’ suggestions on rural credit were considered. Yet there was some centralisation, 
because central office decided that CEC leaders and CDOs should consult the state 
government. Secondly, it was the Chairman’s decision that loans should be interest-
free. Finally, it was central office’s decision (particularly the Chairman) to consult 
Grameen Bank. Yet downward accountability was maintained, because VA and CA 
leaders (representatives of the people) were involved in most phases of decision-
making. Moreover CDOs reported the problems people faced only after interacting 
with them. 
Yenadi Tribal Development Project (1988) 
This project empowered Yenadi tribals in 16 clusters of Nellore district. Each 
cluster had 20 villages and 2,000 families. Among these, 80 individuals were selected 
and trained at Bhagvatipuram for two months, by AWARE and social action experts. 
During training alcoholism, caste exploitation, and landlords’ exploitation were 
discussed. Beneficiaries expressed their problem and also how it should be resolved.  
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Beneficiaries were taught their rights in areas where they showed lack of 
empowerment. For e.g. if they faced non-availability of ration cards, they were taught 
their rights as consumers. Similarly, if villagers were harassed by unlawful detainment 
from the police, they were taught to demand their constitutional right of ‘habeas 
corpus’. If villagers had water problems, their leaders were taught to petition before the 
Mandal Development Officer (MDO) and the District Collector. They were also taught 
to use posters and campaigns for protest. Initially AWARE’s CDOs and ADOs (Area 
Development Officers) helped villagers contact authorities. Subsequently beneficiaries 
did it themselves.  
According to six respondents, i.e. five AWARE respondents and one consultant, 
this programme was significant. They felt that it covered many beneficiaries and a 
large area. For the first time large tribal belts were covered under a comprehensive 
education programme.328 Besides it faced significant constraints like beneficiaries’ 
passivity, local landlords’ hostility, and disagreement among AWARE’s field staff.  
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, head of administration, 
ADOs, CDOs and Nellore’s administrative officers participated in the project. 
Beneficiaries reported their problems to CDOs, ADOs and ZOs, who informed the 
Chairman. The latter consulted the head of administration and governing body. 
Subsequently 25 functionaries (CDOs, ADOs, Administrative Officers and some lower 
staff) were appointed to survey Nellore. They divided villages into clusters and 
surveyed villagers’ assets, levels of education, professions and problems they faced in 
their professional lives. They presented a three-year perspective plan, which proposed 
                                                           
328Previous programmes had not included basic education along with training in legal rights. Yenadi programme 
aggregated all these efforts, according to Dr. Chandra. 
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psychological, social and economic empowerment for Yenadis. After this was 
approved, youth and village associations were established.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first external influence, during project execution was beneficiaries’ passivity 
towards their problems. Their inertia delayed the project. It also made project co-
ordinators work harder at mobilisation. Another external constraint compounded this, 
i.e. local landlords’ threat to CDOs and ADOs, who went to survey Nellore. In fact, 
landlords used violence against AWARE’s field staff and provoked villagers against 
them. However this was overcome due to a positive, external influence, i.e. support of 
the District Superintendent of Police and his subordinates.329 Nevertheless, 
beneficiaries’ passivity and hostility of landed elite hindered the project’s success. 
Many internal factors also influenced decisions. One positive internal influence 
was the initiative by AWARE’s rural staff and lower level personnel in creating village 
and youth associations. These associations consolidated training given in consumer 
laws and citizens rights and also ensured that authorities addressed villagers’ 
grievances.  
However there were negative internal influences like infighting among AWARE’s 
staff. This was because certain CDOs rejected the direct means to empower people by 
merely educating them about their constitutional rights. They wanted AWARE to 
station its members to familiarise villagers with the process of fighting for their rights 
and that after some time, people should be made to take the initiative. This was 
                                                           
329 The head of administration mentioned, “Whenever the top official has been supportive of us, even the 
subordinates have been nice.”  
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overcome by the head of administration’s intervention and a subsequent change of 
approach, whereby AWARE’s field staff initially helped villagers with their rights.330 
Major impacts 
Like the previous project, all AWARE respondents and consultants called this 
project successful. In fact, there were fifteen instances of beneficiaries demanding 
rights. Moreover, 200 people demanded ration cards from the MRO and district 
collector. Many even lodged complaints against instances of alcoholism, caste 
exploitation and harassment.331 There were requests for similar schemes from 
Mehbubnagar. It also led to the critical social action programme, Chaitanya Shakti.332 
Also 72.5% beneficiaries called it successful, because they felt capable of demanding 
their rights from government functionaries. They even cited instances of how they 
obtained redress from social evils by approaching district officials. However 27.5% 
respondents called it moderately successful, because social evils persisted. In fact, 
many tribals were still wary of demanding their rights for fear of reprisals from 
authorities.333 
                                                           
330The head of administration mentioned, “Although the field staff initially followed the plan they later complained. 
We therefore posted project co-ordinators to help villagers contact authorities initially.”  
331This indicated success, according to the heads of Bliss and AIF.  
332Prof. Chandra called this the most significant achievements of this project.  
333Nine respondents said they desisted from demanding potable water from the authorities, because they feared 
being penalised.   
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Table: 5.4                     Impact of Yenadi project as perceived by respondents 
  RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE               5   5 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
             1   1 (100%)   
Beneficiaries             40 29 (72.5%) 11 (27.5%)  
Decisions here were partially participatory, but primarily top-down, because 
central office took key decisions. In fact, the Chairman and other central office 
members decided that middle level staff should survey the region before project 
implementation. Also, it was their decision to implement the programme after the 
action plan was submitted. Finally, when CDOs and field staff disagreed, it was the 
head of administration’s (a central office member) decision, which was binding. Still, it 
was somewhat decentralised, because project details depended on the report prepared 
by lower and middle staff and their assessment of people’s problems. Besides, it was 
the lower personnel, who wanted village and youth associations. However downward 
accountability was maintained, because the project took shape following beneficiaries’ 
complaints. Also, village associations were formed so that people could gain redress. 
Good Voters’ Programme (1994) 
This was a three-month programme for increasing political awareness among 
Girijans and Harijans in Mehbubnagar and Vizag. Training was at Bhagvatipuram and 
in villages. They began with an initiation talk by the Chairman. Thereafter, project co-
ordinators and leader of AWARE’s education campaigns conducted political 
motivation sessions. District political leaders and Civil Servants were invited to attend 
this. Beneficiaries were made aware of their rights and duties as citizens, India’s 
present political situation, and finally how vigilant citizens could resolve political 
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evils. Such workshops were organised before every state or district election, since 
AWARE felt that people would be motivated if they were held close to elections. To 
further mobilise beneficiaries, this NGO fielded candidates to positions of Sarpanch or 
Prajapanch (village heads), and distributed political manifestos of major political 
parties. Beneficiaries were asked to vote after examining a candidate’s ability. 
Out of ten, six, including four AWARE respondents and two academics / 
consultants called this programme significant, because it affected many people by 
covering two major districts of Andhra. It was novel, because earlier programmes 
concentrated on educating beneficiaries in socio-economic issues, rather than political 
motivation. Besides, it faced many constraints like local politicians’ hostility, 
government’s hostility and people’s lack of motivation. 
According to respondents, CDOs, VA leaders, the Chairman, governing body 
members, and head of administration participated in the project. It was conceived when 
CDOs and VA leaders noticed low voter turnout during the 1990s assembly elections 
and informed the Chairman, head of administration and board members, who perceived 
this as lack of political awareness. Subsequently the central office organised a research 
team of middle level staff members to interact with people.334 Also, Madhavan visited 
some villages and learnt that women were least motivated. Therefore, he wanted a 
political education campaign like AWARE’s legal and property rights campaign. After 
the board’s approval, political instructors were hired and AWARE applied for funds. 
Subsequently the project was implemented. 
                                                           
334The head of Bliss mentioned, “We had noticed low voter turnout before. But the report showed the extent of 
political ignorance.” 
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Factors influencing project decisions 
The external factor, which initiated this project, was beneficiaries’ lack of political 
motivation. Consequently villages suffered from proxy voting and lack of political 
awareness. This was revealed by investigating team’s report, which showed that the 
population comprised of nearly 40% women and 60% men and yet only 40% of the 
latter, voted and became political decision-makers. 
There were some constraining external influences, for e.g. the state government’s 
hostility and local politicians’ lack of co-operation. Local politicians perceived 
AWARE as a political rival and hindered it when it fielded candidates. In fact, local 
politicians intentionally fielded their candidates in the same constituency as AWARE’s 
candidates. Subsequently AWARE candidates were defeated.335 In fact, certain 
respondents feel politicians’ hostility affected the project’s outcome. Moreover state 
government also exerted pressure. It protested when AWARE invited certain retired 
civil servants and district leaders to conduct workshops. It sent inspectors to scrutinise 
AWARE’s activities and categorically refused funds. Still donors provided funds. 
However they imposed constraints on AWARE that funds should be used only for 
political education and training. Expenses for follow-up exercises and campaigning 
were to be borne by AWARE. So financial resources were limited. 
Apart from external factors, there were internal influences like central office’s 
concern that they should not field their own candidates and become a political 
organisation. However project co-ordinators felt that villagers would not be mobilised 
unless one of their kinsmen contested in elections. So the board agreed that it was 
                                                           
335Dr. Narasimhan said, “AWARE had to lose in this very first election, because they were new to the fray and 
unknown.”  
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expedient if beneficiaries participated in political decisions of the village government. 
Subsequently AWARE fielded beneficiaries as independent candidates and 
campaigned for them.  
 Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 50% consultants (one out of two) called this project 
successful, because political awareness increased in Vizag from 30% to 50%, among 
30,000 beneficiaries.336 Among women beneficiaries, political participation increased 
by 20%, especially in Mehbubnagar. Yet, 50% consultants (one out of two) said it 
failed, because it made AWARE lose its non-political nature. Candidates from the 
target group, who won elections sought AWARE’s political advice. So political 
awareness was attained by compromising the essence of an NGO.337 Nevertheless 
42.5% beneficiaries called this successful, because they could represent their people at 
the assembly and direct government’s attention to community problems.338 However 
57.5% respondents called it moderately successful, because even after election, they 
faced hostility within their community,339 and from others in the assembly.  
                                                           
336Although the Chairman claims that awareness increased by 50%, the head of administration suggested that it was 
67% in areas around Vizag after five years. 
337Dr. Narasimhan feels this compromised AWARE’s success. But Prof. Madduri (Hyderabad Central University) 
feels that despite losing its non-political nature, this NGO made beneficiaries politically aware. 
338Fourteen beneficiaries (now occupying seats in the local self-government) recalled how they managed to improve 
their community’s access to basic services.  
339Twelve respondents narrated instances of how they had to satisfy their fellow tribal men and women, who 
became suspicious of their political influence.  
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Table: 5.5           Impact of Good Voters’ programme as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                4   4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2   1 (50%)  1 (50%) 
Beneficiaries              40 17 (42.5%) 23 (57.5%)  
Decisions were primarily centralised. However lower staff members like CDOs 
and VA leaders noticed low voter turn out and decided that the central office should be 
informed. It was the project co-ordinators, who insisted, despite board’s reluctance that 
people could be politically motivated only if AWARE fielded candidates. Still, 
centralisation tendencies were strong, because the Chairman decided (along with 
board’s endorsement) to have a political education campaign. Even funding was 
entirely decided by central office, where lower and middle staff had no role. 
Nevertheless, accountability was maintained, because AWARE decided to obtain 
information from people through CDOs, VA leaders, AWARE’s investigation team 
and finally by Madhavan himself. Also it was decided that beneficiaries should 
participate in local elections. 
Bliss Foundation (1997) 
AWARE established Bliss to institutionalise its education programmes. Bliss 
(along with AIF) was to supervise all education programmes and impart training for 
tribal and rural development. Its resource people included graduates, grass root 
workers, village level workers, health development voluntary workers, personality 
development workers, national development voluntary workers, village organisers, 
village co-ordinators and rural education centre members. It trained AWARE’s 
functionaries and beneficiaries in different areas of social action. Instructors, who came 
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to train, were paid an honorarium.340 Bliss initially trained beneficiaries through 
experts, but later sought TFRD’s help. Bliss trained TFRDs, CDOs, VA leaders and 
other village functionaries, since all of them had to work closely. 
Out of ten, eight, including five AWARE respondents and three academics / 
consultants called Bliss significant, because all education programmes were centralised 
under one body for the first time.341 They also felt it impacted many beneficiaries.342 It 
even faced its share of constraints like disagreement between the Chairman and board, 
and bureaucratic hurdles from government ministries. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, head of administration, AWARE’s 
trustees, board members and field co-ordinators of education and poverty eradication 
programmes participated in the project. Board members and head of administration 
suggested that AWARE should institutionalise its programmes by establishing sister 
organisations. But the Chairman agreed after some debate, following which the 
Ministry of Education and HRD registered Bliss as AWARE’s HRD wing.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The primary external influence, which initiated Bliss’s formation, came from 
beneficiaries, who availed AWARE’s services and training programmes in large 
numbers. This was because beneficiaries faced new social and economic exploitation 
from landed elite. Consequently AWARE introduced more education and training 
                                                           
340According to the head of Bliss, this honorarium was higher for private instructors, or those who were well 
known.  
341AIF had already consolidated social action programmes. But this was the first time that education programmes 
were centralised. 
342The head of Bliss, head of administration and a former consultant to NOVIB said this project covered nearly 
100,000 beneficiaries.  
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programmes to address new issues. Due to increasing programmes more staff members 
were recruited. This was a new internal constraint. 
Many personnel were hired to manage new programmes. But uncontrolled 
recruitment caused internal problems, i.e. load on AWARE’s head office in managing 
and supervising new members.343 Co-ordination and supervision decreased, due to 
over-staffing. This made the head of administration and board members prefer a sister 
organisation to monitor HRD programmes.  
The Chairman rejected this suggestion and caused an internal constraint in 
decisions. He feared AWARE’s dismemberment with each branch at loggerheads. This 
was resolved when the head of administration proved the lack of co-ordination 
between projects in poverty eradication and health, which were undertaken 
simultaneously. Subsequently the Chairman agreed.  
However there was disagreement regarding jurisdiction of AWARE’s head office 
and Bliss. The head of administration wanted Bliss to supervise extension of education 
programmes, introduction of new programmes, hiring experts, deciding on target 
groups to be covered, and changes in the mode of training programmes. The central 
office was to remain a consultant, but also control Bliss’s finance. Yet the Chairman 
wanted central office to have an advisory role on all matters pertaining to Bliss and a 
veto power over Bliss’s decisions. Finally, the latter position prevailed. 
Although these internal differences were resolved, AWARE was constrained by 
the Ministries of Education and HRD. Their clearance was required for Bliss to 
                                                           
343The head of administration mentioned, “There was crowding since duties and responsibilities were not well 
distributed. There were project co-ordinators on health and poverty eradication reporting. I pointed this to the 
Chairman, but he was hesitant.” 
159 
function as AWARE’s sister organisation. However this was delayed, since different 
departments in the Ministry required different documents. Consequently, Bliss’s 
establishment was delayed. But, even with Bliss’s establishment, some respondents 
feel that overstaffing continues.344 
 Major impacts 
All AWARE and 33% consultants (one out of three) called this successful, 
because there was more co-ordination between AWARE’s HRD wing and social action 
programmes. Bliss successfully monitored HRD activities, while the central office 
played an advisory role.345 This power devolution gave greater opportunity to undertake 
more programmes and approach donors. However 66% consultants (two out of three) 
called it moderately successful, because there was no corresponding rise in co-
ordination between central office and Bliss. So projects with low co-ordination 
suffered greater losses, because it covered more people and regions.346 Yet 32.5% 
beneficiaries called it successful, because more projects that addressed other problems 
were undertaken.347 However 67.5% called it moderately successful, because it 
widened the distance between people and AWARE’s top functionaries. In fact, some 
even suggested that there was some confusion on whom to approach to report certain 
issues.  
                                                           
344Non-AWARE respondents said Bliss created more personnel. Ironically, the constraint of over-staffing, which 
AWARE sought to resolve, actually became one of the project outcomes. 
345The Chairman, the treasurer, head of administration, and heads of Bliss and AIF, highlighted this. 
346Both Prof. Chandra and Dr. Narasimhan feel there was no co-ordination between Bliss and the central office, or 
any clear-cut division of duties. Therefore, large-scale projects like the secondary school and diploma programmes 
were bound to fail. 
347Seven respondents said that with Bliss other programmes were organised like internet education and stress 
management in rural life. 
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Table: 5.6 Impact of Bliss as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE                 5   5 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
               3   1 (33%)   2 (66%)  
Beneficiaries               40 13 (32.5%) 27 (67.5%)  
Decisions here were centralised, but Madhavan alone did not make all strategic 
decisions. In fact, it was the idea of the head of administration and board to have a 
sister organisation like Bliss to oversee education programmes. Even the discussion to 
convince Madhavan of the suitability of sister organisations, was confined only to 
board members and head of various departments. Besides, the issue of Bliss’s 
jurisdiction was decided amongst Central Office members. Moreover, decisions did not 
directly uphold downward accountability, since accountability was towards AWARE, 
i.e. the need to keep AWARE effective whilst expanding its activities and influence.  
Project on training Task Force for Rural Development (TFRD) (1998) 
Under this programme Bliss trained beneficiaries to serve as AWARE’s rural 
functionaries. Training was for six months, after which those who needed further 
training were inducted for the next six months. Every six months new members were 
enrolled. Nearly 10,000 functionaries were trained at Bhagvatipuram.348 Subsequently 
they were inducted as AWARE’s honorary and part time workers, who promoted 
empowerment schemes (in health, poverty eradication and women’s empowerment) 
within their villages. In this, AIF supervised them. For every project, TFRDs were paid 
three hundred rupees (approximately US$ 6.54).  
                                                           
348 AWARE’s human resource development and training cell. 
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Out of ten, six respondents, including four AWARE respondents and two 
consultants called this project significant, because it covered many beneficiaries. It also 
faced many critical constraints. These were limited funds, difficulty in undertaking 
further training programmes and difference of opinion among AWARE’s personnel. 
According to respondents the Chairman, heads of Bliss and AIF, and governing 
body members participated in the project. The head of bliss initiated training of TFRDs 
after the board and other central office members approved. Since this project involved 
training by Bliss and field placement by AIF, the heads of these two wings networked. 
Even the Chairman and head of administration consulted them regarding co-ordination. 
Although they voiced their views, the board’s decision was binding on all, because 
they calculated the cost and feasibility of suggestions given by the heads. After 
everyone agreed on how the project should be executed, the board approached foreign 
donors. Dutch donors refused. So AWARE approached donors from UK and USA. 
After six months AWARE took loans from banks.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first internal factor was concern of Bliss’s head regarding workshops for 
training beneficiaries. The busy schedule of experts made it difficult for them to 
instruct all training sessions. Consequently, training would be incomplete. He therefore 
suggested that few target group members should be trained every six months. Then 
experts could be hired periodically and these target group members would be trained as 
TFRDs. These TFRDs could independently monitor rural camps without the presence 
of experts. 
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When the head of Bliss proposed all the above-mentioned advantages of 
introducing TFRDs, he met another internal factor, i.e. board’s concerns about the 
scheme’s cost efficacy.349 When this was calculated, it showed a saving of 300,000 
rupees a year (approximately US$6500), which would have been spent on monitoring 
the programme. Such exercises would have included frequent trips of AWARE 
functionaries to villages to monitor project performance, transport of beneficiaries to 
training centres, boarding and lodging of beneficiaries. 
Another internal factor was interaction between AIF’s head and the board, in 
terms of their preferences. AIF’s head wanted training to be separately undertaken in 
villages, so that more TFRDs would enrol. However the board felt it was uneconomical 
and would dilute the project’s aim, which was not to train more workers, but to have a 
competent team of resource people. 
Certain external factors influenced this project, like the age of TFRD trainees. It 
was easier to train younger than older trainees. Therefore AWARE hired resource 
people, who simulated a role-play for instructors, with one of them pretending to be a 
trainee or student. Nevertheless certain respondents feel that the constraint of training 
older beneficiaries has limited the project’s success.350 Although the constraint was 
addressed there was another external problem, i.e. husbands of trainees, who disrupted 
classes and demanded that women should attend to their families. Often, women left 
for fear of violence. Besides, the elite fostered feelings of doubt against AWARE. But, 
                                                           
349The treasurer mentioned, “The scheme had to prove its cost efficacy. We wanted to ensure that it could be 
implemented despite limited funds.”  
350Some older beneficiaries said they could not handle field situations. They also mentioned that AWARE had 
ignored this issue.  
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when such incidences became frequent, instructors intervened after ensuring that 
trainees supported them.351 
Another external constraint was Dutch donor’s reluctance to fund, because they 
found it similar to the project they had funded recently, in which experts had trained 
beneficiaries in health, women’s empowerment and poverty eradication. They were 
also reluctant, because AWARE and NOVIB had fallen apart.352 Consequently, 
AWARE approached donors from UK and USA. But these donors favoured micro-
credit programmes. Nevertheless, this project was undertaken again after six months 
with bank loans. 
Major impacts 
Only AWARE respondents considered this project successful, because 5,500 
members were trained in 375 villages. Follow-up expenses were avoided, because 
TFRDs made follow-ups, redundant. Besides, many TFRDs monitored projects in 
other Indian states.353 It also established closer links with people, since new issues were 
identified and reported.354 More projects were developed, which gave further 
opportunities for seeking funds and interacting with more donors.355 However all 
consultants called it moderately successful, because it reached only 6000 beneficiaries, 
out of a possible 8000. Also it made AWARE concentrate on urban, rather than rural 
poor. Moreover it did not reach the 500 villages it had sought to cover.356 Still the 
                                                           
351The head of Bliss said, “If they had intervened at the very first instance they would have lost their students’ 
support”  
352According to Bhat (NOVIB’s former consultant), “AWARE’s later projects were repetitions of previous projects. 
NOVIB and other donors noticed this. Later when AWARE and NOVIB parted ways other Dutch donors also 
refused funds."  
353These include Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, according to the treasurer.  
354The heads of Bliss and AIF said there were campaigns following the identification of such problems. One was the 
water campaign for women. 
355According to the Chairman, other donors from UK and USA were approached.  
356Dr. Narasimhan feels that falling short of its target made this project less successful  
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project increased AWARE’s influence among people in more regions. 45% 
beneficiaries called it successful, because they could reach their own people and 
independently undertake development projects in other regions. However 55% called it 
moderately successful, because they handled most field problems on their own for 
which they were not competent enough.357 
Table: 5.7 Impact of TFRD training as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                 4   4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
               2    2 (100%)  
Beneficiaries               40 18 (45%) 22 (55%)  
Decisions were somewhat participatory, because middle level staff played an 
important role. In fact, the head of Bliss (a middle level staff member) suggested 
training of TFRDs. Even AIF’s head - another middle level staff member - suggested 
that TFRDs should be trained separately in each village. Still centralising tendencies 
were present, because the board had to approve the proposal made by Bliss’s head. 
Also the Chairman and board rejected the suggestion of AIF’s head. Moreover the 
Chairman and board members decided to approach British and American donors. Even 
downward accountability was not directly maintained, because decisions intended 
making AWARE’s training viable.  
Veterinary training programme (1999) 
Here, Bliss trained unemployed youths of Vizag, Khammam, Vijayanagaram and 
adjoining areas, in animal care. Experts gave demonstrations to trainees and took them 
                                                           
357 16 beneficiaries felt they could have handled situations better if AWARE’s personnel had supervised.  
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on field visits to study fodder of milch animals. Trainees were taught how water-
soaked grass and urea is given to cattle; how animal feed could be improved; when is 
the right time for insemination so that a milch calf was born; how to treat common 
diseases of milch animals; and how milk yield could be increased. To enhance training, 
AWARE provided insemination equipment. After training, rural youths helped their 
community in livestock health care. They could confront non co-operative village vets.  
Out of ten, six, including five AWARE respondents and one consultant called this 
programme important. This is because it affected many beneficiaries.358 Moreover, it 
faced many constraints, like government’s corruption, lower bureaucracy’s hostility 
and beneficiaries’ passivity.  
According to respondents, the head of Bliss, head of administration, board 
members, head of MACS and the Chairman participated in the project. CDOs and ZOs 
learnt about government vets exploiting beneficiaries and reported to the head of 
MACS, who consulted the head of administration and the Chairman. Subsequently 
middle level staff was dispatched for investigation. Meanwhile, the head of MACS 
mentioned that people defaulted on loans, due to death of milch animals or loss of 
milk. So one board member suggested that a project should be introduced to train 
villagers in animal care. The head of Bliss was asked to calculate the programme’s 
feasibility. Next the heads of Bliss and AWARE’s health services hired instructors to 
train beneficiaries and contacted GoI’s Animal Husbandry Department for trainers. 
Meanwhile VA leaders and CDOs identified villagers experienced in animal 
husbandry.  
                                                           
358According to Dr. Chandra and the heads of Bliss and AIF, this project extended into three major districts, with 
large populations. 
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Factors influencing project decisions 
The field report was the first external influence, which initiated the project, since 
AWARE learnt of villagers’ exploitation. It carried accounts of corrupt government-
employed vets, who gave cows to villagers only if they were bribed. Later when 
unhealthy cows fell ill, these vets improperly inseminated cows and made a profit of 
twenty to fifty rupees with each insemination. Improper insemination caused milk yield 
to drop from ten to two litres each season.  
Apart from this, villagers could not afford vets. Consequently livestock, including 
those purchased from loans, died due to inadequate care. Moreover poultry farms did 
not flourish, so people were pushed further into debt. Corrupt vets and indifferent 
Animal Husbandry Department officials compounded this problem, and prompted 
AWARE to take action.359 However another internal factor influenced this project, i.e. 
AWARE management’s desire to increase surplus from cattle loans. Therefore, it 
trained beneficiaries so that they could address the problem independently. 
Other external constraints were actions of beneficiaries and government’s lower 
level bureaucracy. To consider beneficiaries first - they were against training in animal 
care, although they themselves reported their grievances to CDOs. They refused to 
spend on trainees’ services, but preferred paying known village vets. AWARE argued 
that beneficiaries must pay to have a say in service delivery. In the six months when 
people protested, there were positive internal influences like motivation speeches from 
the Chairman and government functionaries. People’s psyche was sought to be 
                                                           
359The head of AIF mentioned, “We led them (beneficiaries) to the authorities to resolve the issue, but we knew that 
authorities themselves delayed.”  
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changed through audio-visual instruction, which was due to a positive internal 
influence, i.e. project co-ordinators’ initiative.  
The second external constraint was that lower level bureaucrats did not want 
village vets to be supplemented by AWARE’s trainees, since vets shared their bribes 
with officials. Consequently, when AWARE launched its trainees, lower bureaucrats 
refused to release State Government’s certificate for permitting this programme. 
Besides, lower bureaucracy wanted bribes. AWARE’s central office overcame this 
constraint by refusing bribes and contacting higher bureaucrats, although it delayed the 
programme.360 However some respondents are sceptical about the project’s success, 
due to the continued harassment by vets and the fact that only those dairy farms gained, 
which were close to markets. 
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 80% AWARE respondents (four out of 
five), because nearly 13,000 beneficiaries were covered. Moreover, cattle loans in 
Khammam and Vizag were recovered within eight months in nearly thirteen out of 
twenty-five villages. Cattle yield increased, as fewer cattle died. Each beneficiary could 
afford eight cows after two months. There were tie-ups with Horlicks for beneficiaries 
to market their produce.361 Nevertheless, 20% AWARE (one out of five) and all 
consultants called it moderately successful, because cattle deaths fell slightly from 55% 
to 37%. Not all districts performed well.362 There were areas where people reported 
harassment from government vets, even after two years of project implementation. Yet 
                                                           
360The head of AIF and the treasurer spoke about it at length.  
361Both the Chairman and head of AIF felt this was a significant achievement.  
362According to Prof. Chandra, Khammam and Vizag benefited more, because they were close to dairy market 
centres. 
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40% beneficiaries called it moderately successful, because cattle deaths fell 
significantly and they could market surplus.363 But sometimes AWARE-trained vets 
could not diagnose diseases, forcing villagers to turn to government vets. Hence 60% 
beneficiaries felt it failed, because cattle yield did not improve. Even harassment by 
government vets did not reduce.364  
 Table: 5.8 Impact of veterinary training as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
 UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                5   4 (80%)   1 (20%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              1    1(100%)  
Beneficiaries              40  16 (40%) 24 (60%) 
  Decisions here were somewhat participatory, because the head of MACS (not a 
board member) decided to approach central office on the problem that rural 
functionaries had reported. He even expressed his opinion regarding default on loans. 
His opinion was well received, which shows that middle level staff had a stake in 
decisions. Moreover head of Bliss (not a board member) was invited to in project 
details. Besides heads of Bliss and health services were delegated responsibilities. Still 
decisions were top-down, because the head of MACS reported to the Chairman and 
head of administration that government vets exploited villagers. It was due to these top 
officials’ decision that an investigation team was deployed to the region. Also the 
suggestion to train people in veterinary services came from board members. Finally, 
the decision to contact upper bureaucrats to overcome hostility of lower bureaucrats 
was that of central office.  
                                                           
363At least seven beneficiaries said there was no surplus in milk yield prior to this project in Khammam 
364These beneficiaries were from East Godavari district, where the project was not successful.  
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Yet, decisions maintained downward accountability, due to following reasons. 
Firstly, the head of MACS decided it was important to inform central office, when he 
received complaints from rural functionaries, who directly interacted with people. 
Secondly, AWARE’s decision to deploy an investigation team shows it wanted direct 
contact with beneficiaries. Finally, the decision to train members of target group in 
veterinary service shows that AWARE wanted people themselves should address their 
problems. 
“Deemed University” (2000) 
This project by Bliss, offers diploma in engineering, commerce, computer science, 
water management, women’s development and tribal development studies. These are 
for beneficiaries, who cannot afford university education. Some seats are reserved for 
women. Since these are government-recognised courses, Bliss’s graduates have 
degrees that are accepted in all governmental institutions. The programme covers 
Khammam, Mehbubnagar, East and West Godavari, Nellore, Vishakhatapatnam, 
Padkal and R.R. districts. 
Out of ten, seven respondents, including five AWARE respondents and two 
consultants called this project significant, because it covered people in eight densely 
populated districts and targeted men and women. Secondly, it was novel, because no 
project had focused on higher education before. Finally, it faced many constraints like 
disagreement within AWARE members, lack of adequate funds and inability of 
experienced AWARE members to pre-empt situations on the field. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, head of administration, governing body 
members, heads of Bliss and AIF, and academics participated in the project. In fact, 
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central office wanted a university ever since Bliss was established. Consequently, 
AWARE tied up with Osmania and Hyderabad Central Universities. The Chairman 
and the board consulted academics on course structure and schedule. After these were 
finalised, board members, head of Bliss and some professors, contacted Andhra 
Pradesh Government’s education ministry for the university’s recognition. 
Subsequently it was established with partial funds from University Grants Commission 
(UGC) and bank loans.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
An internal factor initiated this project, i.e. preference of board members and 
Madhavan for a deemed university that would offer diploma courses.365 They believed 
that with Bliss’s establishment, AWARE’s programmes should be extended to 
university education. The Chairman and board believed this would attract even urban 
lower middle class. 
However, an internal factor constrained the project, i.e. the need to decide course 
structures. AWARE had to decide whether to simplify formal degree courses and make 
them viable for rural students.366 Subsequently its staff and academics surveyed and 
concluded that standard degree courses were unsuitable, and that diploma was better. 
Still it took five months for AWARE to decide. Meanwhile, many academics 
committed themselves to other engagements. 
Thus, the delay in AWARE’s decisions engendered a negative external influence, 
academics’ involvement in new projects. Since they could not break these 
                                                           
365 While the Chairman said he had wanted the deemed university to consolidate earlier programmes, the head of 
administration felt it was to expand AWARE’s focus from primary to higher education. 
366The Chairman said, “We wanted the pattern to be similar to an Open University.” 
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engagements, it was difficult to persuade them to join Bliss. Consequently, these 
academics sent their associates. But these associates left due to inadequate pay, 
arguments with AWARE’s staff, and difficulty in teaching students from different 
socio-cultural backgrounds.367 Subsequently Bliss discontinued lessons and waited for 
replacement from Hyderabad University. Meanwhile, professors and vice chancellors 
from Osmania and Hyderabad Central Universities exerted a positive influence, by 
assisting AWARE in formulating the course structure and providing equipment for 
Bliss’s laboratory. 
However there was another constraint during implementation, because many 
students were new to classrooms.368 Many of them were women, who were unexposed 
to formal education system with men. Others were school dropouts, who found it 
difficult to follow structured study patterns. So they withdrew from the programme 
even after registration. 
Funding was another constraint. Donors were against funding not only a time 
bound project, but also a programme like the deemed university, which was to be a 
permanent feature. Their reluctance was due to AWARE’s problems with NOVIB. 
Consequently, AWARE approached the Ministry of Education and UGC. The latter 
said it could provide limited funds. Therefore AWARE approached certain rural landed 
gentry for donations. They agreed to fund on the condition that they should decide the 
university’s administrative issues, which AWARE rejected. So financial constraints 
affected this programme since its inception. Therefore, it is natural for respondents to 
                                                           
367According to Prof. Madduri, “AWARE just did not have enough to pay academicians. In fact many of them 
received three times more in formal educational institutions.” Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) also 
corroborated this.  
368Prof. Madduri, who instructed one batch of students in a subject, revealed this. 
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feel that lack of resources and beneficiaries’ lack of exposure to a formal education 
system has hindered this project’s outcome. 
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 60% AWARE respondents (three out of 
five), because Bliss was capable of organising higher education. It assisted 
beneficiaries, who had not been to schools or colleges before and helped them obtain 
employment, which were not seasonal or semi-skilled.369 For the first time AWARE 
networked with the Central Board for Secondary Education (CBSE). Still, 40% 
AWARE (two out of five) and all consultants called it moderately successful, because 
it could not consolidate early achievements. In fact, many women left after 
enrolment.370 All non-AWARE respondents felt this failed, because it had ill-equipped 
laboratories.371 But, 20% beneficiaries felt it succeeded, because they obtained 
employment as semi-skilled workers. 12.5% called it moderately successful, because 
AWARE could not address women’s hesitance towards a formal programme like this. 
In fact, 67.5% felt it failed, because the university lacked resources. Moreover, students 
could not identify with subjects that were taught.372 
                                                           
369According to the treasurer, 8,000 beneficiaries got access to higher education. But the head of administration and 
head of Bliss suggest that 5000 beneficiaries obtained jobs. 
370Prof. Madduri and Mr. MK Bhat believe this occurred, because AWARE focused on something that was not a 
felt need of the community, and it did not sufficiently mobilise people. 
371The prime reason for this failure, according to Prof. Madduri and Mr. MK Bhat, is lack of funds. Funds from 
UGC were insufficient. Besides, most donors were reluctant after NOVIB’s charges. 
372Fifteen respondents (including eight women) said classroom lectures dealt with subjects that they could not 
identify with. Previously, Bliss’s training programmes had focused on subjects relevant to beneficiaries.  
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Table: 5.9              Impact of the deemed university as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                5  3 (60%) 2 (40%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2     2 (100%) 
Beneficiaries              40 8 (20%) 5 (12.5%) 27 (67.5%) 
     Decisions here were top-down, but not completely centralised, because 
stakeholders, i.e. non-AWARE members, like university professors and ministry of 
education officials participated. The former helped decide project details, while the 
latter advised on the legality of undertaking an education programme. Still 
centralisation did occur, because it was the Chairman and board’s idea to have a 
university. Besides, only central office consulted non-AWARE members and decided 
project details. Roles of middle level staff like heads of Bliss and AIF were only to 
investigate the viability of this programme for beneficiaries, rather than choose courses 
of action. Also noticed was a lack of accountability towards beneficiaries. 
Accountability was towards AWARE itself, i.e. to expand and diversify activities.  
THE INCREMENTAL MODEL AND DECISIONS IN EDUCATION 
PROJECTS 
So far decisions within AWARE’s landmark education projects have been 
discussed. Now it is relevant to examine them through the Incremental Model and take 
the discussion further. In the previous chapter, this model’s features were discussed. 
Therefore, it has not been repeated here. Instead, decision processes within each 
landmark education project (discussed above) are examined to see whether the model 
can be used to explain them.  
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The model’s thesis on problem identification and diagnosis can explain how 
AWARE’s junior staff undertook problem identification in the property rights project, 
while the Chairman and his staff diagnosed it. This sequential order makes the model 
relevant. Even in the legal rights project this sequential order was followed, because 
VAs identified the problem, whilst legal workers diagnosed it. Training of Chaitanya 
Nidhi personnel also had problem identification and diagnosis undertaken sequentially. 
CDOs identified problems of extreme rural indebtedness and bonded labour, while 
diagnosis was undertaken as a twin strategy. CEC leaders, CDOs and head of 
administration consulted the state government on its microfinance programmes, whilst 
board members visited Bangladesh to study its rural credit project.  
However there was a change in Yenadi project, because beneficiaries reported 
their problems, rather than AWARE identifying the problem itself. Subsequently 
AWARE diagnosed the problem. So the model’s sequential order is applicable here. It 
is also applicable in good voters’ programme, because CDOs and VA leaders identified 
the problem of low voter turn out, which engendered a two-pronged problem 
diagnosis; i.e. middle level staff gathered information whilst Madhavan visited villages 
for further investigation. For Bliss, the board and head of administration observed that 
AWARE lacked consolidation and centralisation. Unlike previous projects, problem 
diagnosis occurred simultaneously, since head of administration and project co-
ordinators had noticed this before and gathered evidence about its existence. Thus, 
sequential order is inapplicable. Even in the TFRD project, diagnosis was done along 
with identification. Therefore, like the project on Bliss, this model’s sequential order is 
inapplicable.  
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However in the veterinary programme, beneficiaries identified the problem of 
exploitation by corrupt government vets. For diagnosis, AWARE’s middle level staff 
was dispatched. So the model’s sequential ordering is applicable like many earlier 
projects. Similarly for deemed university, sequential order is applicable, because the 
issue of AWARE’s expansion was first identified by its management, who consulted 
academics for further diagnosis.  
The model possesses other features, like ‘decision interrupt’ and ‘recycling of 
decision loops’, which may be used to explain certain aspects of project decisions. But 
the model’s decision interrupt cannot explain constraints in property rights project, due 
to limited funds from donors, and hostility from landed elite and local politicians, since 
it was a difference of opinion between AWARE and non-organisation members 
(donors, landed elite and local politicians).373 However AWARE designed a solution 
for it without retracing decisions but by selecting new alternatives (as proposed in the 
model too). The solutions were Madhavan’s contribution of his own funds, and 
approaching the High Court for redress.  
However in legal rights project, the board’s concern for cost efficacy, was similar 
to incrementalists’ decision interrupt. In fact, AWARE re-examined its alternatives, 
making the model’s decision recycle relevant. But the constraint from landed elite and 
Naxalites is not an interrupt (from the incrementalists’ perspective), since it involved 
non-organisation members. Yet, when Naxalites infiltrated into AWARE and 
attempted to stymie this project from within, it would have qualified, as an interrupt in 
                                                           
373Incrementalists do not specify whether disagreement between organisation and non-organisation members can 
qualify as interrupts. Hence, constraints through such disagreements may not be considered as decision interrupts. 
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the model. This is one of the model’s shortcomings, which does not consider 
constraints to be interrupts, unless organisation members are involved. 
In the project that trained Chaitanya Nidhi’s resource personnel, the lack of 
expertise among staff makes the model’s decision interrupt relevant. So AWARE 
retraced decisions, which the model could have explained, and asked the Grameen 
Bank for assistance. Another interrupt was difficulty in training older resource 
personnel, which was resolved along with the previous interrupt. Still AWARE 
compromised by delaying project completion. The model cannot be used to explain 
such compromises. 
In Yenadi project, this model is relevant for explaining interrupts, like CDOs’ 
disapproval of beneficiaries’ direct empowerment and insistence that they should be 
initially assisted. Incrementalists would call it an interrupt, because it was among 
organisational members. To resolve this, AWARE did not recycle decisions, but 
followed ‘judgement’ as Mintzberg mentions, i.e. top decision-maker/s decide.374 The 
head of administration decided in favour of initial assistance for beneficiaries.  
Like the previous project, this model can explain constraints in good voters’ 
programme as an interrupt, because it involved only organisational members. Central 
office members and project co-ordinators disagreed with each other. To resolve this, 
AWARE did not retrace into problem diagnosis, (which the model could not have 
explained) but readjusted its mission. Still, Mintzberg’s model does not explain why 
AWARE compromised its non-political organisational mission.  
                                                           
374Mintzberg, 1976.  
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This model is relevant to Bliss, because an earlier problem of lack of co-
ordination among staff became an interrupt here (similar to the model), and was 
resolved in parts. This was Madhavan’s disagreement with board’s suggestion of a 
sister organisation. To convince him, the management recounted instances of lack of 
co-ordination from the past, which the model’s decision recycle premise can explain. 
The model is applicable for explaining AWARE’s response to the first decision 
interrupt in TFRD project, which was the board’s concern for cost efficacy. To resolve 
this, AWARE consulted old records, where the model’s recycling of decisions could be 
applicable. Another interrupt was disagreement between the board and head of AIF, 
which was resolved whilst recycling for the former interrupt. The model may explain 
this too.375 
The model is also applicable for explaining AWARE’s response to the 
management’s concern for surplus-generation in the veterinary project. This was an 
interrupt between organisational members and hence easily explained by the model. 
AWARE resolved it by revamping the project, which the model’s decision recycle 
concept can explain. But there were other constraints like beneficiaries’ reluctance to 
training in animal care and bureaucracy’s pressure. AWARE resolved these by 
recycling earlier decisions.  
This model is relevant for explaining AWARE’s response to an interrupt even in 
deemed university project, i.e. the dilemma on whether to introduce degree or diploma. 
It can explain AWARE’s search for solutions by reconsidering information that 
academics gave. The model can also explain why AWARE chose to address only 
donors’ reluctance to fund, despite other constraints. This is because the model 
                                                           
375 Although incrementalists do not specify, a single recycling of decisions could resolve multiple interrupts. 
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suggests that organisations with many problems choose to resolve only some 
interrupts.  
     AWARE built its education programmes through many landmark projects, 
rather than one all-encompassing programme. Initial decisions addressed basic issues 
in education, but later decisions addressed complex issues of expansion and 
consolidation. The incremental model is relevant for explaining how AWARE 
identified, diagnosed and addressed constraints from beneficiaries, donors, state 
government and from within AWARE, by re-examining its strategy. However it is also 
necessary to consider AWARE’s poverty eradication / women’s empowerment 
programme, and see whether decisions in this domain can also be explained through 
Mintzberg’s model. This is done in the subsequent chapter.                                                       
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CHAPTER SIX   
Poverty Eradication - Women’s Empowerment 
Programmes - AWARE’s Experience 
 
The previous chapter described the process and structure of decisions in landmark 
projects in health and education. It also used the incremental model for explaining 
certain decision processes. This chapter similarly examines decisions in landmark 
projects under AWARE’s poverty eradication-women’s empowerment programme. 
These two domains are considered together, because this NGO’s poverty eradication 
efforts were primarily geared towards women’s empowerment.  
In the following sections, decisions of ten major projects in this domain, since 
1970s are examined. They are: Chaitanya Shakti, Poultry Farming, Chaitanya Nidhi, 
Property Ownership for Women, Women’s Skill Training, Dandakaranya Project, 
Aware India Foundation, Gram Lakshmi Scheme, MACS project and Chetana Bazaar. 
This is to learn what the project entailed, who participated in them, what factors 
influenced them, and what the project’s outcome was. For information on project 
decisions ten AWARE and non-AWARE respondents were interviewed. For 
information on project outcome, forty beneficiaries and the above-mentioned AWARE 
180 
respondents and consultants were interviewed.376 Each project is also analysed in terms 
of the incremental model like the previous chapter.  
Projects on poverty eradication were primarily for women’s economic and 
psychological empowerment. In fact, psychological and material empowerment was 
launched in the first project called Chaitanya Shakti. But the focus of the poultry-
farming project was economic empowerment. This continued in subsequent projects 
like Chaitanya Nidhi and skill training. It expanded into areas, which were considered 
men’s domain through the campaign for women’s property ownership. However in 
later projects like DTDP, AWARE incorporated women’s empowerment within 
general rural development. It also wanted to consolidate its social action programmes. 
Therefore, AIF and MACS were launched to centralise social action programmes. 
AWARE also undertook microfinancing through Gram Lakshmi scheme and tried 
improving women’s access to the market in the Chetana Bazaar project. The 
subsequent section discusses decisions within these programmes.  
Landmark projects in poverty eradication and women’s 
empowerment since the 1970s  
Chaitanya Shakti (1981) 
Here AWARE introduced tribal women in Khammam, R.R. District, 
Vishakhapatnam and Nellore, to social, psychological and material empowerment. It 
organised a brigade of 200 women, who were trained for three months. Issues like 
dowry, child marriage, rural indebtedness, reservation in jobs for women, minimum 
wages and reservation of seats in elected public posts were discussed. Women trainees 
                                                           
376The same respondents were interviewed as the ones mentioned in chapters 4 and 5. 
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mentioned their problems in these areas and instructors initiated discussions on how 
they could be resolved. After training, women returned to their villages to conduct rural 
workshops (with the aid of AWARE’s volunteers). After attending workshops, women 
chose their community members to represent them in “Mahila Mandalis” (women’s 
groups). Here village women’s problems were discussed and resolved.  
Out of ten, eight respondents, including five AWARE respondents and three 
academics / consultants called Chaitanya Shakti significant, because it affected many 
beneficiaries and covered major districts in Andhra. Secondly, it faced major 
constraints like women’s passivity, male target group members’ hostility and 
landlords’ hostility.  
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, head of administration, 
and village women participated in the project. It was initiated after Lambada (tribal) 
women accused AWARE of neglecting women in its programmes. Subsequently the 
Chairman and the board worked on diversifying their projects, whilst instructing 
volunteers to interact with women. Later the Chairman shared the task of training 
women in Bhagvatipuram with senior project co-ordinators and head of administration.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
An external influence initiated this project, i.e. a Lambada woman’s public 
accusation that AWARE was male oriented. Two external influences compounded this. 
The first was the report by AWARE volunteers, which revealed women’s problems 
like physical abuse, dowry harassment, lack of economic independence, political 
ignorance, illiteracy and diffidence to take up employment in men’s domain. But the 
report also revealed that many women worked outside homes, albeit in activities 
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considered women’s domain, like domestic helpers, handicraft makers and midwives. 
A second external influence corroborated this, i.e. interaction with Chaitanya Shakti’s 
trainees, who said they lost property in the absence of male heirs.  
     There were certain negative influences. Firstly, beneficiaries were passive. 
Secondly, after attending workshops at Bhagvatipuram, when women went back, other 
women in the community demoralised trainees with their traditional attitudes. This 
external constraint was overcome by an internal factor, namely AWARE’s strategy to 
allow trained target group members from Chaitanya Shakti to train other village 
women.377 Thirdly, there was the critical external constraint of hostile male relatives 
and landlords. Men increased their exploitation, since they were against women 
challenging their authority. The landlords opposed Chaitanya Shakti’s demand against 
wage remuneration, work conditions and bonded labour. Moneylenders opposed, since 
they could no longer exploit rural women’s ignorance. According to some respondents, 
the hostility of rural elite and male villagers, along with the passivity of beneficiaries, 




All AWARE respondents called Chaitanya Shakti successful, because it covered 
many beneficiaries and more girls began attending schools. It even spread to Orissa. In 
fact, women participated in state level conferences and also in village/district 
elections.379 It helped AWARE form future projects, because beneficiaries voiced their 
grievances through this brigade. However all academics called it modestly successful, 
                                                           
377The head of Bliss mentioned, “We were worried that it might be difficult to train others since they may be unable 
to overcome demoralising pressure from within the community. But we soon realised that women who were already 
trained could effectively train other villagers.”  
378Most non-AWARE respondents felt thus. 
379The head of MACS calls this significant, because their issues were politically represented. 
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because it succeeded after three years of implementation. Besides, only four local 
women were elected in the 1980s to the local government. Many were marginalized in 
distant tribal areas.380 But 52.5% beneficiaries called it successful, because they found a 
platform to resolve their grievances and gained self-confidence.381 But 47.5% 
beneficiaries called it moderately successful, because empowerment was delayed and 
many faced increased exploitation after Chaitanya Shakti’s establishment.382  
 Table: 6.1 Impact of Chaitanya Shakti as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE               5   5 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
             3    3 (100%)  
Beneficiaries             40 21 (52.5%) 19 (47.5%)  
Decisions here were centralised, because only Madhavan and board decided 
project details and the modus operandi. Still target group members participated, since 
they expressed their dissatisfaction to central office and demanded women oriented 
programmes. Even lower staff played a role, but it was only to gather information for 
the central office. However downward accountability was maintained, because 
AWARE heard women’s complaints against its male oriented programmes, which 
motivated this project. Secondly, the Chairman and board decided to send an 
investigation team to learn more about women’s problems. Thirdly, they decided to 
train women and make them motivate other villagers, because AWARE knew that 
beneficiaries would be more receptive towards their own community members. 
                                                           
380Ms. Thakur (independent researcher) said these women were exploited even after project implementation.  
381One of the respondents said, “I felt I was a human being. I knew my sisters at Chaitanya Shakti would help me 
solve my husband’s alcoholism and my in-laws ill treatment.” 
382Fourteen respondents said they faced more physical violence from their husbands and taunts from their friends 
after joining. Another three respondents said that although the project was successful after sometime, the initial 
years of mental and physical strain was unbearable.  
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Poultry farming (1983) 
AWARE trained 15,000 Girijan and Harijan women from twenty villages in 
Khammam, East and west Godavari and Nellore in poultry farming. Animals and feed 
were provided after training. Once breeding was completed, poultry produce were sold 
in markets under AWARE’s aegis, so that middlemen could not interfere. After six 
months, AWARE withdrew and beneficiaries independently sold their produce.  
     Out of ten, six respondents, including five AWARE respondents and one 
consultant called this project, important, because it covered many women beneficiaries. 
Secondly, it was the first project, which undertook skill development based on locally 
available resources (poultry animals in this case). Finally, it faced significant 
constraints like, funding constraints and improper co-ordination among field staff.  
According to respondents, AWARE’s rural functionaries, the Chairman, head of 
administration, board members, and project co-ordinators were the project participants. 
In fact, the 1982 survey by AWARE’s rural functionaries, which posited tribal 
women’s lack of access to market, initiated this project. Subsequently the Chairman 
asked the head of administration to dispatch an investigating team to this region. This 
team’s reports to project co-ordinators and team leaders, led to project implementation. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The very first factor, which initiated this project, was rural functionaries’ report 
that tribal women’s penury was due to lack of market access. Another internal factor 
compounded this; i.e. the desire of AWARE’s board to materially empower women.383 
                                                           
383The Chairman said, “We believe that after psychological empowerment, women should be made materially self 
sufficient.” 
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However during implementation, the project faced funding constraints from Ford 
Foundation, which insisted that its team wanted to supervise. It also insisted on 
monthly project reviews from AWARE. This external pressure acted on an internal 
concern that AWARE’s finances should not be jeopardised. This made Madhavan 
agree to Ford.384 Subsequently village functionaries reported to Ford apart from 
AWARE’s office. 
However this caused internal problems like improper communication. AWARE’s 
staff had to report to their supervisors at the village, district and central office, apart 
from Ford’s team. This was time consuming and caused improper reporting. Besides, 
there were disagreements between project co-ordinators and volunteers. In fact, some 
respondents feel that lack of co-ordination, affected project outcome.  
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 60% AWARE respondents (three out of 
five), because 6,000 out of 15,000 people became poultry farmers. AWARE networked 
with Ford, which helped future projects. Furthermore, poultry farming was integrated 
into AWARE’s development efforts.385 It also aided village economy. However 40% 
AWARE respondents (two out of five) and all academics / consultants called it 
moderately successful, because less than 50% beneficiaries benefited. Most women 
could not identify and treat poultry diseases, or could not overcome middlemen. 
Nevertheless experience from this was useful for a future project like DTDP. 37.5% 
beneficiaries called it successful, because they felt their living standards improved with 
                                                           
384Ms. Sameeksha (independent researcher) mentioned, “AWARE was still young and could not have antagonised 
major funders. So, by agreeing to their (donors’) condition AWARE was establishing closer ties with them.” 
385The head of administration considers this an indication of a successful project.  
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a steady income.386 It helped them earn even without owning land. But 62.5% called it 
moderately successful, because middlemen were dominant, even though villagers 
owned poultry farms. Moreover it was difficult to treat sick poultry animals.387 
Table: 6.2 Impact of poultry farming as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                5   3 (60%)   2 (40%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              1    1 (100%)  
Beneficiaries              40 15 (37.5%) 25 (62.5%)  
     Decision-making was centralised, like Chaitanya Shakti. However lower and 
middle staff participated. Still their role was information gathering and not strategic 
decision-making, which was the central office’s privilege. Project co-ordinators studied 
these reports, but they only assisted top officials. It was the Chairman, head of 
administration and board members, who deployed a team and decided that using local 
resources like poultry animals was viable. This was because board members wanted to 
economise. But it was the Chairman, who persuaded board members to accept Ford’s 
assistance. Nevertheless, downward accountability was maintained, because an 
investigation team was deployed to learn about people’s problems through direct 
interaction. Also by using indigenous resources, local culture was preserved.  
Chaitanya Nidhi (1985) 
This was AWARE’s informal micro credit project to encourage savings among 
Girijan and Harijan women in East and West Godavari, Khammam, Padkal, R.R., 
                                                           
386Nearly 13 respondents said they could buy new clothes and undertake repairs of their homes. But, all 15 agreed 
that they earned enough even without owning land.  
38714 respondents said AWARE could not reduce middlemen’s dominance. 8 respondents mentioned that they lost 
most of their farm, because animals fell ill and they could not treat them.  
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Vizag and Vijayanagaram. It was a loose co-operative with 134,000 rupees, which was 
lent and collected over a fixed period of time without interest.388 
Each village was divided into units with 250 women. There were five groups in 
each unit with fifty women, who contributed five rupees for a pool. Hence, 250 rupees 
were collected from each group. Into each group AWARE contributed 200 rupees. The 
total pool for each group was 450 rupees, from which women borrowed every week. 
Each woman paid five rupees before borrowing. The repayment rate for each loan was 
ten rupees. It was a fifty-week loan cycle. So in thirty-seven weeks all women got 
loans.  
Thus, AWARE designed this scheme such that money invested by it was returned 
at the end of a cycle. Thereafter the scheme continued with beneficiaries’ money, 
which was circulated within the community. If women refused or could not pay, the 
Community Education Centre was informed and peer pressure was used to collect 
money. When members defaulted, the entire group forfeited loans for one cycle. 
Hence, collective responsibility ensured loan repayment.  
Out of ten, eight respondents, including six AWARE respondents and two 
academics / consultants called Chaitanya Nidhi significant, because it affected many 
beneficiaries in most rural areas of Telangana. Secondly, it was a novel effort, because 
previous programmes had ignored microfinance. Finally, it faced many constraints like 
pressure from donors, landlords and moneylenders. 
                                                           
388Here, the actual implementation of Chaitanya Nidhi and its impact is discussed. This project was discussed 
previously under AWARE’s education programmes, but it had dealt only with training given to AWARE’s 
personnel for this project.  
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According to respondents, project participants were the Chairman, governing 
body, CDOs, VA leaders and project co-ordinators. Reports of CDOs and VA leaders 
and their periodic observations launched this project. Through their reports, central 
office realised that thrift was unknown to people. Subsequently the Chairman visited 
villages for more information. Following this, AWARE launched this project, which 
was funded by NOVIB.   
Factors influencing project decisions 
Through the report of CDOs and VA leaders, AWARE learnt that its projects were 
mostly ineffective, because old problems reinvented themselves after it withdrew its 
projects. The report also showed that despite employment generation efforts, 
beneficiaries could not buy essential goods. They were indebted to moneylenders and 
spent wastefully on alcohol. An external factor corroborated this report, i.e. 
beneficiaries’ complaint. The Chairman learnt that each household barely saved five 
rupees per week. But beneficiaries exerted a significant influence by suggesting that a 
pool could be made and money could be periodically lent to each beneficiary. An 
internal factor complemented this, i.e. board’s role. Both the Chairman and board 
developed this basic guideline of beneficiaries.  
Another external influence was NOVIB’s intention to fund this programme, 
because it had funded similar projects for other Asian NGOs. However it was against 
interest-free loans and wanted depreciation rates to be considered. But AWARE argued 
that beneficiaries could not afford interest. Thereafter NOVIB agreed to fund partially. 
Hence, the board designed the project so that beneficiaries would generate 50% of the 
finances. Despite the board’s efforts there was an external constraint, i.e. landlords and 
moneylenders’ concern that their power would be eroded. Consequently they used 
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violence for a year. But AWARE sought police protection and co-operation of 
beneficiaries. However some respondents feel that the project’s outcome was limited, 
because it was a novel project and AWARE had little prior experience.  
Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 83.33% AWARE respondents (five out 
of six), because more than 30,000 women could clear their debts. It led to a similar 
scheme for men and spread to Orissa.389 It was subsequently undertaken in 
Mehbubnagar on people’s request. In fact, the pool money increased rapidly.390 
However 16.66% AWARE respondents (one out of six) and all consultants called it 
moderately successful, because tribal women were not helped. Besides, most 
beneficiaries used loans to clear debts, rather than invest in interest generating 
activities.391 But 55% beneficiaries called it successful, because they felt immediate 
economic empowerment and they used the money to address their immediate 
expenses.392 However 45% called it moderately successful, because they could put 
loans only for limited use. It did not clear many outstanding debts and it was a while 
before they registered any improvement in living standards.393 
                                                           
389The head of administration and the head of MACS call this a significant success. 
390According to the treasurer, the project increased pool money to Rs. 150,0000 within two years. 
391According Dr. Narasimhan (journalist), this scheme cleared debts in the short-term. However, the actual success 
of the project came later, when people used loans for small-scale industries.  
392Seventeen respondents said they freed their land and animals after borrowing from Chaitanya Nidhi. Eleven 
respondents said that they bought new milch and poultry animals.   
393Sixteen respondents said they wanted to buy essential goods and send their sons to school. But, the limited 
amount that was lent, could not satisfy these needs. Eleven respondents mentioned that loans did not clear all their 
debts together. Six respondents said their lifestyle was unchanged.  
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Table: 6.3  Impact of Chaitanya Nidhi as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE                6   5 (83.33%)   1 (16.66%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2    2 (100%)  
Beneficiaries              40 22 (55%) 18 (45%)  
Decisions were quite participatory and decentralised, despite the central office’s 
strategic role. In fact, decision-makers heeded women beneficiaries’ suggestion to have 
a collective pool with rotating funds. It was beneficiaries’ idea, which top-level office 
bearers further refined. Nevertheless, the role of AWARE’s middle and lower staff was 
similar to earlier projects, i.e. gathering information to assist the Chairman and board 
in deciding project details. The Chairman played a strategic role in deciding that loans 
should be interest-free. Still downward accountability was maintained, because 
AWARE decided to interact with people and address their rural indebtedness, and lack 
of access to the market through this scheme.  
Women as property owners (1986) 
Here, AWARE returned land to tribals and schedule caste villagers, who were the 
original owners, and from whom it had been seized by the government, or landed elite. 
Apart from returning land, it also sought to make women the owners of this reclaimed 
property. The project was introduced in Khammam, Nellore, Vishakhapatnam, West 
Godavari and R.R. and covered nearly 12,000 women. It was an extension of 
AWARE’s earlier campaigns, where women had not been targeted. 
Out of ten, six, including four AWARE respondents and two academics / 
consultants called this project significant, because it affected many beneficiaries and 
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covered Andhra’s major tribal districts. Secondly, it faced major constraints like 
women’s passivity, threat from male members of the target group and state 
government’s hostility. However no respondent felt it was novel, because it was an 
extension of AWARE’s erstwhile property rights programme for men.  
According to respondents, VA leaders, CDOs, Chaitanya Shakti members, the 
Chairman, governing body members and head of administration participated in the 
project. In fact, VA leaders, CDOs and Chaitanya Shakti members formed a team to 
learn about tribal agitation for property, which was rampant in this period, and 
submitted field reports to central office. After scrutinising it, central office members 
decided to expand their earlier programme on property reclamation to include women. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
This project was initiated by the report of AWARE’s investigating team, which 
revealed Girijan and Harijan women’s socio-economic condition in the region. It 
showed they had no financial control, because men of the household monitored their 
earnings. Subsequently an internal factor guided AWARE, i.e. the objective to 
empower women materially so that they could decide on property matters. This 
decision was influenced by an external factor; i.e. the problem of lack of access to 
property expressed by women during training sessions.  
There was also an external influence, i.e. donors’ preference for women’s 
economic development. This was a common agenda for donors aiding developing 
countries during this period. However AWARE had few gender-based projects.394 So 
                                                           
394It was AWARE’s early days and it did not have many women-specific projects to suit donors, according to the 
Chairman.  
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the board felt that women’s rights and property rights should be combined to obtain 
funds. After AWARE announced this, Ford, NOVIB and USAID provided funds. 
Still not every external influence was beneficial, as was revealed by women 
beneficiaries’ reluctance to take responsibility in a male-dominated domain. Although 
AWARE tried persuading them, an external influence constrained them. This was from 
male target group members, who threatened women. In fact, some men sold property to 
prevent women from controlling it. AWARE resolved this by counselling some men. 
Still many respondents feel that the negative influence of men constrained this 
project’s impact. 
The final external constraint was from the state government. The then Chief 
Minister said that the land transfer regulation act, under which AWARE sought to 
return land to tribals, should be scrapped. This led AWARE to protest for seven 
months, aided by beneficiaries from former projects and friends in the bureaucracy. 
Later the government retained the law, but launched a debate on AWARE at the state 
assembly sessions. Subsequently AWARE was taken to the High Court and its head 
office was raided. However the court ruled AWARE’s actions as constitutional.395 
Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents called this project successful, because nearly 3,700 
women became property owners. This changed family relations, since women decided 
in domestic matters. However all consultants called it moderately successful, because 
                                                           
395According to the Chairman, “The state government did not have enough to back its charges against us.”  
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only around 3,000 women accessed property, out of 10,000 targeted beneficiaries.396 
Still networking with donors improved and the project extended to neighbouring 
villages.
397
 In fact, 20% beneficiaries called it successful, because women became 
independent. They learnt how to maintain property, which increased their self-
confidence to address other issues. Yet 57.5% called it moderately successful, because 
although women became property owners, men still controlled it for sometime.398 
22.5% beneficiaries called it unsuccessful, because property was not converted to their 
names. Besides, men controlled property matters and women could access their land 
after long legal battles, during which families faced further penury.399 
Table: 6.4 Impact of women’s property ownership project perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                4 4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2    2 (100%)  
Beneficiaries              40 8 (20%) 23 (57.5%) 9 (22.5%) 
Decisions here were somewhat participatory, because lower staffs like CDOs and 
VA leaders initiated the project. But the Chairman, head of administration and the 
board, made strategic decisions. In this respect it was centralised. In fact, after reports 
were scrutinised, the board with other central office members and decided to materially 
empower women. It was also their decision to combine women’s rights and property 
ownership issues. The Chairman and board made another strategic decision to expand 
                                                           
396 Prof. Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central University) says the reason is that AWARE found it difficult to 
convince women, who were used to male domination in property matters. Also the hostility of village men and 
struggle with the state government prevented the project from being successful. 
397 According to Dr. Narasimhan (journalist), this is one of the achievements, although only less than 50% 
beneficiaries successfully obtained property.  
398 One respondent mentioned, “My property was mine only on paper, but my brother-in-law operated it. However, 
I realised what was happening when transactions required my thumb print.” 
399Seven respondents felt that they got more economic empowerment through Chaitanya Nidhi than property 
ownership efforts in this project. 
194 
the previous programme on property ownership to include women. However 
downward accountability was maintained, because the decision to launch this project 
was made only after villagers mentioned their problems to AWARE’s functionaries. 
Even the decision to counsel male target group members shows that AWARE was 
sensitive to the discontent among certain beneficiaries. 
Skill training for women (1987) 
Nearly 3,000 rural women were trained in cot-making, mat-weaving, Kalamkari 
and basket making for three years.400 The aim was women’s economic empowerment, 
through skill development. It was introduced in Nellore, but extended to Padkal, 
Khammam and Mehbubnagar. Around 1,500 women were trained in cot making and 
500 in mat making. Many in Mehbubnagar were trained in Kalamkari. Basket making 
was undertaken in Khammam, and cot making in Nellore.  
For cot making, Nellore’s local grass was used, while Kalamkari and mat making 
were extant arts, which AWARE further developed. Beneficiaries were divided into 
groups of ten and trained. Each group was trained for four days every week and used 
raw material that AWARE provided. After six months, beneficiaries independently 
sold their produce. 
Out of ten, six, including four AWARE respondents and two consultants called 
this project significant, because it affected more women than any previous project. 
Secondly, it was the first project that undertook training women in handicrafts to make 
                                                           
 
400Kalamkari is a local handicraft.  
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it commercially viable. Besides, it faced critical constraints like donor pressure, 
pressure from the target group.  
According to respondents, the Chairman, board members, CDOs, head of 
administration and project co-ordinators participated in the project. During the 
Chairman’s visit to Nellore, CDOs complained that villagers prevented them from 
clearing grass and hindered agricultural activities. He questioned villagers and found 
that they used grass for basket weaving. Hence, he felt that basket making and the 
related skill of mat weaving should be developed. But CDOs found that although the 
product was in demand, few practised basket weaving (which was improperly 
organised). Subsequently AWARE organised it differently by introducing division of 
labour. People were employed for cutting, drying, tying and weaving grass. Money 
from sale of baskets was given to everyone involved in its production. Meanwhile, 
CDOs of Mehbubnagar and Khammam were also persuaded to develop local skills of 
Kalamkari and cot making. Later donors were approached for funds. However after 
sometime, when one of the donors ceased funding, AWARE relied on marketing of its 
produce to sustain the project.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
An external constraint initiated this project. This was villagers’ refusal to allow 
CDOs to launch agricultural projects, because they wanted to practice traditional skills. 
Subsequently the Chairman visited Nellore and learnt the use of local grass. There was 
also an internal influence, i.e. board’s preference.  They felt it was economical to let 
villagers practice their traditional activity. This way, even the unemployed would 
benefit. Besides, it was congruent with AWARE’s objective that beneficiaries should 
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be aided to become economically independent. However respondents felt beneficiaries’ 
lack of experience affected the project outcome. 
However AWARE faced another external constraint during project 
implementation, which was donors’ influence.401 Two donors wanted to fund.  But one 
donor wanted its representatives to be present during training, inspect AWARE’s 
withdrawal from the project, and inspect beneficiaries’ marketing of produce. The 
other wanted non-indigenous skills to be included. Consequently, central office 
members met the donors, after which each donor contributed 50% and non-indigenous 
skills were excluded. Still after eight months, one of the donors stopped funds.  
Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 50% consultants (one out of two) called this project 
successful, because 2,000 beneficiaries were trained to make their skills commercially 
viable. Products were sold in India, USA and even Europe. Hence, beneficiaries built 
contacts for their trade and AWARE won further recognition.402 Besides, some trainees 
established training centres for other villagers. So beneficiaries marketed their skills 
even after AWARE withdrew.403 However 50% consultants (one out of two) called it 
moderately successful, because it was successful in the short-term. In fact, when it was 
reintroduced in 1990s, less then 50% beneficiaries could market their skills.404 37.5% 
beneficiaries called it successful, because they practised their traditional activities in an 
organised manner. Some even earned more contacts, which boosted sales. But 47.5% 
                                                           
 
401The Chairman said, “We were initially happy to have two funders. But we realised they had their own designs. So 
we thought it best to let each of them share half the finances.” 
402According to the head of Bliss, nearly 1,000 beneficiaries sold their products overseas.  
403According to Ms. Thakur (independent researcher), the sustainability of this project made AWARE reintroduce it 
in 1990 and 1992 in the Godavari region, Khammam and Mehbubnagar.  
404According to Dr. Narasimhan, lack of sustainability made the project moderately successful. 
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called it moderately successful, because they underwent initial losses, due to lack of 
experience.405 15% called it unsuccessful, because living standards did not improve and 
clientele fell.406   
Table: 6.5 Impact of skill training for women as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                4   4 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2   1 (50%)   1 (50%)  
Beneficiaries              40 15 (37.5%) 19 (47.5%) 6 (15%) 
Decision-making here was partially participatory, because beneficiaries forced 
AWARE to think of this project by rejecting agricultural programmes. But like the 
previous project, decisions were centralised, because the Chairman and board made 
strategic decisions. In fact, they decided to develop cottage industries through this 
project. The Chairman verified reports of CDOs by interacting with beneficiaries. 
Moreover, only he and board members made decisions regarding funding and 
negotiation with donors. Still downward accountability was maintained, because the 
decision to launch this project was made after villagers expressed their preference for 
local skills. 
Dandakaranya Tribal Development Project (DTDP) (1991) 
Through DTDP, AWARE integrated disparate programmes like women’s health, 
education, empowerment and poverty eradication in Dandakaranya forests in East and 
West Godavari, Vishakhapatnam, Vijayanagaram, Srikakulam, Gajapati, Rayagada, 
                                                           
405Seventeen respondents mentioned that AWARE’s help was inadequate, because it did not help them earn new 
clients.  
406All the six respondents said that initially their lifestyle improved, but only marginally.  
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Pulbani and Koraput. It covered 3092 villages grouped into 21 zones, with 345 clusters 
and a population of 295,520, 40% of which were women. 46 tribal groups were 
targeted from 1991 to 1996 that included women’s mobilisation through village 
associations and economic assistance for agriculture development, animal husbandry, 
cottage industry, and employment generation.  
Out of ten, seven, including four AWARE respondents and three academics / 
consultants called DTDP significant, because it affected many.407 Also it was the first 
time that many issues were aggregated under one project. Besides, it faced constraints 
like pressure from donors and hostility of beneficiaries.408 
According to respondents, the Chairman, head of administration, board members, 
AWARE’s lower and middle staff, academics and project co-ordinators participated in 
the project. In fact, The Chairman and head of administration organised an 
investigation team with CDOs and middle level staff. This team surveyed this region’s 
development needs and reported to the central office. Subsequently project co-
ordinators on orders from the central office, drew a perspective plan for a social action 
programme in the region for the next five years. This was incorporated in the DTDP. 
 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The internal factor, which initiated this project, was preference of central office 
members to undertake a programme in Dandakaranya, to increase AWARE’s influence 
through material empowerment of tribal women. But during project implementation 
                                                           
407The Yenadi project (under the health domain) was another major tribal project, but it had not targeted as many 
people as the DTDP. 
408According to Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB), pressure from donor (NOVIB) was present 
previously, but in this project it became pronounced. 
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there was an external constraint in the form of NOVIB’s accusations that AWARE 
misused funds. An internal factor compounded this, i.e. central office members’ 
insistence that money earned through poverty eradication programmes, including 
DTDP, were AWARE’s earnings. They argued that NOVIB’s funds were only for 
continuing the project. 
Subsequently NOVIB wanted to scrutinise AWARE’s accounts, which it said 
were maintained dually. To belie this charge, AWARE’s central office initiated two 
impact studies that were conducted while DTDP was still operative. For this, 
academics and private researchers were appointed, but NOVIB’s participation was 
refused. This study report posited that money generated from the project was 
AWARE’s. Soon NOVIB and Dutch donors ceased funds, whilst other donors delayed 
funds. 
There was another external constraint, i.e. beneficiaries’ hostility, because tribals 
near Orissa were unfamiliar with AWARE’s activities. To resolve this, AWARE 
sought help of beneficiaries from neighbouring regions, where it had previously 
conducted health campaigns. However social action programmes including gender 
issues and land rights were unpopular in this area. Due to beneficiaries’ hostility, 
which was compounded by funding constraints, AWARE’s management decided to 
suspend the project. Later it was resumed with an emphasis on economic 
empowerment through skill training, and employment generation for women.409 
However respondents feel that beneficiaries’ hostility was a major constraint, which 
even affected the outcome of this project. 
                                                           
409According to the head of administration, “It was not a defeat for us that we had to halt the project for sometime. 
In fact it helped sharpen our focus.”   
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Major impacts 
DTDP was considered successful by 75% AWARE respondents (three out of four) 
and 33% consultants (one out of three), because household income increased by 
33%.410 Moreover, AWARE undertook integrated rural programmes as DTDP’s 
extension. It reached nearly 80% tribal regions, with 66.4% households benefiting from 
agricultural improvement. Also, microfinance schemes under DTDP reduced 
moneylenders’ role, considerably. Structure of village administration improved under 
cluster officers, development officers and zonal officers. However 25% AWARE 
respondents (one out of four) and 33% consultants (one out of three) called it 




Similarly, 33% consultants (one out of three) called DTDP unsuccessful, because 
women’s social issues were neglected. Even, its microfinance scheme was ineffective, 
because core poor, who formed a majority of the target group, did not benefit.
412
 But 
40% beneficiaries called it successful, because they could access the market. However 
35% called it moderately successful, because living standards improved marginally. 
Some women felt recent programmes benefited them more than DTDP.413 Finally, 25% 




                                                           
410Although the head of administration feels household income increased by 33%, the head of MACS says it was 
30%. 
411According to Ms. Thakur (independent researcher), funding problems curtailed the project, which could have 
been used to address these social problems. Moreover, the hiatus made the programme lose its momentum.  
412Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) feels that project failure was compounded by limited funds. 
413One tribal woman, who also served as AWARE’s functionary said, “I feel women have benefited more from rural 
programmes undertaken in the same year as DTDP. Our empowerment was piecemeal. In fact, I feel more 
empowered by the microfinance programme that was undertaken last year.”  
414Eight women respondents said they continued to be harassed by men.  
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Table: 6.6 Impact of DTDP as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 




AWARE                4   3 (75%)   1 (25%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              3   1 (33%)   1 (33%)   1 (33%) 
Beneficiaries              40 16 (40%) 14 (35%)  10 (25%) 
Decisions were top-down. Like the previous two projects, the Chairman, board 
and head of administration made strategic decisions, while lower and middle staff, like 
CDOs provided field information. However Madhavan consulted central office in most 
decisions. In fact, it was his and the head of administration’s joint decision to have a 
project to increase AWARE’s influence in Orissa. Also, it was the Chairman’s decision 
that NOVIB should be excluded from the investigation team. Moreover, it was the 
board’s decision to enlist services of other beneficiaries from Telangana and win 
people’s support. Finally, it was a joint decision of central office members to resume 
the project after limited funds stalled the project. Still downward accountability was 
somewhat maintained, because AWARE decided to change its focus, according to 
what was acceptable to beneficiaries, when the project was resumed.  
Formation of AWARE India Foundation (AIF) (1994) 
AIF was AWARE’s sister organisation. It was a policy decision than a project. Yet 
it is included here, since respondents called it significant in AWARE’s social action 
efforts.
415
 After its establishment, social action and poverty eradication projects were 
entrusted to AIF. It had to report people’s socio-economic problems to the central 
office and collect feedback from beneficiaries. It was a conduit between AWARE and 
                                                           
415 Social action includes AWARE’s poverty eradication and women’s empowerment programmes. 
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beneficiaries. Therefore, its head networked with CDOs, VA leaders and the central 
office. 
Out of ten, eight respondents, including six AWARE respondents and two 
consultants called AIF significant. They felt it was a novel effort at consolidating 
poverty eradication efforts.416 Moreover, it affected all beneficiaries, who had been 
covered by earlier social action projects, because they came under the purview of one 
monitoring body. Respondents also suggested that AIF faced significant constraints, 
like lack of co-ordination among personnel, overstaffing and central government 
statutes. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, body members, head of administration, 
AWARE’s trustees and project co-ordinators participated in the project. Project co-
ordinators and CDOs informed board members about problems in co-ordinating 
women’s empowerment, poverty eradication and skill development programmes. They 
told the management that they wanted a separate poverty eradication department for 
social action programmes. Subsequently AWARE’s management decided to 
institutionalise AIF for implementing social action projects and distributing loans to 
beneficiaries. 
Factors influencing project decisions: 
The first internal factor, which initiated this project, was lack of co-ordination 
among project co-ordinators. This was related to the internal problem of over-staffing. 
Due to numerous social action projects and large number of personnel, who 
participated in them, there was improper reporting. When this was reported to the 
                                                           
416AIF was AWARE’s first effort in creating sister organisations. 
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board, other internal factors influenced it, like concerns of the Chairman and head of 
administration. They felt AWARE would lose its unity under sister organisations. But 
the board argued that they could retain control over decisions of new social action 
projects, by making AIF responsible for project implementation alone. They also 
insisted that AIF would induct supererogatory staff. Ultimately, the central office 
agreed, because it felt AIF would consolidate and centralise all social action 
programmes.  
Certain external influences made the central office accept AIF. These were central 
government rules, which banned organisations that were not registered micro credit 
institutions from disbursing loans. AWARE had instituted crop loans and microfinance 
schemes, but it could not implement them, since it was not a microfinance institution. 
Hence, the board and trustees favoured AIF’s establishment because such schemes 
could be undertaken. However AIF was not effective according to some respondents, 
because AWARE could not overcome the constraint of being a large organisation.  
Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 50% consultants (one out of two) called AIF 
successful, because it consolidated social action programmes,417 which engendered 
further projects, like Gram Lakshmi and Chetana Bazaar. Experience from AIF was 
used in MACS. Henceforth, there was greater power devolution, since rural 
functionaries reported to AIF and not central office.418 However 50% consultants (one 
out of two) called it unsuccessful, because AWARE distanced itself from beneficiaries. 
                                                           
417Prof. Madduri feels that AIF signified AWARE’s growth to a big NGO, which could not be controlled under one 
individual. It had to consolidate itself by branching into smaller departments. This is functioning even today. 
418According to the head of Bliss, AIF’s head and his team got more responsibilities and had to report periodically 
to the central office. 
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It was turning bureaucratic, since people could not directly interact with the head 
office. But 25% beneficiaries called it successful, because they reported their problems 
to more field personnel.419 They said there was more monitoring and were satisfied.420 
35% called it moderately successful, because they felt that despite monitoring, there 
was misinformation from the field to central office.421 Finally, 40% beneficiaries called 
it unsuccessful, because they lost touch with upper organisational officials. There was 
no transparency by AWARE anymore and most AIF projects were repetitions of 
former programmes.422 
Table: 6.7 Impact of AIF as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
    
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                6   6 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2   1 (50%)    1 (50%) 
Beneficiaries              40 10 (25%) 14 (35%)  16 (40%) 
Decisions were centralised, but not concentrated in the Chairman’s hands. In fact, 
board members and trustees convinced Madhavan about AIF’s importance, despite his 
hesitation. So although it was a joint decision, board members played a prominent role. 
The role of lower staff like project co-ordinators and CDOs was minor, but significant, 
because they urged the top management to decide in favour of a separate institution for 
poverty eradication. Yet downward accountability was absent, because decisions were 
accountable to AWARE itself, i.e. for maintaining its efficiency and viability.  
                                                           
419Beneficiaries could choose whom to report their problems. 
420All ten respondents said field conditions were reported to central office, without beneficiaries having to 
personally meet officials. 
421Seven respondents mentioned that AIF’s officials misinterpreted people’s problems. For example, when 
beneficiaries told AIF officials that they preferred skill-training programmes for rural youth, the central office 
sanctioned a handicraft project, which the people did not want.  
422Four beneficiaries felt that most AIF projects were repetitive. All sixteen respondents said that with AIF’s 
formation, they lost the former bond with central office.  
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Gram Lakshmi Scheme (1996) 
AIF targeted women in Vizag, Khammam, Vijayanagaram and other adjoining 
areas in this project. It was targeted in the same region as the village-vet-training 
programme. It helped them buy milch animals through a loan of 10,000 to 15,000 
rupees. Animals thus bought usually yielded fifteen to eighteen litres of milk. This 
scheme provided fodder to women dairy farmers and allowed marketing of dairy 
produce. It also enabled beneficiaries to retain 50% of their farm’s yield after repaying 
AWARE’s bank, since it paid for the purchase of milch animals. It provided milch 
animals every six months. After the first lot of animals dried up, it provided more, 
while the first were inseminated. When the second lot dried, the first would be ready 
for lactation. Thus, continuity of milk production was maintained. Moreover village 
vets, who were members of the target group, were trained to serve their people.   
Out of ten, seven respondents, including five AWARE respondents and two 
consultants called Gram Lakshmi significant, because beneficiaries were not only 
given money to improve their dairy farms, but were also taught how to care for 
livestock. Besides, it covered many beneficiaries.423 It even faced many constraints, like 
corruption of village vets, default on loans and concern for low resources. 
According to respondents, CDOs, ZOs, heads of Bliss and AIF, head of 
administration, board members and the Chairman participated in the project. It was 
introduced because beneficiaries informed CDOs and ZOs about their problems, who 
in turn informed the head of AIF.
 424
  Subsequently heads of AIF and Bliss felt that a 
                                                           
423Not everyone felt this project affected many beneficiaries, especially non-AWARE respondents like Ms. Thakur 
(independent researcher) and Dr. Narasimhan (journalist). 
424 The problems faced by beneficiaries have already been mentioned in chapter – 4 under “Village Vet training 
programme”.  
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programme for beneficiaries in cattle and dairy farming was needed. They met all 
central office members. A two-pronged programme was launched, which included 
cattle loans and veterinary training. The head of AIF controlled the former and Bliss 
controlled the latter. The government and local bodies provided grants for this self-
financing scheme. Subsequently AWARE returned the principal to these bodies. 
Factors influencing project decisions 
The external influence, which initiated this project, was beneficiaries’ complaint 
to CDOs and ZOs about harassment from government village vets. An internal factor 
complemented this, i.e. concerns of central office members. Heads of AIF and Bliss 
felt that Bliss could undertake training in dairy farming. But the board was concerned 
about cost and felt that training village vets should generate surplus. In this, the head of 
administration’s role was significant, because he drew attention to AWARE’s extant 
crop loans, saying that AWARE had the ability to introduce specialised loans. With 
this precedent in mind, he suggested loans for dairy farmers. His suggestion was 
accepted and this two-pronged programme.  
However certain external factors proved constraining, like farms’ distance from 
urban dairy centres. Also, these farms had no milk collection facilities. Another 
external influence compounded this problem, i.e. announcement by milk collection 
centres that they would collect milk only if villages produced a minimum of 10,000 to 
15,000 litres. But farmers could not produce this quantity collectively.425 In fact, many 
respondents believe that milk collection centres’ non-co-operation limited this 
project’s success. 
                                                           
425According to the head of AIF, “Our focus was to increase market access of those who lived away from market 
centres.” (But, Dr. Narasimhan said that those who were close to market towns were given special attention.)  
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Major impacts 
This project was considered successful by 60% AWARE respondents (three out of 
five), because economic status of nearly half the target group improved.
426
 Women 
farmers could diagnose sick animals. In fact, AWARE even partnered similar projects 
with Horlicks,427 a large corporation. However 40% AWARE respondents (two out of 
five) and all consultants called it moderately successful, because consumers could not 
access more than half of what dairy farms produced. Besides, only those living close to 
market towns benefited. The distance and the non-co-operative attitude of collection 
centres were not addressed by AWARE. So respondents feel this prevented the 
project’s success. However 17.5% beneficiaries called it successful, because they could 
directly access urban markets. Women felt dairy farming was different from what their 
previous vocations and they got an opportunity to learn new things.428 But 37.5% 
called it moderately successful, because they felt collection centres were not co-
operative. Often there was wastage, since all the produce was not sold.429 However 
45% respondents called it unsuccessful, because their living standards did not 
improve.430 
                                                           
426According to the treasurer, it affected 16,800 villagers out of 35,000, who were initially targeted.  
427 This had been mentioned under the village vet training programme. The vet-training programme and dairy loans 
were parts of the same scheme. 
428According to a woman respondent, “I did not know much about cattle’s disease. Now, I know something.”  
429All fifteen respondents felt the time taken for collection vans to reach farms was enough to spoil stored milk. 
430Six respondents, who felt this project failed, were from distant farms. Twelve respondents were from farms near 
market towns and said that returns from selling their produce was insufficient to improve their living standards.  
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Table: 6.8 Impact of Gram Lakshmi as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                5 3 (60%)   2 (40%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              2    2 (100%)  
Beneficiaries              40 7 (17.5%) 15 (37.5%) 18 (45%) 
Decision-making was top-down, but the Chairman did not dominate, because he 
followed the board’s decision. Participation was limited to the central office. However 
role of middle level staff was significant, because heads of AIF and Bliss (who were 
middle level staff members) urged the board to launch a dairy programme. The head of 
administration supported them, but the board accepted it after it was satisfied about its 
cost efficacy. But lower staff had a minor role of reporting field problems to the central 
office. Still downward accountability was maintained, because the decision to provide 
loans and animals was made after people reported instances of harassment from 
government vets to AWARE.  
MACS (Mutually Aided Co-operative Society) (1998) 
AWARE institutionalised its banking system through MACS, which was similar 
to Chaitanya Nidhi, but unlike the latter, it provided loans to both men and women. It 
did not directly undertake employment generation, skill training, agricultural reforms, 
water management and housing schemes, although it lent money for these activities. 
MACS charged interest on loans and signified a shift in AWARE’s interest-free policy. 
It began with 1500,00000 rupees but now has nearly 3000,00000 rupees in its pool. 
Out of ten, eight respondents, including five AWARE respondents and three 
consultants called MACS significant. They believed it affected many beneficiaries. 
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Secondly, it was novel, because no previous credit scheme had charged interest on 
loans. Finally, respondents believed it faced many constraints, like governmental 
sanctions, increased expenditure, discord between AWARE members, default on loans 
and beneficiaries’ reluctance to pay interest. 
According to respondents, the Chairman, governing body, head of administration 
and senior project co-ordinators participated in the project. A situation was thrust upon 
board members and Madhavan, making it imperative to launch this project. The board 
felt they should establish a new department for micro credit, which could be registered 
as a co-operative under GoI statutes. The Chairman, head of administration and senior 
project co-ordinators agreed, although the former insisted loans should be charged 
interest.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
The first factor, which initiated the project, was Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) 
injunctions that AWARE being registered under company’s act could not disburse 
loans, nor function like a microfinance. But this was problematic, since AWARE had 
instituted many loans. Therefore, its board wanted a separate microfinance institution. 
This insistence by the board, Madhavan and head of administration was not due to 
government’s injunctions alone, but also due to a significant internal factor. It was 
AWARE’s increasing expenditure along with an increase in projects and beneficiaries. 
Since more finances were needed for AWARE’s upkeep, it was felt that loans should 
be made permanent sources of income. In this regard, there was a significant internal 
factor - Madhavan’s preference.  
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The Chairman suggested that loans disbursed by MACS should charge interest. 
This engendered another internal factor, i.e. disagreement between CDOs and the 
central office. The former vehemently opposed introduction of interest, since it would 
turn the NGO into a veritable business. Madhavan, however was firm and insisted that 
they had to indigenously generate money, due to resource crunch caused by external 
factors like limited funds from donors and AWARE’s strained relations with NOVIB. 
He argued that earlier they had adequate funds and did not need surplus. But the 
present situation demanded generation of surplus.
431
 Consequently, others in the 
organisation agreed. 
Another external factor prompted AWARE to charge interest on loans. This was 
people’s default in earlier loan schemes. So the management felt that by introducing 
interest, beneficiaries would be compelled to return loans on time. But some staff felt 
this was unfair, because the core poor would be excluded. Consequently, the Chairman 
argued that the poor, who paid 72% to moneylenders and lost their money, would be 
financially secure by paying merely 12% interest to MACS. 
Apart from internal dissent, there was the external factor of beneficiaries’ 
resistance to pay interest. AWARE’s volunteers tried to convince them by highlighting 
that their economic situation had changed since twenty years. Previously they could not 
afford interest, so Chaitanya Nidhi’s loans were interest-free. However MACS charged 
interest, since the poor were sufficiently empowered to modestly pay for services. Still 
the internal influence of increasing expenditure and the need to generate surplus was 
constraining, which respondents feel affected the project’s outcome.  
                                                           
431 When NOVIB was the primary funder, it wanted loans with interest to account for depreciation rates. 
But AWARE refused. Here the Chairman feels AWARE was wrong.  
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Major impacts 
All AWARE respondents and 66% consultants (two out three) called MACS 
successful, because it enhanced loan repayment by nearly 85%. It gave AWARE the 
status of a microfinance institution, whilst shifting its focus towards economic 
empowerment from service delivery.432 It also posited that relations with beneficiaries 
had progressed and AWARE could expect responsibility from them. Besides, surplus 
was generated, thereby creating a corpus fund, which helped finance projects. However 
33% consultants (one out of three) called it unsuccessful, because AWARE 
transformed into a bank from a non-profit organisation and the core poor were not the 
focus anymore.433 20% beneficiaries called it successful, because they got larger loans, 
which they could use for various economic activities.
434
 42.5% called it moderately 
successful, because it was difficult to repay interest on time. They also took sometime 
to adjust to the new microfinance pattern.435 But 27.5% called it unsuccessful, because 
MACS did not reach some of them. Moreover, some were debarred from availing 
loans, because they could not repay interest.
436
  
                                                           
432According to the head of administration, head of Bliss and Prof. Madduri, earlier projects focused on social and 
psychological empowerment. But with MACS, focus shifted to people’s capacity building. 
433Only those with a minimum living standard could afford interest. According to Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant 
to NOVIB), AWARE turned into a business organisation.  
434All twelve respondents said they used loans for their own small-scale businesses.  
435Seven respondents said that they were often unable to calculate interest. Moreover, they were intimidated by the 
formal manner in which MACS operated.  
436Four respondents said they could not access MACS’ services with its demand for interest. They felt intimidated. 
Moreover, seven respondents said that they had not understood the scheme and had not paid interest, thereby 
forfeiting their right to avail loans.  
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Table: 6.9 Impact of MACS as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL 
AWARE                5   5 (100%)   
Academics/ 
Consultants 
              3   2 (66%)    1 (33%) 
Beneficiaries              40 12 (30%) 17 (42.5%)  11 (27.5%) 
Decisions here were centralised and made by central office. Lower and middle 
staff had no major role. Consequently, decisions were less participatory. Firstly, it was 
the board’s decision to have a separate microfinance institution. Secondly, it was the 
Chairman’s decision to introduce interest through this project. Although many middle 
level staff demurred, his decision prevailed. Naturally, downward accountability was 
absent. Accountability was towards AWARE’s financial sustenance.  
Chetana Bazaar (1998) 
Through this project, AWARE marketed women’s produce and helped them earn 
a livelihood through Chetana Bazaar - a village store. It sold vegetables, fruits, rice, 
pulses, flour, chillies, beans, forest produce, milk products, incense sticks and 
handicrafts. Its targets were Chandangiri’s tribal women, whose access to market was 
limited. It covered Mehbubnagar, Khammam and Padkal districts. Local goods were 
sold in the market and goods from one district were also sold in another, without the 
presence of middlemen.  
Out of ten, six respondents, i.e. five AWARE respondents and one consultant 
called Chetana Bazaar significant. This is because they said it affected many 
beneficiaries in Telangana’s major districts. They felt it was novel, because an effort 
was made for the first time to sell goods from one district to the other. Also, it faced 
213 
many constraints, like flaw in previous efforts at marketing local produce and limited 
funds. 
According to respondents, heads of AIF, Bliss, the Chairman, board members, 
head of administration and CDOs participated in the project. AIF’s head noticed that 
tribals’ could not access the market, despite Bliss’s skill training. Subsequently the 
head of AIF consulted the head of Bliss regarding development of beneficiaries’ skills. 
Next they reported to central office. In the joint meeting, the head of administration 
highlighted a basic flaw in skill-training programmes. To rectify this, a departmental 
store for selling tribal women’s produce was considered essential. Hence, the project 
was launched.  
Factors influencing project decisions 
This project owes its inception to an internal problem, i.e. discrepancy in training 
conducted by Bliss and tribals’ lack of marketing facility. When the heads of AIF and 
Bliss reported this to the central office, other internal influences followed. Firstly, there 
was an internal flaw identified by head of administration that despite Bliss’s skill 
development and AIF’s marketing strategies, the programme benefited Harijans 
(backward caste members), rather than Girijans (tribals). The head of administration 
was supported by CDOs and heads of Bliss and AIF. The latter wanted village stores to 
address this problem. 
However this proposal met a second factor, i.e. concerns of cost efficacy by 
governing body and Madhavan. An external factor engendered this, namely limited 
funds from donors, due to AWARE’s legal problems with NOVIB. Since this NGO 
faced resource constraints, the board suggested that the project’s initial cost should be 
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covered by corpus funds, but subsequent sustenance of the store should be from sales 
proceeds. Therefore, the head of administration was asked to present an expense report, 
following which the project was launched with loans from local banks and co-
operatives. 
Nevertheless, project implementation faced certain external problems. Firstly, 
commutation from Chetana Bazaar to tribal units was time consuming. Secondly, 
storage of produce was improper, which caused spoilage of goods before they reached 
the main market. AWARE’s central office sought to overcome this by developing 
village economy’s interdependence, i.e. goods from one district were sold to another. 
Yet spoilage continued. Besides, not many goods were unique to a particular village, 
due to geographical, cultural and socio-economic similarity between villages. In fact, 
respondents suggest that the project’s outcome was limited, due to constraints like 
distance of the bazaar, and the fact that goods from one district were no different from 
the other.  
Major Impacts 
This project was considered successful by 60% AWARE respondents (three out 
five), because 12,000 out of 20,000 beneficiaries registered improvement in living 
conditions.437 Middlemen’s role was largely reduced as many beneficiaries began 
selling their products independently. Also, AWARE learnt what goods were in demand 
and encouraged beneficiaries to market them. Still 40% AWARE respondents (two out 
of five) called it moderately successful, because demand for goods fell along with fall 
in clientele. Customers felt goods were highly priced, whilst quality was low. 
                                                           
437The head of administration said, “Beneficiaries spent not only on essential goods, but non essentials too. 
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Nevertheless, living standards improved initially, due to high demand.438 Yet all 
consultants felt this project failed, because the store closed and customers were 
dissatisfied. Moreover only few beneficiaries were benefited.439 42.5% beneficiaries 
called it moderately successful, because they could interact directly with customers. 
However 57.5% called it unsuccessful, because the store stopped functioning too soon 
to make any difference.440 
Table: 6.10 Impact of Chetana Bazaar as perceived by respondents 
RESPONDENTS OPINION ON PROJECT OUTCOME (%) 
CATEGORY TOTAL 
RESPONDENTS 
SUCCESSFUL MODERATELY    
SUCCESSFUL 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
AWARE                 5 3 (60%)   2 (40%)  
Academics/ 
Consultants 
               1     1 (100%) 
Beneficiaries               40  17 (42.5%) 23 (57.5%) 
Decisions were somewhat participatory, since middle level staff like heads of AIF 
and Bliss decided to notify the central office about beneficiaries’ problems. Secondly, 
it was their insistence that made central office decide in favour of village stores. 
Finally, they supported the head of administration for this project. However the central 
office took key decisions, for example, it was the head of administration, who 
influenced the decision that a project should be taken to assist tribals only. Next, it was 
the board and the Chairman’s decision that cost efficacy must be maintained and that 
the project should generate surplus. Finally, it was a joint decision of central office 
members that districts should sell goods to each other. Accountability towards 
beneficiaries was present, since a decision was taken to improve tribals’ access to the 
                                                           
438The head of AIF felt that goods were in demand, because customers were still testing them. They had not yet 
rejected these goods. 
439Ms. Thakur (independent researcher) felt this project failed both in the long run and short-term. 
440All 23 respondents said there was no improvement in living standards and access to market. In fact, a male 
beneficiary said, “It was almost as if the store never existed….” 
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market, yet it was also towards AWARE itself, since a decision was taken to generate 
surplus.  
THE INCREMENTAL MODEL AND DECISIONS IN WOMEN’S 
EMPOWERMENT/ POVERTY ERADICATION PROJECTS 
This section examines decision processes in the above-mentioned projects through 
the Incremental Model, as was done for decisions in health and education projects. 
Problem identification, diagnosis, decision interrupts and recycling of decision loops, 
which are features of the model, have been considered to explain decision processes.  
As far as problem identification and diagnosis are concerned, they are applicable 
to most projects here. In fact, for Chaitanya Shakti, AWARE did not identify the 
problem, because beneficiaries notified them. Subsequently AWARE dispatched 
volunteers to collect information. So the model’s sequential order of identification and 
diagnosis is applicable, although decision-makers themselves did not identify the 
problem. Similarly sequential order can explain the poultry farming project, where 
AWARE’s previous survey report had identified the problem and an investigation team 
further diagnosed it. The sequential order of problem identification and diagnosis is 
applicable in Chaitanya Nidhi too, because reports from CDOs and VA leaders led to 
problem identification. Subsequently the Chairman visited villages for further 
information or diagnosis. It is also relevant for women’s property ownership project. 
AWARE identified the problem through tribals’ agitation. Subsequently rural 
functionaries undertook diagnosis. 
However in the skill-training project, identification and diagnosis were not 
sequentially undertaken. Instead, identification and diagnosis occurred simultaneously. 
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Even in DTDP, like the skill-training project, the sequential order is inapplicable. 
Identification of problems like illiteracy, morbidity, lack of agricultural reforms and 
lack of access to market was done whilst gathering information on the community’s 
general problems. Similarly sequential order cannot explain AIF, where project co-
ordinators identified the problem of lack of co-ordination and overstaffing, but no 
diagnosis occurred, because AWARE already knew this problem. So identification and 
diagnosis occurred together. 
The model cannot be used to explain the Gramlakshmi project, where AWARE 
did not identify the problem, because beneficiaries reported it. But personnel already 
knew it, so diagnosis was not undertaken. Although, the model mentions that in 
emergencies, no diagnosis is done; it is also true that diagnosis is not undertaken even 
when decision-makers know a problem beforehand. Yet the model’s perception of 
decision-making in an emergency can explain how MACS was established, because the 
problem was thrust on AWARE through RBI’s statute. Consequently, no diagnosis 
occurred. This model can also explain how Chetana Bazaar was established through 
sequential identification and diagnosis of problems.  
Other features of this model, like decision interrupts and recycling of decisions are 
also somewhat applicable. It can explain AWARE’s response to constraints, like 
beneficiaries’ passivity and hostility from landed elite and village men in Chaitanya 
Shakti. AWARE recycled earlier decisions and developed a new response that 
beneficiaries should train others from their community. The model can explain this 
recycling. However Mintzberg may not have considered these constraints as interrupts, 
since no disagreements occurred between organisational members. Besides, the model 
cannot explain certain constraints in the poultry-farming project. Ford’s constraint may 
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not qualify as an interrupt, because it was an external constraint. But since lack of co-
ordination, miscommunication and internal disagreement affected AWARE, an 
interrupt did occur. However AWARE did not recycle decisions. Instead, it 
compromised by choosing status quo. Incrementalists cannot explain this compromise 
and why AWARE avoided recycling decisions despite the interrupt.  
Still it is applicable for explaining AWARE’s response to NOVIB’s limiting its 
funds in Chaitanya Nidhi, which can qualify as an interrupt. AWARE revamped its 
plan to make Chaitanya Nidhi self-sustaining. The model’s concept of recycled 
decisions can explain this. It can also explain the response to constraints from village 
men, who were hostile to women’s property ownership project. AWARE responded by 
retracing its decision of focusing only on women and developed new strategies of 
counselling men. Another constraint here was state government’s accusation, which 
would not qualify as an interrupt, according to the model, since it involved non-
AWARE members, i.e. state government. Nevertheless, to resolve this AWARE 
launched strikes, which can be explained by Mintzberg’s custom-designed response. 
In the skill-training programme, constraint from a previous project (villagers’ 
reluctance towards agricultural reforms), made AWARE reconsider its decision to 
expand agricultural projects. It reverted to an earlier phase of decision-making. The 
model’s recycling concept can explain this. Another constraint was disagreement with 
donors, which incrementalists may not call an interrupt (since non-organisation 
members were present). But decisions were recycled nevertheless. In fact, this 
recycling led to the decision on who should fund the project. Decisions were recycled 
even during DTDP to address NOVIB’s charges, which can also be explained by this 
model. Empowerment programmes were revamped to include impact studies, to show 
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the absence of fund misappropriation. AWARE’s responded to beneficiaries’ hostility 
and low resources by reconsidering introduction of DTDP. The model can explain such 
a recycling of decisions. Subsequently the project continued by addressing only skill 
training and employment generation.  
Similarly, the model’s decision recycling concept is relevant for explaining 
AWARE’s response to GoI’s statute, in the AIF project. AWARE reconsidered its 
strategy of dispensing loans, and also addressed lack of organisational co-ordination. 
But an interrupt occurred, due to disagreement within central office on the need for a 
sister organisation and its jurisdiction. Again decisions were recycled or reconsidered, 
which makes the model’s explanation relevant. This model is also relevant, because 
AWARE reconsidered (recycled) its previous project on crop loans, when 
‘Gramlakshmi’ was launched. Subsequently a loan for dairy farmers was selected. 
Unfortunately, the model cannot explain AWARE’s reaction to another constraint, i.e. 
distance from market towns. AWARE did not retrace decisions, but focused on farms 
close to market towns, and compromised its objectives. Incrementalists cannot explain 
this compromise.  
Even for MACS, AWARE decided to resolve the problems of RBI’s injunction 
and increasing expenditure, by recycling decisions, which can be explained by the 
model. Credit policy was changed, to include interest, which was not accepted by the 
staff. This is similar to incrementalists’ interrupt, since it occurred between 
organisation members. Although the model explains decision processes here, it does 
not explain the rationale behind AWARE’s compromise in its objective, i.e. charging 
interest on loans. Yet this model is somewhat relevant for explaining how AWARE 
reconsidered decisions for Chetana Bazaar. However the board’s concern for cost 
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efficacy was an interrupt that occurred when previous projects on market access, were 
considered. So the interrupt occurred after recycling into previous decisions, which is 
different from the model.
441
 Nevertheless, in responding to spoilage of goods, AWARE 
reconsidered its plan and decided that goods should be sold among districts. The model 
can explain this recycling.  
Thus, the incremental model can explain certain aspects of decisions even in 
women’s empowerment and poverty eradication projects. It explains how recognition 
of problems led to situations whereby a decision had to be taken to address them. 
However problems were not always identified and diagnosed sequentially. Still the 
model explains how AWARE made decisions despite differences of opinion amongst 
its members, although interrupts did not always engender recycling of decisions. This 
is true of decisions not only in women’s empowerment / poverty eradication projects, 
but also in health and education projects. Hence, this model cannot explain all aspects 
of decision processes. Perhaps other theories can supplement this model and explain 
decision processes. This is done in the next chapter, where AWARE’s decisions are 
examined through the Garbage Can Model and the theory of Bounded Rationality. 
                                                           
441Incrementalists imply that decision interrupts occur before reconsidering strategies. This is because interrupts 
engender reconsideration of decisions.  
221 
CHAPTER SEVEN   
 
Decision-Making In AWARE - How Effective 
Has It Been? 
The previous chapters examined AWARE’s landmark project decisions in terms 
of process and performance. In this chapter, the pattern of change in objectives among 
projects within each domain is studied. Internal or external factors responsible for 
change in objectives are also identified. Thereafter, the manner in which the decision 
structure changed along with change in objectives (for each domain) is considered. 
Subsequently patterns of changes in objectives are examined through garbage can 
model. Factors influencing these changes are also observed through bounded 
rationality.  
THE HEALTH DOMAIN  
Changes in project objectives  
There were changes in the objectives of health projects. The original objective (in 
Chinnapuram centre) was to introduce AWARE to beneficiaries and provide what they 
demanded through curative health. Later the mobile clinic spread health education. 
This brought a shift towards gradual introduction of preventive health care. Even in the 
project on VHWs and midwives, the focus was on integrating preventive and curative 
health. But the trend changed, because projects became specific. For example, in the 
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midwives project, the objective was maternal and childcare, rather than general health 
services.  
The trend of narrowing health issues continued in Food and Nutrition programme, 
because the objective was to specifically change people’s diet, rather than provide 
general health care. Even the focus on preventive health continued. The objective of 
combining preventive and curative health care was observed in the boat hospital as 
well. Yet there was a change towards expansion by covering more beneficiaries and 
villages. Another change was the intention to familiarise donors and the state with 
AWARE.  
The trend of scaling-up continued in Padkal centre, because more villages were 
covered. Even the objective of making AWARE’s agenda known to donors and the 
state continued. However there was a change in terms of treating serious diseases like 
leprosy. Although the focus was on specific health issues, it was different, because no 
previous project intended curing such diseases.  
Even in the Latur project, the objective of scaling-up continued. However the 
intention was to scale up at the national level. Earlier projects like boat hospital and 
Padkal centre had focused on expanding only at the state level. Besides, Latur’s 
objective was different, i.e. to provide relief to people, who were not AWARE’s usual 
target group. Another basic change was AWARE’s overt tendency to undertake 
projects to build its image, rather than serving beneficiaries.442  
                                                           
442 Madhavan mentioned that Latur let AWARE prove itself for the first time on a national level and proudly 
showed various trophies / certificates of recognition. Even the head of administration, head of health services and 
the head of AIF referred to Latur as a challenge, where AWARE had succeeded. All recalled the high-publicity and 
media coverage AWARE received. No one mentioned that it also gave them an opportunity to prove themselves to 
the disaster victims / families. Had they had done so, it would have been obvious that their intention was not just 
scaling up, but also genuine concern for those affected. 
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The preoccupation with scaling-up continued even in Shantivanam in terms of 
expanding its activities by providing multi speciality health care. However fundamental 
changes occurred, because scaling up was for organisational survival.443 Secondly, the 
objective was to revamp and consolidate the organisation, which had not been 
considered before. The trend towards consolidation continues even in the latest health 
loans project. However the shift is towards disbursing loans and generating surplus for 
organisational sustenance.  
Thus AWARE’s objectives have changed. Initially, it provided health services to 
beneficiaries at their doorstep. This has changed to making people approach clinics 
instead.444 But a common feature of all projects till 1980s was to satisfy people’s needs. 
This has changed to scaling up and surplus generation.  
Factors influencing changes in objectives 
Certain influences were responsible for change in objectives. These were 
preferences and interests of beneficiaries, donors, AWARE’s Chairman, board 
members and upper and middle staff.  
The Chairman’s preference 
AWARE’s Chairman influenced all the above-mentioned changes in objectives. In 
the Chinnapuram project, he wanted to network with beneficiaries and provide only 
what they demanded. This determined the goal of providing curative health and 
interacting closely with people. Subsequently, he preferred to provide services in a 
manner that was acceptable to people. Consequently, AWARE’s goal continued as 
                                                           
443Previously scaling-up was for reaching more beneficiaries and villages, than organisational sustenance. 
444The Chairman highlighted this as a sign of people’s empowerment. 
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curative health care. In the project on VHWs and midwives, he wanted to address 
maternal and childcare, which he had found to be lacking. Hence the trend changed 
towards treating specific health issues.  
The Chairman positively influenced even the food and nutrition project, because 
he wished to eliminate recurrent diseases. He wanted to do this by making AWARE’s 
efforts sustainable and addressing people’s living habits. Consequently, objectives 
changed towards preventive health care. Then he found it important to increase 
AWARE’s influence among distant tribal hamlets, which became the boat hospital’s 
objective. Hence objectives shifted towards scaling-up.  
His influence was salutary even in the Padkal project, where the objective was to 
treat and rehabilitate lepers. He wanted to economise by treating lepers and non-lepers 
with the same resources and reach many villagers. So the objective was to treat a 
specific disease, but the trend was still to reach more people.  
In the Latur project, the Chairman desired large-scale relief operations. Hence 
scaling-up continued. His preference for scaling-up was seen even in Shantivanam, 
because he wanted to consolidate health programmes. So expansion continued, but it 
was for ensuring organisational survival. Subsequently he preferred surplus generation, 
which is the trend even today.  
Beneficiaries’ influence 
People’s influence was negative in the Chinnapuram and Mobile Clinic projects, 
because they were against changing their lifestyle. They were also unfamiliar with 
AWARE. Consequently, the objective was to build closer ties with beneficiaries and 
provide whatever was acceptable. However they did not directly influence the 
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midwives project, because AWARE predicted that people could relate better to target 
group midwives. Hence the trend of building networks with beneficiaries continued. 
They also indirectly influenced the food and nutrition project, because AWARE knew 
beneficiaries would be against changing their lifestyle. So the objective was to 
gradually introduce preventive health. Lately they have caused a fall in AWARE’s 
clientele and finances, which have shifted objectives towards surplus generation and 
organisational survival.  
Board members’ preference 
The board was reluctant to risk beneficiaries’ hostility and antagonise local 
politicians. This influenced the mobile clinic’s objective, which was to build people’s 
trust and introduce preventive health care indirectly. In the midwives project, they 
preferred cost-efficacy and were against hiring experts. Consequently, the objective 
was to train people themselves in specific health issues. Even in the food and nutrition 
project, they were against risking people’s hostility. Therefore, the objective changed 
to gradual introduction of preventive health care. Their preferences changed 
subsequently, because they were concerned that AWARE had grown too big to be 
handled by the central office alone. They wanted sister organisations to be established. 
Therefore, the objective shifted to organisational survival and restructuring under 
Shantivanam. 
Donors and government’s preference 
Donors and the government influenced AWARE’s recent objectives. For example, 
in the Latur project, MEMISA said it would fund if it were allowed to supervise. This 
shifted objectives towards partnering with donors. They also significantly influenced 
health loans through their preference for microfinance. In fact, this shifted the trend 
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towards microfinance for generating surplus. Apart from this, the government sought 
AWARE’s assistance. This changed the trend towards large-scale expansion and 
networking with the central government.  
AWARE’s incipience and lack of expertise 
This factor made AWARE undertake projects that were low-key and acceptable to 
beneficiaries. Therefore, early projects like Chinnapuram Centre, Mobile Clinic, 
VHWs and Midwives projects aimed at building networks with beneficiaries. Even in 
later projects like Latur, resource personnel’s lack of expertise made them unable to 
handle natural disasters. Consequently, objectives changed to networking with donors 
to overcome this constraint.  
Preference of AWARE’s middle staff members 
The middle staff changed certain objectives. For example, Chinnapuram centre’s 
head wanted an appendage for his centre, which would identify causes of diseases and 
bring Chinnapuram closer to people. This influenced the mobile clinic’s objective and 
even buttressed the need to build networks with beneficiaries. He also wanted to 
gradually change people’s diet. Consequently, the food and nutrition project was 
launched, which changed the trend towards gradual introduction of preventive health 
care.  
Mode of decision-making  
     The mode or pattern of decision-making changed gradually. In fact, the level of 
centralisation and participation in decisions changed along with change in objectives. 
The very first trend was to provide health services to beneficiaries in an acceptable 
manner. This was influenced by reluctance of beneficiaries for preventive health 
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services. Consequently, the Chairman felt that close ties should be built with them, 
which shows that decisions were quite participatory.  
The trend then changed towards gradual introduction of preventive health 
services. Chinnapuram Centre’s head (a middle level staff member) influenced this. He 
had observed that beneficiaries continued to resist preventive health. His feedback 
made the Chairman feel that preventive health should be gradually introduced. This 
caused some participation even though decisions were still centralised.  
Specific health issues were addressed in the next shift. The Chairman and the 
board decided to do so after feedback from Chinnapuram’s head. This shows that a 
centralised decision engendered the shift. The subsequent trend was towards scaling up 
to reach more people, apart from networking with the state and donors. This was 
entirely the Chairman’s decision and hence centralised. Subsequently, he and the board 
decided to treat severe diseases, which shows that a centralised decision shifted 
objectives again.  
Expanding at a national level and networking with donors was the next phase. 
Donors and the government made their preferences clear and effected this change, 
although it was the Chairman’s decision to cater to their preference. So a centralised 
decision shifted objectives. Even the trend towards consolidation of health services 
was engendered by centralised decisions, because it was the Chairman and board’s 
preference. Finally, the trend was towards organisational survival and surplus 
generation, which was also caused by preferences of the Chairman and board to 
undertake schemes that donors would favour.  
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Theoretical analysis of changes in objectives  
This section theoretically examines changes in objectives and the influencing 
factors. The former is examined though the garbage can model and the latter through 
the bounded rationality theory. 
Initially AWARE wanted to build ties with beneficiaries and introduce health 
services in an acceptable manner. This is because beneficiaries’ reluctance had left 
unresolved issues like recurrence of diseases and lack of health consciousness, which 
became the objective in this phase. The garbage can model can explain this.445 Even 
subsequently, the objective was to gradually introduce preventive health. The garbage 
can model can explain this as well, since preventive health was an unresolved issue 
from the past. Here AWARE did not want to risk changing beneficiaries’ lifestyle until 
it won their trust.446 
However the garbage can model cannot explain the change towards specific health 
issues. This is because AWARE became conscious of them after projects were 
completed.447 Thereafter the focus was on scaling-up to expand and to build its image. 
                                                           
445This model posits that unresolved issues are considered later in the next phase of decision-making. It could be 
applied to AWARE too. For example in the Chinnapuram project, beneficiaries did not fully recognise AWARE’s 
contribution and the latter was not very cognisant with people’s health problems. This unresolved issue was 
addressed in the next phase through Mobile Health Clinic, where the objective was to learn about people’s health 
problems. This gave rise to the unresolved issue of people’s unhygienic lifestyle and dietary habits, which was 
addressed subsequently in the Food and Nutrition programme.  
446According to J.G.March, JWPayne, T.Kunreuther and L.Meszaros, risk aversion, as a concept is typical of 
organisational decisions. See J.G.March and Cyert, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm. Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Business, 1992. p. 252; J.W.Payne, “The scarecrow’s search: a cognitive psychological perspective on 
organisational decision-making,” in Zur Shapira (ed.), Organisational decision-making. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. p.353; Kunreuther and Meszaros, “Organisational choice under ambiguity,” in Shapira, 
Decision-making. p. 61.  
447The Garbage Can model suggests that unresolved issues from the past are carried over to the next phase. 
However it is doubtful if an issue, whose existence was unknown, but addressed in a later decision is also included 
in this model.  
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But AWARE also sought risk, unlike its previous tendency. Possibly it felt that it could 
risk courting donors. Its action is similar to that of moderately placed firms.448 
The trend changed recently to consolidation of heath services and organisational 
restructuring.449 This is because AWARE’s aspiration fell following constraints like 
decreased funding and problems with NOVIB.450 It avoided risk by carefully 
centralising its programmes. Yet, it also sought risk, because it served urban rather than 
the rural poor and introduced service charges. This compromised the agenda of non-
commercially serving the rural poor, thereby giving credence to the belief that scaled 
up NGOs change their mission. In fact, the trend changed to surplus generation that 
further compromised AWARE’s mission. This occurred because low clientele 
engendered low surpluses. Once again the garbage can model could explain this, 
because unresolved problems were addressed.
451
 
Having examined objectives through garbage can model, this section considers the 
rationality of changing objectives. For example, beneficiaries’ passivity and AWARE’s 
incipience made this NGO scale-down and compromise its objectives.452 But Haq, 
Riddel and Robinson think that projects succeed, when they correspond with 
                                                           
448H.Simon, J.G.March and J.W.Payne believe such firms seek more risk than those that barely survive. See John 
G.March and Herbert Simon, “Bounded rationality and satisficing,” in C.Randall (ed.), Four Sociological 
Traditions: Selected Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. p. 145. See also Payne, “The scarecrow.” 
in Shapira, Decision-making. p. 353.  
449 This happened in Shantivanam and Health loans project, where the focus changed to surplus generation and 
organisational restructuring. The prime target for AWARE was now the urban population, rather than the rural 
poor. 
450Aspirations of bounded rational decision-makers fall, according to Simon, due to constraints. But they rise, when 
they have had previous successes. See H.Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1982. 
451The unresolved problem was that of low resources. This was addressed through institutionalisation of health 
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the domain, wherein more and more people had enlisted AWARE’s services. It engendered financial pressures, 
which were further aggravated by funding problems in earlier projects.  
452The Chairman said he had grand plans that were not implemented, because villagers rejected them. Thus 
objectives were scaled down for people’s sake.  
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beneficiaries’ need.453 They ignore the fact that problems are unresolved, even when 
NGOs scale-down for beneficiaries. If AWARE’s incipience and beneficiaries’ 
reluctance were absent; it could have undertaken preventive health. But, it was a low-
resource, fledgling organisation and had no networks with donors. Hence it satisficed 
like Simon’s bounded rational actor to make itself acceptable to beneficiaries without 
stretching its resources.454 
In the next trend, AWARE focused on specific issues by training villagers in 
maternal and childcare. Perhaps AWARE should have hired health experts for training. 
But that would have been irrational, since AWARE would have compromised 
beneficiaries’ participation, which Haq feels is necessary for any project’s 
sustainability.455 Even the trend towards preventive health may be called irrational, 
since AWARE lacked health experts and resources. But it was boundedly rational and 
not irrational, because AWARE formed expectations of beneficiaries’ response.  
During the subsequent trend of scaling-up to reach more villages, the state was a 
constraint. AWARE could have postponed scaling-up and developed partnerships with 
the state. Or it could have assisted the government with its health campaigns. But this 
would have delayed tribal empowerment and would not have been feasible, because the 
state was hostile towards AWARE after its land transfer campaigns. 
Even the trend towards treating complex diseases was problematic (like in the 
Padkal centre). AWARE launched a socially correct project, which differed from 
                                                           
453 R.Riddel, et.al, Non-governmental Organisations and rural poverty alleviation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
p.303. 
454 H.Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A study of decision-making processes in organizations. New York: Free 
Press, 1976. p. 364. 
455 Mehboob ul Haq, Human development in South Asia. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
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people’s perception of social correctness.456 They overtly supported but psychologically 
rejected the campaign. Perhaps AWARE could have joined governmental campaigns 
for rehabilitation of patients with terminal diseases.457 The partnership could have 
solved fund shortage. It was irrational that AWARE ignored this alternative. However 
Satish and Prem Kumar’s suggestion of competition between NGOs and government, 
justifies AWARE’s decision to remain autonomous.458 
Scaling-up at the national level was the next phase. Perhaps AWARE should have 
used donors’ assistance to reach more beneficiaries, rather than build its image. This 
decision might be called irrational since downward accountability was ignored. 
However AWARE realised that many agencies would be competing. So maximising its 
reach, apart from maintaining contact with the donor was improbable. Therefore it 
satisficed within the bounds of its dependence on donors and organisational image. 
Subsequently the objective was to consolidate programmes for organisational 
survival. AWARE spread to urban areas for this purpose. Perhaps it should have 
continued in villages and established a monitoring body there. But AWARE could not 
do this, due to disagreement with NOVIB, which caused other Dutch donors to stop 
funds. So it decided upon urban areas, and proved Edwards and Hulme right that 
donors cause loss in NGOs’ mission.459 AWARE could have pursued rural 
development and solicited funds from elsewhere. But its rationale was to assert its 
autonomy and prevent liquidation. 
                                                           
456Simon further developed organisational and social correctness as issues that organisations strive to balance. See 
Simon, Bounded Rationality. p. 89.  
457Sameeksha Thakur (independent researcher) spoke of an earlier governmental campaign for terminally ill 
patients, which she participated in. 
458 S.Satish and R.Kumar, “Are NGOs cost effective than government?” in J.Farrington, et.al (eds.), Non-
governmental organisations and the State in Asia. London: Routledge, 1993. p.169. 
459Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Non-governmental organisations: performance and accountability beyond 
the magic bullet. London: Earthscan and Save the Children, 1995. p. 83 
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Finally, the aim was to generate surplus for organisational survival. Perhaps 
AWARE should have partnered with donors instead of generating surplus through 
loans. Or it should have reduced personnel, and continued rural health programmes. 
However AWARE wanted to continue expansion since it wanted an autonomous 
corpus fund. So its decision was justified, because as Arbour suggests, even welfare 
service providers should be compensated.460 
EDUCATION DOMAIN  
Changes in project objectives  
Like health projects, AWARE’s education projects began modestly but gradually 
expanded. This section examines how objectives in this domain changed. In the first 
few projects (property rights and legal rights projects), the focus was to build close ties 
with people and train them in basic rights, so that they could fight for their rights 
despite exploitation from rural elite. In the next project Chaitanya Nidhi’s resource 
personnel were trained, but there was no change in basic objective, which was to equip 
beneficiaries against exploitation. But training was given in microfinance. So there was 
a shift towards women’s economic empowerment, because merely social and legal 
issues were not considered.  
The specific objective in the Yenadi project was to empower tribals by combining 
education in legal / property rights, women’s empowerment and other social issues. 
Objectives shifted as social issues were integrated. Previously, the objective had been 
to separately address legal rights, property rights and microfinance. Another shift was 
                                                           
460Ann Arbour, “In defence of the Good Samaritan,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 97, March 1999. p. 1152. 
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the intention to expand and cover more villages. Scaling-up was considered even in the 
project on people’s political mobilisation, because AWARE wanted a political niche 
for itself. Hence there was a shift even in scaling-up, because AWARE no longer 
ignored political issues. 
The trend of scaling-up continued, but consolidation was also considered. For 
example Bliss was established for overcoming co-ordination problems by centralising 
education programmes. In fact, Bliss shifted objectives towards organisational survival. 
Nevertheless scaling-up continued even in the TFRD project, because the objective 
was to launch TFRDs in outreach projects. But the shift was towards training target 
group members to undertake projects on AWARE’s behalf.461  
The objective of training beneficiaries to overcome exploitation was maintained 
even in the veterinary training programme. However the specific objective was to train 
them in treating dairy animals. A shift in objectives occurred, because new skills had 
not been imparted to beneficiaries before, although training in socio-economic issues 
had been common. Nevertheless scaling-up continued even in the deemed university. 
But objectives shifted significantly towards university education, because previously 
the objective had been to conduct awareness-camps alone.462  
Thus, AWARE’s objectives changed from addressing specific problems of 
beneficiaries like property rights and legal rights, to functionally scaling up and 
addressing economic and political issues. In fact, functional expansion merged with 
                                                           
461Earlier beneficiaries were trained only to dissipate knowledge to their community. 
462The head of Bliss and head of administration suggest that organisational survival was still emphasised, because 
university education was introduced to sustain other programmes.  
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organisational expansion in later projects. Yet in the recent projects, organisational 
survival, once a long-term goal, became the immediate objective.  
Factors influencing changes in objectives  
The influence of landed elite and local politicians influenced all decisions in 
education projects. There were other influences like the role of rural functionaries and 
preferences of the Chairman and board members.  
Rural functionaries’ role 
CDOs, VA leaders and ZOs reported field problem, which determined 
organisational objectives. For example, in the property rights project, they reported that 
villagers lost their land to the elite. This determined the objective of educating villagers 
on land rights. It also set the trend that educating beneficiaries on their rights was 
important to prevent harassment. Similarly, it was CDOs’ report on poverty and rural 
indebtedness, which led AWARE to undertake beneficiaries’ material empowerment 
by first training resource personnel in microfinance. So their report changed objectives 
from social and legal issues to economic issues. Their report during the Yenadi project 
further changed the focus towards integrated rural development. CDOs and VA leaders 
were significant even in the good voters’ programme, because they revealed 
beneficiaries’ lack of political motivation. This engendered a major shift in objectives 
towards AWARE’s gradual politicisation.  
The Chairman’s preference 
The Chairman determined objectives through his preferences. In the property 
rights and legal rights programmes, he wanted beneficiaries to be equipped to fight 
exploitation. Consequently, the objective was to impart direct training to people on 
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their rights. Even in the good voters’ programme, his preference was critical, because 
he wanted people to be politically conscious. Consequently, objectives changed 
towards political mobilisation. However he negatively influenced the formation of 
Bliss by his reluctance for sister organisations. This delayed consolidation. However 
his concern made the Central Office supervise Bliss and exercise veto. His preference 
also ensured scaling-up in the form of university education through the deemed 
university programme.  
Board members’ preference 
The preference of board members was significant in changing certain objectives. 
For example, in the training for Chaitanya Nidhi’s personnel, the board wanted to 
network with other NGOs practising microfinance, because it realised that AWARE’s 
personnel lacked expertise. They also engendered a change in objectives, by focusing 
on material empowerment, rather than social and legal empowerment. Even in the 
Yenadi project, they insisted on integrated rural development after CDOs submitted 
their report. Consequently, a new trend occurred, i.e. addressing social and economic 
issues together. Then in the good voters’ programme, they preferred to mobilise people 
by allowing them to contest in elections. This shifted objectives towards political 
mobilisation.  
Recently the board favoured AWARE’s revamping through Bliss. So another shift 
in objectives occurred, i.e. scaling-up for AWARE’s survival. Their preference in the 
TFRD project ensured the same trend, because it wanted a competent team of 
subsidiaries, who could undertake projects for this NGO. However the board wanted 
cost-efficacy, which ensured that even whilst scaling-up only few people were trained. 
Even in the veterinary project, the board suggested that villagers should be trained in 
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veterinary services. Consequently, the objective was training beneficiaries in a skill to 
overcome exploitation. Finally, the board preferred higher education, which has 
influenced the latest trend towards formal university education.  
Role of AWARE’s upper and middle level staff 
AWARE’s staff drew attention to issues, which caused changes in objectives. For 
example, the head of administration (an upper staff member) wanted Bliss for 
consolidation of programmes. His preference influenced the objective of scaling-up 
and revamping AWARE. Subsequently during the TFRD project, the head of Bliss (a 
middle level staff member) felt it was difficult to hire experts. He influenced the shift 
towards scaling-up by training villagers to independently undertake projects. Another 
middle level staff member, i.e. the head of MACS showed how beneficiaries defaulted 
on loans, although many owned dairy farms. He preferred a programme to train 
beneficiaries in veterinary services along with managing cattle loans. This shifted 
objectives, because people were trained in a specialised skill for the first time.  
Beneficiaries and elite’s influence 
Grievance of beneficiaries and exploitation by elite were responsible for 
determining objectives. However their influence on latest objectives has been 
minimal.463 For example, in the initial projects on property and legal rights, people 
reported that the elite exploited them. Consequently, the objective was to train 
beneficiaries in legal and property rights so that they could fight exploitation. But, 
moneylenders continued exploitation. When beneficiaries reported this, they changed 
AWARE’s agenda towards economic empowerment. Even in the Yenadi project, 
                                                           
463AWARE has lately been driven by the need to survive than address any particular need of beneficiaries. 
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tribals reported that the elite exploited them in social and economic issues. This 
changed the focus towards integrating both issues. In another instance, the rural elite 
won assembly seats and exploited villagers. This shifted objectives towards political 
mobilisation of beneficiaries. Finally, in the vet-training project, beneficiaries reported 
that government vets exploited them. This changed objectives, because a skill was 
introduced as the means to fight exploitation.  
 Mode of decision-making 
Like the previous domain, the mode of decisions changed along with change in 
objectives. The initial trend was to build ties with people and train them in basic 
rights.464 Continued exploitation by the elite and beneficiaries’ marginalisation 
influenced this trend. However it was the Chairman’s decision that people themselves 
should be trained to fight for their rights. So centralised decisions determined this 
trend. The next shift was to train personnel in women’s economic empowerment (i.e. 
the Chaitanya Nidhi personnel’s training programme), which was decided by the 
Chairman and the board. Hence centralisation again shifted objectives. However for 
planning and implementing projects many lower and middle staff lent their services.  
Subsequently the trend shifted towards integrated rural development. CDOs’ 
report and beneficiaries’ feedback induced the board to decide that objectives should 
be shifted. So the decision was not wholly centralised. However centralised decisions 
engendered the next shift on scaling up politically. It was the board’s preference and 
the Chairman’s intention.  
                                                           
464 As was seen in Property Rights and Legal Rights training programmes. 
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The board and the Chairman also decided the next shift towards expansion and 
organisational revamping. However others like the head of administration also 
expressed their preferences. Yet participatory decisions shifted the trend towards 
scaling-up by training target group members to supervise projects. In fact, the head of 
Bliss (middle level staff) wanted this. Even the shift towards training beneficiaries in a 
skill to overcome exploitation was a participatory decision, because the head of MACS 
(middle level staff) was involved. However the shift towards university education was 
a centralised decision by the Chairman and the board. 
Theoretical analysis of changes in objectives  
Change in objectives and factors that engendered them are theoretically analysed 
here. The garbage can model can explain how unresolved issues of the past were 
addressed in the first phase of objectives, i.e. networking with people and training them 
in basic rights. Another feature of this period is that AWARE’s dependency relation 
was around beneficiaries.465  
The garbage can model could also explain AWARE’s approach of gathering 
information and addressing them afterwards. For example, during earlier projects, it 
learnt that women’s economic empowerment, was essential. This was addressed later 
through micro-credit. Another purpose for introducing microfinance was to include 
more beneficiaries.466 Also, by training personnel in micro-credit, AWARE wanted to 
                                                           
465Dependency relations are important, according to Salancik and Brindle, because it influences organisational 
priorities. AWARE’s priorities in this period were beneficiaries. See Shapira, Decision-making. p.111.  
466Goran Hyden calls this tendency in organisations as functional scaling-up, when they undertake more activities. 
See T.Weiss and L.Gordenker. NGOs, the UN and Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Publishers, 1996. p.250.  
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shift its organisational symbolic stance to attract donors, who were partial to 
microfinance.467 
     Having educated beneficiaries in socio-economic issues, AWARE decided to 
functionally scale up.468 It was reflected in its objective of integrated rural 
development. This expansion was due to growing aspiration after the success of 
previous projects. But, AWARE wanted to expand by covering more people. So the 
belief that scaled up NGOs break away from beneficiaries is inapplicable here, because 
AWARE being a fledgling organisation wanted to network with people. 
Functional expansion continued, when AWARE politically empowered 
beneficiaries. However in scaling-up politically, AWARE compromised its non-
political nature.
469
 But it had learnt that it needed political influence to overcome 
politician’s opposition. This is typical of bounded rational decision-makers, who do 
not possess information before making decisions, but subsequently learn to make 




Centralisation and consolidation of programmes was the next phase. This was to 
resolve lack of co-ordination, due to increasing programmes and beneficiaries. The 
garbage can model can explain AWARE’s approach in resolving these older problems. 
Risk avoidance was another feature of this objective, because the board realised that 
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according to Dutton. See James Dutton, “Strategic agenda building in organisations,” in Shapira, Decision-making. 
p. 81.  
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See Simon, Bounded Rationality. p. 158. 
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AWARE’s low resources would not permit many projects and beneficiaries.471 They 
also wanted to give an impression of stability to donors by revamping their 
organisational structure. Subsequently a step was taken to address unresolved problems 
like default on cattle loans. This was to be addressed by providing veterinary training 
to beneficiaries. This problem was recognised during previous routine programmes 
(i.e. not landmark projects) in the area. The garbage can model can explain this, 
because an unresolved problem was considered. However the focus on university 
education revealed a formal shift in AWARE’s organisational symbolic issues. This 
showed that AWARE became confident with its earlier success and overrated itself.472  
Now the discussion is carried further by considering the rationality of AWARE’s 
objectives. For example, in the first phase it may be argued that given its incipience, 
AWARE should not antagonised elite. It should have networked with them, because 
their goodwill could have averted government’s pressure. But AWARE guessed 
(through heuristics) that networks with elite could prompt further interference from 
them.473 It was also part of its strategy to gradually fight the elite, which is justified, 
since Fisher suggests that elite’s dominance should not be broken through revolts.474 
Besides, it was against a young NGO’s rationale to network with exploiters. Also it had 
a whistle-blower’s agenda against elite’s exploitation. 
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During the subsequent shift towards women’s economic empowerment, it was 
decided that experts should guide trainees in microfinance. However there were 
constraints from landed elite and long consultations with experts and donors, which 
delayed projects. This gives credence to Wildavsky and Pressman’s argument that too 
many decision-makers delay decisions.475 In fact, the project could have been 
implemented soon after consultations with the state. Still it was rational that AWARE 
obtained donors’ support, by making the idea of microfinance training, attractive to 
them. This even helped AWARE overcome lack of expertise. 
Next the focus was on integrated rural development, which may be called rational, 
because it showed that AWARE maintained downward accountability. But it was not 
wholly rational, since beneficiaries could become dependent on AWARE whilst 
resolving exploitation by elite. In fact, AWARE could have copied the dependency 
between villagers and elite.476 But AWARE members argue that their phased 
withdrawal from projects prevented this. Still non-AWARE members think otherwise. 
Such dependencies are irrational if AWARE’s goal of empowerment is considered.  
Subsequently the focus shifted to political mobilisation of beneficiaries, whence 
AWARE lost its non-political nature. This gives credence to beliefs that external 
constraints force NGOs to compromise. If AWARE had increased people’s political 
awareness without fielding candidates, it would have been rational. In fact, it should 
have guessed the implications of entering politics and withdrawn after mobilising 
beneficiaries. However this requires instrumental rationality. AWARE was boundedly 
                                                           
475Pressman, J. L., and Wildavsky, A. Implementation. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984. p.87. 
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rational, because it addressed a constraint by building a political base, but 
compromised its non-political nature.477 
Next AWARE aimed at scaling-up by revamping itself. Perhaps this was 
irrational, because downward accountability was ignored while the organisation itself 
expanded. Still it was boundedly rational, since AWARE adapted according to changed 
circumstances, like larger projects and different power equations between beneficiaries 
and elite. Also it wanted centralised programmes to ensure sustainability. This also 
shows that its staff could identify with organisational mission and moved towards 
decentralisation. Nevertheless AWARE compromised by turning bureaucratic, which 
could delay decisions.  
Subsequently the focus shifted towards expansion by training beneficiaries to 
independently undertake projects. Perhaps AWARE should have included more men in 
this and pre-empted their hostility. But, limited resources led to targeting fewer 
beneficiaries. This was boundedly rational, because it was made within the confines of 
financial constraints and threat from elite.  
The next shift was training beneficiaries in a new skill to make them fight 
exploitation. It was rational to involve beneficiaries, since it is believed that NGOs can 
succeed through beneficiaries’ participation. Another rational decision was networking 
with the government to loosen the alliance between rural elite and bureaucracy. But it 
was also irrational, because it replicated government services.  
                                                           
477Salancik and Brindle’s ‘decision-less choice’ theory can explain this. They posit how decisions are taken due to 
external constraints. See Shapira, Decision-making. p.111. 
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Finally, the shift was towards university education, which was irrational because 
AWARE scaled-up with limited finance. Besides it provided something that 
beneficiaries had not demanded. In fact, AWARE imposed its exigencies upon 
beneficiaries without using heuristics to understand beneficiaries’ needs. It inaccurately 
concluded that people were sufficiently empowered for higher education. It did not 
realise that people’s needs determine project outcomes. 
POVERTY ERADICATION / WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
Changes in project objectives 
Objectives in this domain changed from small-scale operations to gradual scaling-
up over the years. For example, in Chaitanya Shakti, the immediate objective was 
towards women’s social and psychological empowerment. The larger objective was to 
reach more beneficiaries, by targeting women, who formed a sizeable proportion of the 
target group. Later in the poultry-farming project, AWARE addressed women’s lack of 
access to the market by helping them maintain a poultry farm. So the shift was towards 
women’s economic empowerment. This continued even in Chaitanya Nidhi, which 
was a micro-credit association that consolidated women’s economic independence. 
However the specific objective was teaching women to save. No project had focused 
on training women to manage their incomes before.  
Women’s material empowerment continued even in the property rights project. 
But the specific aim was to enable women obtain property. Hence there was a shift, 
because AWARE addressed legal issues for the first time. In the subsequent project on 
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skill training the objective was to make women economically independent by training 
them in handicraft production. So the shift was towards developing women’s skills.  
In DTDP the objective was to empower tribals by aggregating earlier issues like 
microfinance, skill development, poultry farming and women’s property rights. So the 
trend changed to scaling-up, because more beneficiaries were targeted and AWARE 
wanted to expand organisationally. Scaling-up continued even in AIF. In fact, through 
AIF, AWARE aimed at consolidating its social action efforts. So along with scaling-up 
there was a shift towards restructuring to ensure organisational survival.  
Organisational survival was ensured even in Gram Lakshmi by generating surplus. 
Previously loans were for clearing debts. But now loans were disbursed for generating 
surplus. Surplus generation for organisational survival continued even in MACS, 
which charged interest on loans. In fact, AWARE aimed at institutionalising rural 
banking through MACS and Gram Lakshmi and be recognised by stakeholders as a 
microfinance organisation. However the most significant trend was interest on loans, 
which was not present in earlier schemes. Even in Chetana Bazaar, the trend towards 
organisational survival and surplus generation continued, although the immediate 
objective was to increase people’s access to market. 
Hence AWARE’s objective began with empowering beneficiaries by developing 
their abilities. This changed to organisational survival by consolidating poverty 
eradication programmes and generating surplus. It is also observed that initial projects 
focused on developing people’s capabilities through social empowerment. This shifted 
to skill development. Today, it is microfinancing.  
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Factors influencing changes in objectives  
The common factor that affected landmark decisions in this domain was influence 
of CDOs and project co-ordinators. There were other significant influences like 
pressure from donors, Madhavan’s initiative, beneficiaries’ inertia and hostility from 
landed elite. 
Role of CDOs 
CDOs reports changed the trend of objectives. For example, in the poultry-farming 
programme, they made AWARE conscious that tribal women lacked market access. 
This shifted the trend towards women’s economic empowerment. Similarly during 
Chaitanya Nidhi they highlighted that thrift was unknown to people. Their report led to 
a continuance of women’s economic empowerment. However it also signified a shift, 
because the emphasis was on managing rural household income. Similarly for the 
property ownership project, CDOs showed women’s lack of access to property. This 
changed the trend towards women’s land rights.  
Even in the skill-training programme, CDOs informed the central office about the 
improper organisation of rural handicraft industry. Consequently, women’s economic 
empowerment continued, but the emphasis shifted towards development of rural 
handicrafts and women’s skills. In fact, CDOs in the DTDP ensured that empowerment 
was undertaken by shifting towards integrated rural development. They were 
responsible for shifting the trend towards organisational survival and revamping in 
AIF, because they reported lack of co-ordination and their desire to have a poverty 
eradication department.  
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The Chairman’s preference 
The Chairman’s role was significant in Chaitanya Nidhi. His preferred to focus on 
women’s economic status. This shifted the trend towards women’s economic 
empowerment. Even in the skill-training project, he learnt that people wanted to 
develop cottage industry. This shifted objectives towards developing handicraft 
industries to ensure women’s economic independence. But in DTDP, he wanted to 
prove the donors wrong. Consequently, objectives shifted towards having impact 
studies apart from rural empowerment. Finally, in MACS he preferred loans with 
interest for AWARE’s sustenance. This shifted objectives towards surplus generation.  
Role of AWARE’s middle and upper level staff 
The role of staff was important. For example, AIF’s head (middle level staff 
member) observed how dairy farmers were harassed. He and the head of Bliss (middle 
level staff member) wanted to help them. This engendered Gramlakshmi’s loans, 
whereby objectives shifted towards surplus-generation. The role of the heads of Bliss 
and AIF was also critical in Chetana Bazaar, because they insisted on addressing 
tribal’s lack of access to the market. Even the head of administration (an upper staff 
member) posited how tribals lacked market access. Consequently, the focus shifted 
towards improving access to market. 
Board’s preference 
The board preferred enhancing women’s access to land and attract donors in the 
property rights project.478 Hence objectives shifted towards property ownership. They 
also wanted a cost-effective skill-training programme. This influenced goals; i.e. 
                                                           
478 MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) felt donors in this period favoured women’s economic empowerment. 
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handicraft industry was developed to empower women cost-effectively. Subsequently 
the board wanted to institutionalise social action under AIF to ensure AWARE’s 
sustainability. This changed the trend, because scaling-up was undertaken for 
organisational survival. Similarly the board changed the trend, when it insisted on a 
microfinance body like MACS to generate surplus. Consequently, the trend towards 
organisational survival continued along with surplus generation.  
Beneficiaries’ preference 
Beneficiaries, i.e. tribal women demanded women-oriented programmes. This 
shifted AWARE’s focus from male-oriented programmes towards social and 
psychological empowerment of women. Women also reported that they were exploited, 
because they were landless. This shifted empowerment towards land rights. Their lack 
of access to rural credit then shifted objectives towards microfinance. But beneficiaries 
seemed to negatively influence skill-training programmes, because they prevented an 
erstwhile agricultural programme. However they showed their preference for local 
skills. This shifted the trend towards development of rural handicrafts.  
Role of donors and government:  
Donors and the government influenced certain trends. For example, NOVIB’s 
preference for microfinance changed objectives towards economic empowerment 
through micro credit. Donors’ preference for women’s economic empowerment made 
AWARE focus on economic issues like land rights. However they accused AWARE of 
financial misappropriation during DTDP. This shifted the goal towards incorporating 
impact studies along with rural development. Even the GoI constrained AWARE 
through its statute that only registered financial institutions could undertake 
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microfinance. Consequently MACS was created for rural banking. Thus GoI 
influenced the change of objectives towards microfinance and surplus generation.  
Mode of decision-making  
The pattern of decisions changed in congruence with change in objectives. In fact, 
the larger objective to empower women socially and psychologically was because 
beneficiaries insisted and the Chairman preferred to empower women. So decentralised 
decisions were responsible for this trend. However the actual implementation of 
projects with this objective was based on centralised decisions. Centralised decisions 
engendered even the shift towards women’s economic empowerment, because board 
members wanted it based on the report by CDOs.  
Subsequently the trend was towards teaching women to save through 
microfinance, engendered by beneficiaries’ preference for a pool that would lend 
money. Their preference was further emphasised by reports of CDOs and even the 
Chairman felt objectives should be shifted in this direction. Hence participatory 
decisions brought this change while centralised decisions shifted objectives towards 
women’s legal issues. This is because board members wanted this change after 
people’s feedback, and also wanted to attract donors, who preferred women’s 
economic development projects.   
The next shift was to develop women’s skills through rural handicrafts. It was the 
Chairman and the board’s decision to do so. Subsequently, the focus shifted towards 
scaling up by covering more beneficiaries. Centralised decision by the Chairman was 
responsible for this. However CDOs’ report and donors’ pressure influenced him. The 
next shift towards scaling-up to ensure organisational survival was engendered by an 
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entirely centralised decision, because the Chairman and the board decided to address 
AWARE’s lack of co-ordination. 
The final shift was towards surplus generation for AWARE’s sustenance. Partially 
participatory decisions engendered this, because it was not just the Chairman and the 
board, who decided to change objectives (due to pressure from donors and the 
government). Even middle level staff (like heads of AIF and Bliss) wanted this change.  
Theoretical analysis of changes in objectives  
The discussion here is carried further through the garbage can model and the 
theory of bounded rationality. For example, the first trend of objectives, i.e. women’s 
social and psychological empowerment was formed because beneficiaries wanted it. 
This is seen in the Chaitanya Shakti programme. It made the state and donors recognise 
AWARE’s objective as women’s empowerment. However there was the unresolved 
issue of women’s lack of access to the market, which was addressed subsequently in 
projects like Chaitanya Nidhi. The garbage can model could explain this, because 
previously unresolved issues were addressed. Even later, women’s economic 
empowerment was retained, but with an emphasis on microfinance and thrift. There 
was a long-term benefit in encouraging thrift so that people could sustain themselves 
after this NGO withdrew. Thus, AWARE favoured long-term objectives, although 
Tisdell feels organisations prefer short-term goals.479 
Subsequently the focus was on women’s legal issues, because AWARE guessed 
that donors wanted gender-sensitive projects that would combine all aspects of 
                                                           
479 Clem Tisdell, Bounded Rationality and Economic Evolution: A Contribution to Decision-making, Economics 
and Management. Cheltenham: Edwards Elgar Publishing Limited, 1997. p. 336. 
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women’s empowerment. Even in the shift towards development of rural handicrafts 
(i.e. the women’s skill training programme), the focus on economic empowerment 
continued. This is because AWARE knew that if donors ceased funds, it could rely on 
sale of handicrafts. The garbage can model could explain AWARE’s attempt to 
improve an old issue like beneficiaries’ access to market. 
Economic empowerment was considered even during scaling-up. But AWARE 
cautiously expanded and consolidated its efforts. It realised that it needed surplus too 
and thereby considered long term goals.  Thus, surplus generation for organisational 
survival became the new objective.480 Another feature of this goal is that AWARE had 
learnt about beneficiaries’ lack of resources and their inability to undertake agriculture 
in an organised manner.
481
 Since this unresolved problem was addressed here, the 
garbage can model is relevant. Finally, to ensure organisational survival and to attract 
donors, AWARE changed its mission and charged interest on loans. 
Apart from the garbage can model, it is essential to consider rationality of 
decisions. For example, AWARE should have empowered men and women, instead of 
having a male-oriented approach initially. Naturally when it changed its approach, it 
invited the antipathy of male beneficiaries. It was irrational to have a gap between 
empowerment of men and women. But if they had been empowered simultaneously, 
AWARE would have displayed instrumental rationality, which is rare in the real world. 
Instead, it satisficed by cautiously undertaking a male oriented approach initially. 
                                                           
480 As seen from the institutionalisation of MACS. 
481 This was addressed in the skill-training programme. 
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Next, women’s economic empowerment was considered. Perhaps AWARE should 
not have undertaken this without anticipating beneficiaries’ problems.482 It did not form 
stable expectations to pre-empt the problem. Nor did it use heuristics based on CDO 
reports. Still AWARE was boundedly rational in its approach towards donors, because 
it was a young organisation and needed funds. It compromised on autonomy, since it 
could not resolve donor’s pressure. Later it shifted towards managing income in rural 
households. Here it should have charged interest on loans and generated surplus. 
However it was not instrumentally rational,483 and satisficed by not exploiting 
beneficiaries’ poverty. Perhaps, it feared losing clients, since not many could afford 
interest. This is boundedly rational, since it guessed beneficiaries’ response.484 
Later women’s property rights became the focus. But it was irrational, because it 
was contrary to beneficiaries’ psyche. Besides an NGO’s rationality lies in satisfying 
beneficiaries and convincing them to participate in projects, and women were reluctant 
to participate. Still AWARE was boundedly rational because it combined donor’s 
agenda of gender-based development with the problem of women’s property rights, 
and so attracted funds. So it strategically used the bounds of its accountability towards 
donors and responsibility towards beneficiaries. 
Next, the focus was on developing rural handicrafts and women’s skills. Here 
AWARE did not guess beneficiaries’ needs through heuristics and its experience in 
earlier projects. In fact, had beneficiaries not protested against the agriculture project, it 
                                                           
 
482 This is especially true of the poultry-farming project, where AWARE did not train beneficiaries in treating 
poultry animals. 
483 Instrumental rationality assumes that decision-makers make optimal decisions with complete knowledge of the 
impact of all their actions.  
484Bounded rational decision-makers form educated guesses about the real world, because complete information 
gathering is impossible given the time and resource limitation.  
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would have addressed an incorrectly assumed need. That would have given credence to 
Basu, Suzumura and Pattanaik’s belief that organisations incorrectly identify causal 
antecedents of phenomena and make faulty choices.485 Nevertheless once people’s 
needs were known, AWARE sold the issue of developing local handicrafts to donors. 
Subsequently AWARE focused on scaling up. Perhaps it should not have 
undertaken this after funds had stopped. It could have saved resources that were spent 
on motivating beneficiaries when the programme was launched again. Yet AWARE 
displayed rationality, because it retained its autonomy with NOVIB. This is 
noteworthy, since it is believed that NGOs usually yield to donors. However it is 
debatable whether AWARE increased its accountability towards beneficiaries since 
most NGOs, according to Biggs and Neame maintain autonomy by compromising on 
accountability.486 Nevertheless AWARE’s action of removing gender issues was 
justified, because it knew that people would reject such sensitive issues.  
Next, AWARE was preoccupied with organisational consolidation. This was 
irrational, because it became bureaucratic and lost former contact with beneficiaries. 
Still it was justified, since AWARE continued disbursing loans, despite government’s 
statute. Besides, members realised that the organisation was too large to be controlled 
by central office and chose power delegation. This was boundedly rational, because 
organisational cohesion was retained, but downward accountability was compromised.  
Organisational survival continued subsequently along with surplus generation. 
Perhaps AWARE irrationally undertook this without using the tools, which Simon 
                                                           
485 Kaushik Basu et.al, Choice, Welfare and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. p. 343 
486Edwards and Hulme, NGOs. p. 178. 
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feels are indispensable for bounded rational actors.487 Firstly, heuristics was not used to 
guess what could hinder project implementation, like the unwillingness of collection 
centres. Secondly, there were no strategies to pre-empt problems, which Klein believes 
is essential for decisions.488 But it is possible that AWARE guessed that farms close to 
market towns would benefit. This too was irrational since the project was to benefit 
very few farms. Hence irrationality was not from improper understanding of problems, 
but inability to develop effective strategies. 
To ensure organisational survival and surplus generation, AWARE introduced 
interest on loans. This was irrational, because the non-core poor, who were not 
included in the original agenda, were targeted. Hence downward accountability was 
neglected, although organisational survival was ensured by addressing depleting funds. 
So it was not wholly irrational. Besides, as Friedman highlights, decision-makers 
abandon their original strategy only if it is critical, because they consider deviation as 
irrational.489 Still it may be argued that AWARE being a non-profit organisation 
should not have introduced interest. This can be refuted by Arbour’s thesis that even 
Samaritans, who serve the society should be paid, because the people they help would 
have sought assistance, even without the Samaritan’s help.490 Besides, beneficiaries 
used AWARE’s services, which made it rational to expect payment.  
Finally, AWARE tried to improve tribals’ access to the market and increased 
organisational surplus. This was rational, because it was aimed at organisational 
survival. Also this NGO tested alternatives to overcome resource crunch. In fact, 
                                                           
487Simon, Administrative. p.364. 
488Gary Klein, Sources of power: how people make decisions. Cambridge: MIT press, 1998. p. 330. 
489Daniel Friedman, “Monty Hall’s three doors: construction and deconstruction of a choice anomaly,” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 88, September 1998. p. 933. 
490Ann Arbour, “The Good Samaritan,” Michigan Law Review. p. 1152.  
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AWARE guessed beneficiaries’ marketing capacity. It was also rational to resolve the 
problem of low sales by increasing village interdependence. But AWARE did not use 
heuristics to realise that villages shared similar geography and socio-economic 
features. Hence, goods from one village were similar to the other, which made this 
rational strategy ineffective in practice. 
SUMMARY  
From the above it is seen that AWARE’s ‘rationality’ changed with a change in 
context. The same yardstick cannot be used to judge rationality of decisions, without 
recognising preferences and objectives that guided them. Constraints and other 
unaccounted eventualities that influence decisions should also be considered.  
In health projects, the rationale was initially to be acceptable to beneficiaries and 
encourage their participation. This trend is also observed in education and poverty 
eradication domains especially in legal and property rights projects, Chaitanya Shakti, 
Chaitanya Nidhi and poultry farming project. But the rationale for mobilising people 
has been different in all three domains. In health projects, it did not include 
confrontation with elite, because they did not pose a threat. However the elite were 
confronted in education and poverty eradication programmes, because they opposed 
AWARE. 
The Chairman’s influence has been considerable in most projects. But his 
involvement through initiating the project, touring villages and interacting with 
beneficiaries was more in early projects like Chinnapuram, midwives’ training, boat 
hospital, Padkal leprosy centre, training in legal and property rights, and Chaitanya 
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Shakti. During the late 1970s and 1980s, beneficiaries’ participation in project 
implementation was high, although the central office planned the project. Even the 
middle level staff’s contribution was significant in terms of gathering field 
information. This is true of most education projects and some projects in poverty 
eradication like AIF and Gramlakshmi.  
In terms of strategies, AWARE initially mobilised beneficiaries and provided 
them the wherewithal for empowerment. Later it undertook organisational 
development. This is noticed in later projects like Bliss, AIF, Shantivanam, health 
loans and MACS, where the concern was consolidation or survival and not 
beneficiaries’ participation. In these projects organisational growth was made 
sustainable, and to this end, power was delegated to AWARE’s sister organisations. So 
this NGO became more decentralised, although beneficiaries’ role in initiating and 
implementing projects was reduced.  
As far as influences are concerned, beneficiaries and the elite constrained early 
projects. Subsequently constraints from donors and government became pronounced. 
AWARE tried to resolve this by maintaining networks with them. Yet when growth 
and sustenance became critical, the organisation was fortified to retain autonomy, apart 
from networking with powerful stakeholders. Unfortunately, the decision to retain 
autonomy did not further networks with beneficiaries. It only prevented AWARE’s 
liquidation.  
     All these influences affected project outcomes. The earliest projects did not 
register immediate success, since constraints from beneficiaries and elite had to be 
resolved. Subsequently there was an improvement. However projects like deemed 
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university, Chetana Bazaar, and health loans have been unsuccessful. This could be 
due to pressure from donors, limited financial resources and lack of downward 
accountability. But it is too early to judge, because these project have been launched 
quite recently. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT   
Recommendations and Conclusions 
This concluding chapter briefly summarises the overall and specific findings of 
this study. It is based on all that has been discussed in earlier chapters. It also puts forth 
recommendations and implications for further research. 
OVERALL FINDINGS 
The study was undertaken with certain hypotheses. It was assumed that greater 
involvement of stakeholders in formulation and implementation of decisions would 
lead NGOs to make decisions that are conducive to achievement of their goals. This 
means that NGOs can fulfil their objectives, if decisions are participatory, i.e. 
stakeholders like the state, donors, beneficiaries, and NGO personnel participate in 
decisions. Through such participation, not only do NGOs uphold their accountability 
towards these stakeholders, they also get feedback from them. This could provide 
NGOs wider choices of how best to achieve goals. However, this hypothesis has not 
been supported by the findings of this study. 
It was observed that AWARE had certain instances of participatory decisions, 
where beneficiaries, donors and lower staff participated. Yet it did not always achieve 
objectives. This is seen in some of the early health projects, like Chinnapuram Centre, 
Mobile Clinic, Food and Nutrition project and even the project on VAs and midwives. 
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Here decisions were participatory since beneficiaries were responsible for initiation of 
projects and its implementation. This enabled AWARE to learn what beneficiaries 
wanted, because the latter freely expressed their views. However they also expressed 
their biases in their feedback, because they were against preventive health care. 
AWARE could not address their biases and hence did not introduce preventive health, 
which could have solved many health problems among the people. Besides, the larger 
objective of addressing the root cause of diseases by changing people’s lifestyle was 
not achieved.  
Decisions were also participatory in the Latur project, because donors like 
MEMISA were involved in planning and implementation. However, this did not make 
achievement of objectives easier. In fact, MEMISA’s preferences clashed with that of 
AWARE’s personnel, causing lack of co-ordination. Although the larger objective of 
boosting AWARE’s image at the national level was achieved, it did not increase 
efficiency of relief operations. Thus, this NGO could not manage the issue of co-
ordination, due to greater involvement of stakeholders. Consequently optimal 
outcomes were not possible even in this case. 
Donors and beneficiaries were involved in AWARE’s property rights project. 
Although donors did not directly participate in project planning and implementation, 
they provided feedback by expressing their opinion openly. They made it clear that 
they preferred projects on women’s economic empowerment. Networks were also 
maintained with beneficiaries, who expressed their fear of entering a male-dominated 
domain like property rights. Eventually there was a clash of opinions and preferences 
among primary stakeholders here. So although decisions here were participatory, it was 
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ineffective, because AWARE could not harness stakeholders’ participation to 
successfully increase women’s access to property.  
Whenever stakeholders have been involved they have indeed provided AWARE 
with more feedback and more exposure to various opinions. But this NGO has not 
reconciled diverse opinions and preferences. This has hindered the achievement of 
objectives.  
The second hypothesis of this study was that when NGOs are faced by various 
internal and external influences, only some factors exert positive influences, which are 
conducive to decision-making. At the same time, negative influence from some other 
factors, constrain decision-making. This means that when powerful internal factors 
(preferences of NGO’s trustees or top management and their interpersonal relationship) 
and external factors (preferences and role of external stakeholders of the NGO) are 
positive, the NGO can make decisions to achieve objectives. However, negative 
influences from these powerful stakeholders can lead NGOs to make decisions that 
compromise their objectives. This hypothesis has been validated by the findings of this 
study. 
It was observed that AWARE faced internal and external pressures, which 
constrained its decisions. For example, it faced negative external influences, like 
limited funds from donors and beneficiaries’ lack of motivation, apart from an internal 
factor, i.e. AWARE’s incipience. These influences constrained AWARE’s decision to 
launch preventive health care in the Chinnapuram project. Instead curative health was 
introduced. Internal constraints like AWARE’s incipience or lack of expertise, and 
external factors like rural elite’s hostility, beneficiaries’ reluctance, and pressure from 
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government and funders were also significant. They constrained AWARE’s decision to 
launch health education. Instead it undertook preventive health care. Subsequently, in 
the poultry farming project, lack of co-ordination with Ford constrained AWARE’s 
decision to educate beneficiaries on cattle care.  
Donors negatively influenced even the Latur project. In fact, AWARE felt 
MEMISA’s supervision was interfering. Eventually it decided to compromise its 
autonomy. Other external constraints, i.e. lack of funds in Shantivanam, made this 
NGO compromise its basic objective of serving the rural poor. Instead, the urban 
people were targeted. Even in Bliss, AIF and the deemed university projects, there 
were pressures (internal) for scaling up and maintaining the organisation, which led to 
a compromise. This was the decision to focus on AWARE’s consolidation rather than 
maintenance of downward accountability. External constraints (milk collection centres’ 
reluctance to travel to distant farms) in Gramlakshmi project made AWARE 
compromise by deciding to help dairy farms that were closer to markets.  
However there were certain conducive, internal and external influences. For 
example, in the Chinnapuram project, beneficiaries exerted a positive external 
influence by converting the relief shelter to a regular health centre. Middle level staff 
also helped by suggesting that medical students could be hired for volunteer work at 
Chinnapuram. Even in the Yenadi project their influence was salutary, because they 
built rural associations to bring AWARE closer to the people. Similarly, in the Padkal 
project, the District Collector aided by providing AWARE the site for the centre. In 
addition, the government exerted a positive influence in the Latur project by inviting 
AWARE’s assistance for a large-scale relief operation. This gave AWARE an 
opportunity to gain national exposure. The media also played a contributory role 
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through its reports, which helped AWARE gain trust of social activists and 
intelligentsia during the legal rights project. In the same project, the local politicians 
helped AWARE release some bonded labourers.  
Donors have also exerted a positive influence in certain projects like the training 
of resource personnel in microfinance and the subsequent launch of Chaitanya Nidhi 
microfinance scheme. Even beneficiaries helped by suggesting that a pool should be 
created from which money could be lent to various women. This useful suggestion was 
further developed by AWARE in Chaitanya Nidhi.  
Thus it can be concluded that positive influences facilitate decisions in projects. 
On the other hand, negative influences engender compromises. These compromises 
have constrained decisions within AWARE. However, it should be noted that certain 
negative influences were offset by the positive influence of certain other internal or 
external factors. Similarly, certain salutary factors did not help decisions due to the 
presence of negative influences. For example, AWARE’s incipience and lack of 
resources constrained its decisions in the Chinnapuram project, despite the positive 
influence of beneficiaries’ participation.491 Similarly, in the Latur project, the 
government’s positive influence was offset by MEMISA’s interference and lack of co-
ordination with AWARE’s personnel.  
                                                           
491 MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) finds it ironic that AWARE’s network with beneficiaries was most 
when resources were least, and when resources improved people’s trust fell correspondingly. His statement is 
relevant, since AWARE has lately focused on sustenance and surplus generation, ever since it has grown in size and 
scale. Mr. Bhat says that AWARE focused on beneficiaries initially, because it was committed to them. He feels this 
is because NGOs are “small and beautiful and hence committed, unlike BINGOs.” Once NGOs get big and famous 
their pursuits turn into commercial ventures, he said. 
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SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND INFERENCES 
Change in objectives  
Examination of projects revealed that AWARE’s objectives and mission gradually 
changed over the years. These steady changes were noticed in all the domains of 
health, education and women’s empowerment / poverty eradication. Initially the focus 
was on introducing this NGO to beneficiaries and gaining their trust, because it was a 
young organisation and people were unfamiliar with it. This was noticed in the health 
domain through projects, which aimed at providing only those health services that 
people specifically demanded. In the education domain it was through projects that 
focused on training beneficiaries in social and legal rights, so that they could fight 
against exploitation. Similarly, women’s empowerment projects were undertaken to 
empower women socially and psychologically.  
Subsequently, the trend changed to addressing specific issues, which beneficiaries 
themselves reported or that AWARE’s functionaries observed in field surveys. This 
took the shape of gradual introduction of preventive health and addressing maternal 
and childcare in the health domain. The focus of education programmes was on 
women’s economic empowerment and integration of socio-economic issues. Even 
poverty eradication programmes aimed at women’s economic empowerment.  
The next change in objectives was scaling up to include more beneficiaries and to 
address more socio-economic issues. To this end, AWARE launched the boat hospital 
and Latur relief projects in the health domain. In the education domain the TFRD and 
good voters’ projects posited AWARE’s intention to gain political clout and expand its 
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area of operation. Similarly, in the poverty eradication domain, this NGO launched the 
skill development and DTDP projects.  
However, in the late 1990’s the focus shifted to consolidation of AWARE’s 
efforts in various domains through establishment of sister organisations. Yet, the basic 
intention of scaling-up was not forgotten. For example, in the health domain, 
Shantivanam was established to centralise all rural health clinics, whilst attracting 
urban patients.
492
 Similarly, Bliss was established for monitoring all education projects 
along with AIF, which was to consolidate poverty eradication programmes.  
In keeping with organisational consolidation, the next trend in objectives was to 
generate surplus and financial returns for AWARE. For this purpose health loans were 
established in the health domain, whereby patients could get loans from AWARE for 
treatment at Shantivanam. Loans with interest were also disbursed by MACS in the 
poverty eradication domain, whilst Chetana Bazaar was established to ensure returns 
from sale of goods produced by beneficiaries. The last two trends in objectives also 
reveal that decision-makers intended to ensure AWARE’s survival.  
Factors affecting change in objectives  
The study also reveals that certain major factors affected decisions to change 
AWARE’s objectives over the years. These were the Chairman’s preference, board 
members’ interests, need of beneficiaries, influence of rural elite, influence of the state 
and donors, and finally the role of AWARE’s lower and middle level staff members.  
                                                           
492Shantivanam was built close to the city to attract urban patients.  
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The Chairman wanted to provide only what was demanded by beneficiaries. He 
wanted direct interaction with people and empower them to fight for their rights. This 
affected the trend of objectives, which was aimed at building networks with 
beneficiaries. Subsequently, his preference changed to scaling-up, which was again 
reflected in organisational objectives. Next, he wanted to consolidate AWARE’s 
efforts in various domains through monitoring bodies. This was reflected in the trend 
towards consolidation and centralisation. Finally, he wanted financial resources to 
sustain the organisation. Therefore, the latest trend in objectives has been to generate 
financial surplus through various schemes.  
The board members also affected the trend of AWARE’s objectives through their 
preferences. Initially they did not want to antagonise beneficiaries and preferred to gain 
their trust. This was reflected in objectives, which was to build close networks with 
people. Later they wanted to maintain cost efficacy by training beneficiaries themselves 
in specific socio-economic and legal issues. This affected the trend in objectives, 
which was to focus on specific issues in health, education and poverty eradication. 
Subsequently board members wanted to gain recognition from powerful stakeholders 
like the state and donors. Hence, the trend of objectives was to scale-up. The board 
also wanted organisational revamping to make AWARE more effective. Therefore, 
consolidation and centralisation of all programmes became the new trend in objectives. 
Finally, they wanted to prevent liquidation of AWARE, due to lack of resources. 
Consequently, surplus generation and financial returns have become the latest trend.  
Interests of beneficiaries have significantly affected objectives. For example, their 
unfamiliarity with AWARE made this NGO focus on building close networks with 
them as its first objective. After some trust developed between AWARE and the 
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people, the latter themselves reported their problems to the NGO. Hence, the focus of 
objectives was to address specific socio-economic issues of the people. With more and 
more people joining the fold of this NGO, there was the need to expand its area of 
operation. Therefore, the new trend of objectives was to scale-up. However, 
beneficiaries did not utilise many of the latest services offered by AWARE through 
Shantivanam and Bliss. Consequently, this NGO fell short on financial resources, 
which led to surplus generation as the latest trend in objectives.  
Beneficiaries’ preferences were guided by the influence of elite. In fact, the elite 
exploited people in specific socio-economic issues, which led AWARE to focus on 
empowering beneficiaries by addressing specific issues. Subsequently, they gained 
political power and exploited the people openly. This made AWARE aim at scaling-up 
to gain political influence itself.  
AWARE’s staff also significantly influenced organisational objectives by 
expressing their opinion to the Chairman and board members. For example, the head of 
Chinnapuram expressed his desire to build close ties with beneficiaries, which also 
became the objective for AWARE in this period. Later the head of Bliss wanted target 
group members to be trained in specific skills to monitor projects. This made AWARE 
focus on scaling-up as an objective. Even the CDOs played an important role through 
their field reports and surveys. For example, they showed that people lacked access to 
basic rights, which decided the objective of training in basic rights and building 
networks with beneficiaries. Subsequently, they also showed how people lacked 
political motivation, which was one of the factors in AWARE’s decision to scale-up.  
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Even the state and donors have played a significant role by either contributing to 
AWARE’s decisions or hindering them. For example, the state’s calling upon AWARE 
to assist in certain projects led to the objective of scaling-up and building networks 
with the state. On the other hand, the state’s statute regarding rural microfinance led 
AWARE to concentrate on surplus generation and consolidation. Donors have played 
an important role with their demand for supervision of AWARE, which led to the 
objective of developing networks with donors. Even their decision to curtail funds to 
AWARE critically affected this NGO’s objectives, which changed to surplus 
generation to overcome shortage of funds.493  
Thus different factors have influenced AWARE’s objectives at different points of 
time. AWARE started by serving beneficiaries and addressing only their felt needs. 
Although this was not a grandiose decision, it was coupled with its Chairman’s 
idealism of psychologically empowering the poor to fight socio-economic injustice 
perpetrated by landlords, local politicians and even domestic violence. This was 
utopian and perhaps adventurous, because AWARE positioned itself in direct 
opposition to the powerful rural elite, whilst being inchoate. Still it was primarily 
guided by downward accountability towards beneficiaries.  
However, the latest trend of surplus generation schemes is driven by the pragmatic 
goal of sustenance and expansion. Doubtless this change was engendered by certain 
exigencies (as was seen above), but it is far removed from the original, humane 
(though idealistic) objective of abolishing mental and physical poverty.494 Nevertheless 
                                                           
493This is true especially of later projects after AWARE’s conflict with NOVIB.  
494 Showing the downtrodden his right to live. Hyderabad: AWARE National Administrative Office, 2001. p. 9. 
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AWARE’s goal today is ambitious, since it is poised to compete with the corporate 
world, especially in health and insurance. 
Change in mode of decision-making  
Decisions have been primarily centralised in AWARE, despite change in 
objectives and influences of several factors. However, even within these centralised 
decisions there were certain decentralising and participatory tendencies that were 
present during certain periods. For example, in the first trend towards building nework 
with beneficiaries, the Chairman and board’s influence engendered centralised 
decisions. However, there was a lot of involvement from beneficiaries through 
feedback and suggestions. In fact their feedback led to the next trend in objectives, 
which was to address specific socio-economic issues. Decisions were more 
participatory and decentralised. This is because not only beneficiaries, but even 
AWARE’s lower staff voiced their opinion based on field surveys.495 During this period 
the state and donors also lent their expertise to AWARE causing decisions to be more 
participatory. 
Subsequently, the mode of decisions was top down, i.e. not only were they 
centralised because AWARE’s top officials made strategic decisions, but it was 
concentrated in the hands of central office members. It was their decision that AWARE 
should scale up and build a broad base for itself. Nevertheless, centralisation was less 
pronounced in the shift towards consolidation and organisational restructuring. This is 
because middle level staff members expressed their need for sister organisations to 
correct lack of co-ordination and over staffing. Yet, centralisation has become the latest 
                                                           
495This is especially true of decisions to train people in issues that empower them to fight for their rights.  
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trend in AWARE’s decisions, because it has been the Chairman and the board’s 
decision to generate surplus and build financial resources for the organisation.  
Thus, there is a certain pattern in AWARE’s decision-making at policy and project 
levels. Policy level decisions changed AWARE’s objectives in terms of policies and 
long-term plans. Project level decisions on the other hand, impacted particular projects 
and AWARE’s stance with regard to specific socio-economic issues.  
In all policy level decisions across domains, the Chairman and board have been 
directly involved and they significantly influenced decision processes. This is observed 
in decisions that AWARE undertook for the establishment of Shantivanam, Bliss, AIF; 
and institutionalisation of MACS, Health loans and TFRDs.496 On the other hand, the 
influence of beneficiaries, donors and the government agencies has been subtle. For 
example, the gradual increase in the number of beneficiaries, over a period of time, 
indirectly led AWARE to consolidate itself under departments like AIF and Bliss.497 
Influence from donors has also been indirect. For example, there had been a 
shortfall in funds ever since the DTDP project was undertaken. But, it was only when 
the growth of AWARE coincided with shortage of funds that the top management 
decided to institutionalise Health Loans and MACS and also established Shantivanam. 
In the case of MACS, the government’s influence through statutes was only putatively 
                                                           
496 AWARE trained TFRDs with the intention of not undertaking further empowerment or service delivery on its 
own. Instead, these trained target group members were to spread empowerment among others in their community. 
This signified a shift in AWARE’s policy from direct empowerment efforts, to a subtle and incremental process of 
percolation. Besides, these beneficiaries were now considered members of the organisation, who were officially 
responsible for undertaking projects on AWARE’s behalf. 
497 There had been a gradual increase in the number of beneficiaries. But, it was not until AWARE’s middle ranking 
staff and top management were burdened by lack of co-ordination among projects that AWARE decided to have 
sister organisations, like AIF and Bliss. 
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direct.498 Its injunction only justified AWARE’s decision to consolidate its financial 
programmes.  
In project level decisions on the other hand, the influence of external factors like 
beneficiaries, the landed elite, donors and others have been both direct and significant. 
Such decisions in AWARE, have been more common across domains.499 For example, 
beneficiaries played a significant role by voicing their needs and influencing the 
establishment of Chinnapuram Health Centre, Padkal Health Centre, Chaitanya Shakti, 
Chaitanya Nidhi, Property Rights and Legal Rights programmes. Similarly, landed 
elite significantly influenced the objectives and outcome of these very programmes. 
But their influence was through their exploitation of beneficiaries. Donors also played 
a crucial role by supporting AWARE’s early projects, especially those in women’s 
empowerment and poverty eradication.  
However, the role of government agencies was significant only in certain project 
decisions, which were similar to government’s rural development efforts. This was the 
case in Legal / Property Rights Training, Boat Hospital, Good Voters’ programme and 
Latur relief project. In most other cases, its influence has been indirect. 
                                                           
498 The recent RBI statute, according to the Head of Health Services, is that loans cannot be disbursed by NGOs, 
which are registered under company’s act. 
499 These include all other project decisions, for example the Chinnapuram project, Mobile Health clinic, Boat 
Hospital, Latur earthquake, property / legal rights, Chaitanya Shakti, Chaitanya Nidhi, Gram Lakshmi, Chetana 
Bazaar, DTDP and others.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
Recommendations for AWARE  
After having examined AWARE’s decision processes and interviewed various 
respondents, it is possible to make certain recommendations for this NGO. These are 
practical suggestions based on the findings of this study.  
First, It is important that AWARE keeps its projects small and provides only what 
people demand, rather than focussing on large scale efforts.500 This is because latest 
large-scale projects like Shantivanam, Deemed University, and Chetana Bazaar have 
failed despite targeting many beneficiaries and addressing complex socio-economic 
needs. Therefore, it may be suggested that AWARE should expand its activities only to 
further develop what beneficiaries themselves have already demanded. Even while 
scaling-up, people’s interests should be considered as far as possible, i.e. functional 
expansion should be undertaken.501 In this way downward accountability can be 
maintained.502 Apart from this, AWARE’s central office should encourage lower staff 
members to take responsibility in project planning and not just implementation. It has 
followed this in successful projects like Chinnapuram health centre, Chaitanya Shakti, 
Chaitanya Nidhi and Padkal centre. This will ensure contact with beneficiaries and 
encourage staff members to develop responsibility even in the absence of the NGO’s 
leaders. 
                                                           
500This is the maxim on which AWARE operated its initial projects. However, lately it has moved away from 
addressing people’s needs and concentrated on organisational survival, according to Mr. MK Bhat and Prof. 
Madduri (professor at Hyderabad Central University)  
501This means only services and socio-economic issues addressed by the NGO should be expanded 
502AWARE did follow this trend of functional scaling-up initially, when it provided curative and later preventive 
health care, or social-psychological empowerment of women followed by economic empowerment. Even in 
education projects it initially provided training in legal issues, which later developed to political mobilisation.  
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Secondly, as far as specific empowerment issues are concerned, AWARE should 
not actively campaign for people, whenever it undertakes political mobilisation in the 
future. It had committed this mistake in its ‘good voters’ programme’ and had lost its 
credibility as a non-political organisation. Henceforth it should not advice on political 
matters even if some beneficiaries are elected.  
Thirdly, AWARE should not make beneficiaries the means of generating profit for 
the organisation. Doing so would mean loss of organisational mission and unstable 
profits.503 In fact, funds from donors should be directly channelled by AWARE to 
village associations and groups, i.e. people should manage funds.504 
Fourthly, apart from downward accountability and people’s participation, it is 
equally important for AWARE to network with donors and the state. It initially 
maintained downward accountability, whilst cautiously distancing itself from donors. 
Later, it focused on organisational expansion and neglected downward accountability, 
without strengthening networks with donors. Maintaining networks with donors is 
important for AWARE, not only for the sake of funds, but also to popularise its own 
approach of development and empowerment with the donors. Even for organisational 
survival, networking with donors is imperative. However, AWARE has networked 
with the state government, due to the Chairman’s ex colleagues and friends at the civil 
service. But it is imperative that AWARE does not over emphasise its autonomy and 
understands that networking with donors does not necessarily compromise its 
                                                           
503In fact, AWARE tried to do this in its projects on health loans, MACS and Shantivanam. Most of these projects 
have not been successful yet. 
504 Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) said, “AWARE lost its credibility, because it managed and 
manipulated funds meant for the people. This made NOVIB charge the NGO of fund misappropriation. All this 




independence.505 Also networking or partnering with government can be useful 
whenever there are replication of services provided by AWARE and the government. 
Fifthly, AWARE should not neglect the poor. In AWARE’s case, the non-core 
poor have benefited more than the core poor in its efforts at organisational survival and 
surplus generation.506 Yet the NGO was established for the sake of the poor. By 
expanding and neglecting its original target group, AWARE would not only dilute its 
organisational mission, but also lose its credibility as a people’s organisation. 
Sixthly, AWARE should consolidate all its programmes in the rural heartland, 
rather than shift to urban areas. Even now, future consolidation efforts can be 
undertaken with headquarters in rural areas. This will ensure closer interaction between 
the people and central office members. It could also curb the bureaucratic structure that 
AWARE has begun to develop.507  
Finally, AWARE should undertake phased withdrawal not only from certain 
villages, but all villages. For this it should consider whether to focus on organisational 
survival without serving the core poor, or cease to exist after the target group members 
have been somewhat empowered.508 Just to remain in existence, it should not launch 
new projects on issues that are not specifically expressed by beneficiaries. In such a 
                                                           
505The Chairman said, “We have always been wary of getting close to our donors, even if we have had long standing 
relations. Our autonomy has come at a great price (here he was referring to the hostility between AWARE and 
NOVIB), but we value it.” 
506Dr. Suman Chandra (professor at the Institute of Rural Development Studies) and Mr. MK Bhat (former 
consultant to NOVIB) were against AWARE charging people for availing its services. For example, beneficiaries 
pay for treatment at rural clinics (albeit a nominal sum), for treatment at Shantivanam, for registering in courses at 
Bhagvatipuram and they also pay interest on loans from MACS.  
507AWARE had shown signs of turning bureaucratic even in the 1980s. At that time people had reported against 
such an occurrence to the central office, which had acted by converting itself into a cluster system (As revealed by 
the heads of Bliss, AIF and MACS, the Chairman and even non-AWARE respondents like Prof. Madduri).  
508 Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) said, “I feel NGOs (not just AWARE) should wrap-up once their 
beneficiaries are somewhat empowered. The practice has been to keep on expanding and undertaking projects, 
which even people themselves do not want. It is better that NGOs cease to exist. That way any dependency relations 
with the poor, can end.”   
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case, organisational survival would be the goal, rather than empowering the poor.509 
Nevertheless, there are some lessons that other Indian NGOs can learn from AWARE’s 
experience. 
Relevance of AWARE’s experience to other NGOs  
Despite many of its shortcomings, AWARE continues to be referred by most 
reports as a successful NGO.510 Its experiences can serve as a lesson for other rural 
development NGOs in India. For example, it maintained downward accountability 
right from the beginning of its establishment, till very recently.511 Such an approach 
engendered success in projects and brought greater recognition from donors and the 
state. This can serve as a guideline to other NGOs like AKRDP. AKRDP, according to 
Shah and Shah was pressured by preferences of donors and the state, which led to 
unsuccessful projects for many years.512 Yet another NGO called the KDFSF can learn 
from AWARE’s downward accountability.513 KDFSF has been unable to maintain a 
constant record of successful projects, because it has not addressed basic issues like 
illiteracy, sanitation, women’s status and alcoholism514   
     AWARE can also serve as a role model for many NGOs, due to its learning 
experience. It had learnt during DTDP project that villagers were against gender issues. 
                                                           
509This trend is already visible in latest projects like Bliss, AIF, Shantivanam, health loans, Chetana Bazaar and 
MACS. Most non-AWARE respondents have criticised this, because downward accountability was sacrificed for 
the sake of organisational survival.  
510J.Neggers, et.al, Big and still beautiful. Programme evaluation of the co-financing programme DGIS and NOVIB. 
November 1987 – April 1988. See also S.Narasimhan, Empowering women: an alternative strategy from rural India. 
New Delhi: Sage, 1999. p. 236; Madduri, et.al, Smile that must continue. Hyderabad: Development Research 
Advisory Group and Hyderabad Central University, 1993. p. 106. 
511AWARE’s downward accountability appears to have been compromised in its latest projects, since the early 
1990s.  
512See Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Non-governmental organizations: performance and accountability 
beyond the magic bullet. London: Earthscan and Save the Children, 1995. p. 259. 
513See R.Riddel, et.al, Non-governmental organizations and rural poverty alleviation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995. p. 138. 
514John Farrington, et.al, Non-governmental organizations and the state in Asia. London: Routledge, 1993. 169. 
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Therefore, it had to remove them from its agenda and concentrate on other issues. Such 
an experience can be useful for NGOs that have often had failed projects, or do not 
wholly achieve objectives. This is especially true of rural NGOs like AKRSP, 
MYRADA and BAIF that undertake integrated rural programmes addressing several 
grassroots issues simultaneously.  
This downward accountability can also serve as a lesson to so-called successful 
NGOs like WWF. Although WWF too has maintained downward accountability, its 
objective has not been empowerment of the core-poor. Only those women with a 
minimum level of empowerment, i.e. self-employed women are assisted by it.  
However AWARE’s objective has been more widespread, because it focuses on girijan 
and harijan women, who lack basic socio-economic wherewithal. Consequently, this 
NGO’s impact is more far reaching. Perhaps WWF could also widen its focus and 
reach larger strata of the population.   
One of the primary lessons that other NGOs can learn from AWARE is that its 
board members and top officials have been very active in all strategic decision-
making.515 So it does not have a redundant governing body, which is observed in some 
Indian NGOs, like Grameen Vikas Samiti in the state of Bihar.516 This NGO lacked 
capable advisors from the governing body and staff when it faced problems. Ultimately 
it led to the dissolution of the NGO itself.  
The study also revealed that AWARE achieved project objectives, due to 
networking with the state (especially in the late 1980s). This is also true of AKRDP, 
                                                           
515Prof. Madduri (Professor at Hyderabad Central University) and Mr. MK Bhat (former consultant to NOVIB) 
mentioned that one of the prime reasons for AWARE’s centralised structure is that its board is very dominant and 
actively participates in all major decisions. 
516 Edwards and Hulme, NGOs. p.183. 
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PRADAN and BAIF, which have networked with government and pre-empted 
imminent constraints from powerful stakeholders. However not all NGOs have been 
able to achieve this. In fact, some environmental Indian NGOs like AGRC have not 
escaped governmental pressure. AGRC had to suspend its project with Swedish 
International Development Agency after the Tamil Nadu Forest Department refused 
permission.517 This is because the government did not want to lose control over 
resources to a foreign funding agency. AWARE’s strategy of maintaining networks can 
serve as a model for NGOs like AGRC. 
From this discussion, it can be observed that AWARE’s experience is relevant to 
many NGOs in the country. Besides, there are many issues faced by AWARE that can 
be used as lessons by others. Hence, this study can be useful for not only AWARE, but 
for other similar rural development NGOs in India. 
Relevance of decision models  
Apart from recommendations for AWARE and NGOs, there are certain 
suggestions, which can improve the application of theoretical models. The theories 
used here are the incremental model, garbage can model and the rational choice theory. 
Each of these theories suffers from certain shortcomings. This section examines these 
shortcomings and suggests how they can be overcome.  
Considering the incremental model first. It is significant in explaining how 
decision-makers become conscious of a problem that demands resolution, and how 
internal organisational problems can hinder its resolution. Subsequently, the problem 
                                                           
517See E.Giordano, et.al, “Greenwork at Auroville: from survival to inter-institutional collaboration,” in John 
Farrington, et.al (eds.), NGOs. p. 145. 
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or constraints are overcome by reconsidering or ‘recycling’ earlier decisions. 
Nevertheless this model has certain shortcomings. It assumes that decision-makers 
undertake problem identification and diagnosis sequentially. But, it was seen in many 
landmark projects of AWARE that problem identification and diagnosis were 
undertaken together, or at times diagnosis was absent 
This model’s perception is narrow for another reason. It believes organisational 
decision-makers consider earlier decisions or strategies, only while selecting responses 
to deal with problems. It ignores the possibility that decision-makers could use their 
previous experience in decision-making, or retrace decision loops even when they 
identify a problem or when they undertake problem diagnosis. This is especially true in 
the case Shantivanam, Bliss, AIF and MACS, when AWARE’s decision-makers learnt 
more about the problem’s nature by examining past decisions and previous projects.  
The most significant shortcoming of this model is that it does not explain why 
decision-makers compromise. It does not explain why organisations choose to resolve 
interrupts, or develop a solution that goes against the original mission of the 
organisation, or compromises organisational objectives. This is especially relevant in 
AWARE’s projects like Shantivanam, MACS, health loans, Chetana Bazaar and the 
deemed university, where this NGO compromised its mission of catering to the core 
poor, and focused instead on expanding organisational influence.  
Therefore, this theory should firstly reconsider its sequential order of problem 
identification and diagnosis, because organisations seldom follow a sequence. 
Secondly, it has to expand its perception of decision cycles as not only occurring when 
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decision-makers select a response to a problem, but also when decision-makers identify 
a problem.518 Finally, it has to explain why decision-makers compromise. 
Bounded rationality and the garbage can model explain other aspects of 
organisational decisions. However, sequentialism can be seen even in Bounded 
Rationality, although the study did not adopt this theory to emphasise sequentialism. It 
was only to learn how AWARE made decisions to fulfil goals despite constraints. 
Besides, this theory was used to minimise problems associated with instrumental 
rationality, i.e. that it is not empirical in nature, has limited predictive power and that it 
neglects the real world of decision-making.519 Simon’s bounded rationality rectified 
this, because it was empirical and also made realistic estimates of decision-makers’ 
ability to optimise.520 It did not attribute them with complete knowledge of alternative 
decisions and their consequences.  
However, bounded rationality has certain problems. It is possible for an action to 
be called bounded rather than purely rational, and bring it under the wing of rationality. 
This is because bounds of rationality that Simon defines,521 are subjective and can be 
manipulated to include anything as a bound. Even testing a decision’s rationality is a 
subjective exercise. Besides, decisions made by NGOs (constrained by numerous 
accountabilities and influences from stakeholders) cannot be wholly optimal or 
compromising. 
                                                           
518This is because previous strategies are often considered even in problem identification. 
519Ian Green and Donald Shapiro, Pathologies of rational choice theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 
p. 13. 
520Herbert Simon, Administrative behaviour: a study of decision-making processes in organisations. New York: 
Free Press, 1976. p. 364. 
521According to Simon, these bounds are limits of reasoning, processing information and limits imposed on the 
decision-maker by the environment. See Op.Cit. p.38. 
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Even the garbage can model is flawed. Critics say it considers exceptional, rather 
than routine decisions.522 But, this does not adversely affect the study, because it 
considers only landmark decisions. Secondly, it is accused of ignoring decision-
makers’ rationality and focusing only on organisational disorder. But, this is 
inaccurate, because the model does indeed consider rules. In fact, it focuses on 
organisational learning and repetitive patterns in decisions that enable goal 
achievement. 
Nevertheless, the model has to firstly, specify the nature of influences that various 
decision-makers can bring upon decisions. To leave it undefined is to invite subjective 
interpretations to this theory. It is also insufficient to suggest that varying influences 
from several decision-makers engender disagreement. Hence, secondly, the model 
should predict the reactions that influences from decision-makers can cause. It is too 
simplistic to suggest that the consequence of varied influences upon organisational 
decisions, is conflict of interests and disorder. Thirdly it should predict the course of 
action undertaken by decision-makers to resolve constraints. It is not enough to argue 
that unresolved issues are carried over to the next phase of decision-making, because 
decision-makers can address constraints in many other ways.  
 Further studies  
Although the study has tried to fill gaps in literature, there are many issues that 
still need to be addressed. Besides, it is also essential to have an exhaustive 
understanding of the conditions and constraints of other rural development NGOs in 
                                                           
 
522 See J.Musselin, “Organized anarchies: a reconsideration of research strategies,” in M.Warglien and M.Masuch. 
The logic of organizational disorder. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996. p. 55. 
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India. A study of the decision processes of other NGOs in the country is needed. Such a 
study should have a longitudinal design, which could help stakeholders learn the worth 
of NGOs as supplements to the state. It can even help the state form policies that can 
foster close networking with NGOs. Donors also can decide what NGOs to fund and 
network with. 
As Bebbington and Riddel suggest, it is important that northern donors know more 
about the SNGOs they fund.523 They suggest donors should set up local organisations in 
the south and transfer funds to it. This local branch can then decide which SNGOs to 
fund. The donors can also build an in-country presence in the south to monitor SNGOs 
closely. Many NNGOs and donors like CARE, OXFAM and NOVIB in India have 
already done so. Still it has not improved networking. Therefore Perera suggests 
SNGOs should submit detailed written reports and audited accounts to donors.524 This 
could serve to establish formal relations between NGOs and donors, but it will not lead 
to a better understanding of the activities of SNGOs. For this to happen, donors must 
actively engage in studying and understanding decision-making within NGOs, 
particularly the constraints they face.  
However it is not enough to know the constraints of Indian NGOs alone, without 
considering the conditions under which their stakeholders operate. For this, it is 
imperative to undertake studies that examine constraints of the government and donors. 
As far as the GoI is concerned, its constraints prevent it from reaching out to the 
marginalized sections of society.525 For example, the programme by Indian Council of 
                                                           
523A.Bebbington and R.Riddel, “Heavy hands, hidden hands, holding hands?” in David Hulme and Michael 
Edwards (eds.), NGOs, States and Donors: too close for comfort? New York: St. Martin’s Press and Save the 
Children, 1997. p.107. 
524Jehan Perera, Op.Cit. p. 156.  
525Constraints under which the Indian government operates is discussed in the first chapter. 
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Agricultural Research to enhance the productivity of staple crops in India did not help 
the less developed regions. It improved only those regions that were already well 
endowed with fertile soil. This is because there was no research conducted to learn the 
needs of the poorer regions.  
      Even foreign and Indian donors have constraints, which should be examined. 
Both prefer to fund projects, which yield quick returns, like micro-credit schemes. In 
fact, they are wary of funding financially non-sustainable projects. Beneficiaries too 
should be studied in terms of their constraints and needs. NGOs, donors and 
government have mostly interpreted these needs. It is necessary to examine whether 
these agencies are indeed correct in their interpretation about beneficiaries’ interests. 
Most studies merely evaluate NGO projects for their impact on beneficiaries, without 
examining whether such projects were needed at all. To some extent, Fisher has 
examined this issue, but her focus is primarily on GROs and their funds from foreign 
donors.526  She questions whether GROs do require the kind of assistance lent by 
donors. More studies like Fisher’s are required, but with a focus on beneficiaries.  
     The present study attempts to spawn future studies of decisions made by the 
major stakeholders of Indian NGOs like the government of India, donors and 
beneficiaries. Only through such studies can policies be formulated that can develop 
synergy among all these stakeholders. Mere piecemeal efforts at promoting co-
operation among them are unlikely to be sustainable, although they might be successful 
in the short term. 
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
For Academics / Consultants, i.e. those who have researched on AWARE 





2) In which area/s do you think beneficiaries have benefited 
(a) Health 
(b) Education 
(c) Women’s Empowerment 
(d) Poverty Eradication 
(e) All of the above 
(f) Some of the above – specify. 
3) How and why do you think beneficiaries have benefited in this area/s?  
4) How are AWARE’s relations with the  
(a) Government and its agencies. Is it co-operative or confrontational or both?  
(b) Donors. Is it co-operative or confrontational or both? 
(c) Beneficiaries. Is it co-operative or confrontational or both? 
Please give reasons 
5)  
(a) Can you give any instances of tension between AWARE and the government / governmental 
bodies?  
(b) Can you give instances of tension between AWARE and its donors? 
(c) Can you give instances of tension between AWARE and its beneficiaries?  
6)  
(a) Can you give any instances of co-operation between AWARE and the government / governmental 
bodies? 
(b) Can you give instances of co-operation between AWARE and donors? 
(c) Can you give instances of co-operation between AWARE and its beneficiaries? 
 
ii 
7) It is said that as organisations grow in size and status, they do not pay attention to beneficiaries’ 
interests. Would you say the same has occurred in the case of AWARE?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
Please give reasons 
8) Can you give instances where AWARE has consulted / got feedback from beneficiaries during 
project planning and implementation?  
9) Can you give instances where AWARE has not consulted / got feedback from the beneficiaries in 
project planning and implementation? 
10) Is AWARE an organisation where decisions are made by the Chairman and the organisational staff 




11)  If the answer to question 10 is yes, would you say that this has  
(a) Been helpful to the organisation? 
(b) Not been helpful to the organisation? 
 Please give reasons for your answer. 
12) Would you call AWARE an organisation, where decisions are made through joint dialogues 




13) If the answer to the previous question is yes, would you say the fact that this has  
(a) Been helpful to the organisation? 
(b) Not been helpful to the organisation? 
Please give reasons for your answer. 
14) Which of AWARE’s projects in each domain, do you perceive as having helped beneficiaries? How 
have they been benefited? 
15) Please rate the following projects in each domain according to their benefit on beneficiaries.  
(a) Health  
a) AWARE’s leprosy programme  
b) Mobile health programme 
c) AWARE’s boat hospital  
d) Current campaign/s of AWARE in health.527  
                                                           
527 Their content was mentioned upon interviewing AWARE members. The same method was followed for similar 
questions in the education, poverty eradication and women’s empowerment domains. 
iii 
e) Any other project / s in this field not listed above. 
Please rate the above projects on a scale of 1(i.e. most beneficial to beneficiaries) to 5 (as being 
least beneficial to beneficiaries). Please give reasons for your rating.  
(b)  Education  
a) AWARE’s efforts to provide information on social rights to beneficiaries. 
b) AWARE’s efforts to provide legal rights to beneficiaries. 
c) AWARE’s efforts to provide political rights to beneficiaries. 
d) AWARE’s efforts to provide land rights to beneficiaries. 
e) Knowledge imparted to beneficiaries on agricultural reform methods. 
f) Training in banking and micro credit systems.  
g) Current campaigns of AWARE in education. 
h) Any other project /s in this field not listed above. 
Please rate the above projects on a scale of 1 (i.e. most beneficial to beneficiaries) to 8 (as being 
least beneficial to beneficiaries). Please give reasons for your rating. 
(c) Women’s Empowerment  
a) AWARE’s campaigns through Chaitanya Shakti. 
b) AWARE’s campaigns through Chaitanya Nidhi. 
c) Current campaigns under women’s empowerment. 
d) Any other project/s in this field not listed above. 
Please rate the above projects on a scale of 1 (i.e. most beneficial to beneficiaries) to 4 (as being 
least beneficial to beneficiaries). Please give reasons for your rating. 
(d) Poverty Eradication  
a) Setting up of people’s micro credit banks.  
b) Introduction of poultry farms and animal husbandry. 
c) Establishing cottage industries in the villages. 
d) Vocational training to rural youth as the means for livelihood.  
e) Decision to computerise AWARE’s socio-economic programme profile. 
f) Current campaign/s of AWARE under poverty eradication. 
g) Any other project/s in this field not listed above. 
Please rate the above projects on a scale of 1 (i.e. most beneficial to beneficiaries) to 7 (as being 
least beneficial to beneficiaries). Please give reasons for your rating. 
Following questions for response from beneficiaries 
Health 
1) How were you affected by Shantivanam, Health Loans and other recent projects?528  
2) How were you affected by any other health projects by AWARE , either positively or negatively? 529 
3) What have been the common diseases among you?  
4) Has the incidence of these diseases reduced over the years 
(a) Yes. 
                                                           
528 This is in terms of AWARE’s latest health projects, having fulfilled or not fulfilled their objectives. Only those 
project objectives that dealt with beneficiaries’ satisfaction were considered. These objectives were based on what 
was revealed after interviewing AWARE members. 
529 Based on memory recall of beneficiaries and their association with AWARE in other projects.  
iv 
(b) No. 
(c) Don’t know. 
Why? 
5) Did you take any measures to reduce the occurrence of these diseases 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
6) If the answer to previous question is yes, what were the measures taken by you?  
7) How did you become aware of these preventive measures?  
8) Has household hygiene improved? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
9) If yes to previous question, in what ways has household hygiene improved? Why? 
10) If no to question 8, in what ways has there been no improvement? Why?  
11) Are village health clinics and hospitals easily accessible?  




13) If you believe that accessibility has improved now, to what factors do you attribute this 
improvement? 













17) If yes, how did you become conscious of family planning?  








20) If  yes, what are these project/s that you find helpful?  
21) Why do you find them helpful? 
22) Do you believe AWARE can further improve its health programmes?  
(a) Yes  
(b) No. 
23) If yes, then how?  
 
Education 
24) How were you affected by Veterinary training programme, Deemed University, Bliss Foundation 
and other recent programmes? 530 
25) How were you affected by any other education project /s by AWARE – either positively or 
negatively?531 
26) Are you aware of your political rights? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
27) If yes, can you explain these rights and what you ought to do in case of a violation? 
28) Are you aware of your tenancy rights? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
                                                           
530 This is in terms of AWARE’s latest or most recent Education projects, having fulfilled or not fulfilled their 
objectives. Only those objectives of these projects that deal with beneficiaries’ satisfaction were considered. These 
objectives were specified, according to what was revealed after interviewing AWARE members. 
531 Based on memory recall of beneficiaries and their association with AWARE in other projects.  
vi 
29) If yes, can you explain this right and what you ought to do in case of a violation? 
30) Are you aware of your land rights?  
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
31) If yes, can you explain this right and what you ought to do in case of a violation? 
32) How did you become aware of your rights? 
33) What would you do if someone abused you, i.e. sexually harassed you or used violence against you? 
34) What would you do if your employer made you work without proper facilities (food, inadequate 
pay, inhuman working conditions).  
35) Can you read and write?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No.  
36) If literate, to what factor or factors do you owe your being literate?  
37) Do your daughters attend schools?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
38) If yes, to what factor or factors do you attribute your daughters attending schools? 
39) Between sons and daughters who would you rather educate and why?  
40) Are you (i.e. women among beneficiaries) literate too?532  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
41) If yes, to what factor or factors do you attribute your being literate?  
42) Do you consider AWARE’s education programme helpful? 533  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
(c) Do not know. 
Please give reasons for your choice 
 
                                                           
532 This was asked of women beneficiaries only. 
vii 
43) How have you used the education imparted by AWARE to you to your advantage? 534  




(c) Do not know. 
Please give reasons for your choice 
45) Have you ever felt that you were under the influence of bad luck or evil spirits?  
46) What do you do if you think that you are under the influence of bad luck or evil spirits? 
47) Has consumption of liquor fallen over the years among beneficiaries? 
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
Please give reasons for your choice. 
48) What are the other unhealthy and exploitative practices that were or are prevalent among you?  
49) Are these practices still prevalent?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
(c) Do not know. 
Please give reasons for your choice 
50) Are there any specific projects or actions taken by AWARE in the field of education that you 
consider helpful?  
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
51) If yes, what are these projects or project in the field of education that you find helpful?  
52) Why do you find them helpful? 
53) Do you believe that AWARE can further improve its education programmes?  
(a) Yes (if yes then how?) 
(b) No. 
Poverty Eradication 
54) How were you affected by MACS, Chetana Bazaar and other recent projects of AWARE?535 
                                                                                                                                                                        
533 This was asked of all beneficiaries. 
534 This was asked of those who consider AWARE’s education programmes useful.  
viii 
55) How were you affected by any other health project /s by AWARE – either positively or 
negatively?536 
56) Are you employed?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
57) If yes, since when have you been employed?  
58) To what factors do you attribute your having gained employment?  
59) If not employed, to what factors do you attribute your having failed to secure employment?  
60) If employed, how much do you earn from the new employment?  
61) Is it more or less than the previous employment?  
62) Do you own your own land?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
63) If yes, how did you obtain the land?  
64) Do you buy more farming equipment than the period when AWARE was not yet operative in your 
area? 537  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
65) To what factors do you attribute your being able to buy more farming equipment now? 
66) Do you buy more equipment to better facilitate your work than the period when AWARE was not 
yet operative in your area? 538  
67) To what factors do you attribute your being able to buy more equipment now? 
68) What are the things in your home, which you consider as your basic utilities and luxuries? 
69) Do you buy more of these basic utilities than when AWARE was not yet operative in your area? 
                                                                                                                                                                        
535 This was in terms of AWARE’s latest or most recent Poverty Eradication projects, having fulfilled or not 
fulfilled their objectives. Only those objectives of these projects that deal with beneficiaries’ satisfaction shall be 
considered. These objectives were specified, according to what was revealed after interviewing AWARE members. 
536 Based on memory recall of beneficiaries and their association with AWARE in other projects.  
537 This was asked of those beneficiaries who were farmers.  
538 This question was suitably modified according to the particular profession of beneficiaries, i.e. whether the 
equipment is poultry or seeds or a sewing machine or carpentry tools, etc. 
ix 
70) To what factors do you attribute your being able to buy more basic utilities now? 
71) Do you buy more luxuries for the household than when AWARE was not yet operative in your area? 
72) To what factors do you attribute your being able to buy more luxuries now? 
73) How much did you save (per month) when AWARE was not yet operative in your area? 
74) How much do you now save per month? 
75) To what factors do you attribute the increase (if any) in savings? 
76) Do you depend on moneylenders or mortgages to borrow money?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No. 
Please give reasons for your choice.  
77) Have AWARE’s programmes on poverty eradication helped you?  
(a) Yes. 
(b) No.  
(c) Do not know. 
78) What are the specific project or projects on poverty eradication that have helped you? 
79) Why are they helpful? 
80) Do you believe that AWARE can further improve its poverty eradication programmes? 
(a) Yes (if yes then how) 
(b) No  
Women’s Empowerment 
81) How were you affected by the most recent projects of AWARE in this domain? 539 
82) How were you affected by any other health project/s by AWARE, either positively or negatively?540 
83) What are the major decisions taken in your household? 
84) Who takes each of these major decisions? Please explain. 
                                                           
539 This was in terms of AWARE’s latest or most recent Women’s Empowerment projects, having fulfilled or not 
fulfilled their objectives. Only those objectives of these projects that deal with beneficiaries’ satisfaction were 
considered. These objectives were specified, according to what was revealed after interviewing AWARE members. 
540 Based on memory recall of beneficiaries and their association with AWARE in other projects.  
x 
85)  Do men in the household follow your instructions?  
(a) If yes then in what ways and how? 
(b) If not then in what ways and how? 
86) What is your profession? 
87) Have you started your own enterprise?  
88) If yes, then how did you obtain funds and wherewithal to start this enterprise?  
89) If you are employed elsewhere, how did you obtain this employment? 
90) If not employed, who contributes towards family income? 
91) If both the man and the woman of the household contribute to family income then, whose share in 
family income is more and why? 
92) Do you get beaten or abused in any way by your husband and his family?  
If yes, how often? 
93) What actions do you take after being thus abused 








96) Has alcoholism reduced? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
(c) Why? What were the negative fall-outs of alcoholism?  
97) How many and what kind of atrocities have been stopped by women’s associations set up by 
AWARE in villages?  





99) Are there any specific women’s empowerment programmes, which you consider helpful? 
100) If you consider such programmes helpful, why do you find them helpful? 
101) Do you think AWARE can further improve its women’s empowerment projects? 
(a) Yes (if yes then how). 
(b) No. 
For response from AWARE’s members.
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1) What have been AWARE’s projects in this domain from 1970s to 2002, which have impacted a 
large number of beneficiaries on a large-scale and which also faced numerous hurdles in planning 
and execution?  
2) What was the situation, which called for formulating this project? 
3) What were the action plans formed by decision-makers to encounter the situation? 
4) Who all were the individuals that took part in the making of this project? 
(a) AWARE’s founder-leader 
(b) Departmental heads 
(c) Project managers 
(d) Administrative staff 
(e) Beneficiaries 
(f) Delegates from governmental agencies (mention their posts) 
(g) Founders 
(h) Others please specify. 
5) What role did each member play in this project? 
6) Were there periods during the planning of this project, when decision-makers disagreed amongst 




7) What was the issue on which there was disagreement? 
8) How were the differences (if any) resolved? 
9) Were any actions or courses of actions in this project taken due to 
(a) Needs, preferences and interests of founder-leader. If yes, why and how?  
                                                           
541 The same set of questions was asked to the Chairman and each of the other AWARE members. Also, the same 
format was followed for every landmark project in every domain, i.e. health, education, women’s empowerment and 
poverty eradication. 
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(b) Needs, interests and preferences of beneficiaries. If yes, why and how?  
(c) Requirements of certain departments of AWARE and departmental heads. If yes, why and how? 
(d) Needs, interests and preferences of governmental department officials. If yes, why and how? 
(e) Needs, interests and preferences of donors. If yes, why and how?  
(f) Organisational objectives and mission of AWARE. If yes, why and how? 
(g) Improve relations with certain stakeholders. If yes, why and how?  
(h) Increase the number of beneficiaries reached. If yes, why and how? 
(i) Others please specify. 
10) Was the choice to take up this project made for any other reason not mentioned above? Please 
explain. 
11) In taking this course of action, what were the other choices considered, and yet not taken? 
12) Why were these alternatives not viable? 
13) Was the project plan directly implemented in its original form, or were there any changes 
introduced? If so why? 
14) This project is considered since you mentioned that it faced numerous problems in planning and 
implementation. What were these problems? Please explain. 
15) How were they resolved? 
16) What were the objectives of this project or programme? 
17) Did the project achieve its objectives?  
18) How were these objectives achieved, i.e. in what way?  
19) If not achieved, why were they not achieved? 
20) If achieved, why were they achieved? 
21) Did any of the following factor/s affect this project? 
(a) Nature of leadership  
(b) Communication between the organisational members 
(c) Expertise of staff 
(d) AWARE’s financial resources  
(e) Broader objectives or goals of AWARE  
22) How did these factor/s affect the project? 
23) Did any of the following factors affect this project? 
(a) Policies and approach followed by the Andhra Pradesh State government 
(b) Policies and approach of the Central government 
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(c) Policies and approach of AWARE’s donors  
(d) Approach of beneficiaries  
24) How did this factor/s affect the outcome or performance of this project? 
25) Were there any other factor/s (not mentioned above) that affected the outcome this project? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
26) If yes, what were these factors and how did they affect outcome?  
